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The law governing administrative agency policy change and the checking of 
unjustified inconsistency is rooted in a web of intertwined doctrine. The Supreme 
Court’s 2016 opinion in Encino Motorcars modestly recast that doctrine to 
emphasize that the agency pursuing a change cannot leave “unexplained 
inconsistency” or neglect to address past relevant underlying facts, but 
reaffirmed its central stable precepts. Nonetheless, radically different views 
about broad, unaccountable, and agency power to make rapid policy changes 
have been articulated by Justice Neil Gorsuch while on the Tenth Circuit and by 
agencies pursuing deregulatory policy shifts under the leadership of President 
Donald J. Trump. This Article analyzes the mutually reinforcing strands of this 
body of law, shows the fundamental errors underpinning these claims of broad 
agency power to make policy changes, and explains how the “contingencies” 
underlying an initial policy action must always be engaged by a later advocate 
of policy change. Statutory language constrains agency action while usually 
leaving room for change, but facts and past agency reasoning—the heart of 
regulatory “contingencies” focused on in this Article—unavoidably must be 
engaged to surmount the sturdy core requirements of consistency doctrine. 
Recent efforts to overcome or recast consistency doctrine seek greater room for 
politics and presidential influence and downplay agency obligations to provide 
rational explanation and engage with regulatory contingencies. Due to the 
balanced interests protected by consistency doctrine, this Article argues that 
such a doctrinal reworking is unlikely and would be unwise.  
INTRODUCTION 
Indictments of the administrative state vary, but one strain—notably voiced 
by Justice Neil Gorsuch in a Tenth Circuit opinion shortly before he joined the 
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Supreme Court—is that under existing doctrine, agencies can abruptly shift 
policies and even act on a “policy whim.”1 Regulatory reform advocates and 
others troubled by deference to agencies under the influential Chevron case have 
raised similar concerns about agency policy inconsistency.2 But not all analysts 
of agency latitude for change condemn it. New presidential administrations, with 
the overtly deregulatory administration of President Donald J. Trump being a 
particularly salient example, at times embrace this alleged power, claiming 
broad presidential and agency authority to reverse agency policies and even 
direct agency adjudicatory outcomes.3 
This Article unpacks different conceptions and doctrines framing agency 
power to change policy and the role of consistency-linked doctrine.4 Under 
current doctrinal frameworks, these recent claims of agency latitude for abrupt 
and politicized policy change are erroneous. Agencies and presidents remain 
tethered by statutory delegations’ terms, legal doctrine, and past legal actions. 
But such tethering implies restraint and limitations, not frozen regulation. 
Presidents can request agency policy reconsideration and agencies usually retain 
 
1 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016). Justice Gorsuch’s 
views are reviewed later in this Article. See infra Section I.B. 
2 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). A discussion 
of Chevron deference appears later in this Article. See infra Section I.D; infra notes 188-197 
and accompanying text. 
3 The extent of presidential authority over agencies remains the subject of scholarly 
ferment. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 599 (1994) (arguing for expansive presidential control), 
and Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2320 (2001) 
(arguing that presidential regulatory authority should be presumed to be conferred by statute 
unless explicitly stated otherwise), with Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power to 
Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 284 (2006) (arguing courts and presidents 
should respect different congressional choices about delegation to President versus to 
agency), and Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 977-79 
(1997) (distinguishing among modes of political control and conceptions of discretion with 
emphasis on powers delegated to agencies by Congress and Constitution’s specified means of 
presidential control). For an article analyzing this issue historically, through presidential and 
agency interactions and revealed views about such power, see Robert V. Percival, Who’s in 
Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2495-500 (2011). 
4 By “agency policy change,” this Article refers to the setting where statutory language 
remains stable, but an agency changes some regulatory policy previously set forth by the 
agency. A mere change in stringency, for example, is not a policy change. The forms of 
agency policy change can be numerous, but usually involve a change in approach to regulating 
a risk, or a changed claim about the nature of an agency’s power and related change in 
regulatory requirements. Such policy changes can be substantially rooted in statutory 
language, in empirical observations, or a mix of the two. Policy change examples and related 
cases are reviewed in Parts I and II. 
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room to make policy adjustments.5 Nonetheless, hurdles exist and can be 
substantial even though policy changes are not subject to a heightened standard 
of judicial review. Changes cannot be unjustified, purely political, or 
unacknowledged.6 
Claims of broad agency policy change authority tend to exaggerate the 
freedom granted by statutory language and the often-applicable and deferential 
Chevron judicial review framework. The President’s power to precipitate 
change also tends to be exaggerated without adequate attention to how the 
permissible degree of influence depends on the particular setting and regulatory 
posture. Broad claims of policy change power also tend to downplay the 
regulatory centrality of science, data, other empirical observations and 
predictions about the world, and linked agency explanations. Agency policy is 
rarely, if ever, generated due to statutory language alone; later leadership 
similarly cannot just point to language or presidential edict to justify a change.7 
By building off of these intertwined doctrinal strains, this Article shows how 
agencies considering a policy change must engage with the contingencies 
underlying past and proposed new regulatory actions. Under this analytical 
frame, anyone evaluating room for a possible agency policy change needs first 
to assess the legal frameworks and powers they confer and, as is true of all power 
conferrals, the correlative constraints they state or imply.8 Always important are 
the statutory criteria, goals, and procedures that guide the agency’s choices. 
Then, stakeholders must assess what factors outside the law’s text—but made 
 
5 Part IV reviews different policy change settings and the latitude they provide for change, 
especially change driven by political considerations. 
6 See infra Part II (reviewing categories of actions and legal doctrine that frame and 
constrain policy change efforts). 
7 For two earlier articles analyzing the puzzle of agency consistency, but preceding recent 
policy change power claims and case developments, see Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency 
Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1029-30 (2005), which focuses upon procedural modes 
generating old and new policy; and Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative 
Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 115 (2011), which distinguishes between “expository” policy 
declarations rooted in language and “prescriptive” reasoning that is based on policy choices, 
and calls for de novo review of expository-based changes. 
8 For a modern case that both articulates the centrality of statutory criteria as a constraint 
and also emphasizes the agency’s obligation to engage with underlying facts and science 
relevant to its task, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See also Air All. Hous. 
v. EPA, No. 17-1155, slip op. at 19 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 2018) (stating that it “is axiomatic 
that administrative agencies may act only pursuant to authority delegated to them by 
Congress” and rejecting policy change for several statutory violations, inadequate 
explanations, and failures to address earlier factual findings (quotations and internal citations 
omitted)). For two cogent critiques of Massachusetts v. EPA, its “expertise-forcing” 
underpinnings, and its place in the prevalent ongoing tension between the roles of politics and 
expertise as sources of accountability and legitimacy in regulation, see David J. Barron, From 
Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095 (2008); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: 
From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51. 
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legally relevant due to that text—shaped and explained the earlier agency action 
and policy that is now proposed for change.9 The change advocate must then 
compare the old and new policy and justify the change through legally required 
procedures and public vetting, engaging with the old grounds and contingencies 
and any new variables. 
As a shorthand, this Article refers to such non-statutory text variables as 
contingencies. Their legal significance is determined by each statute’s 
procedural and substantive choices, but most statutes are drafted to leave room 
for agency policy change due to changed empirical assessments or policy 
rationales. The contingencies will themselves be external to the statutes and be 
observable. These are reality-based factors—including past legal 
documentation, history, regulatory experience, health impacts, science, data, 
models and predictions, past agency studies, and published explanations of the 
previous regulatory choice, to name a few such contingencies—that underpin 
any agency action. As explained below, as a matter of logic and under current 
doctrine, such contingencies unavoidably must remain part of the analysis and 
justification for future policy shifts. 
Contingencies typically will be the social or physical manifestation of 
particular decisional criteria explicitly stated in legislation, but not always. 
Contingencies motivating acceptable agency policy change can, if statutory 
language leaves such room, involve some mix of trying better means to achieve 
constant ends, making policy adjustments in light of changing underlying 
scientific or social phenomena, or expert agency reassessment of the workability 
or fairness of past approaches.10 Although broad delegations to New Deal 
agencies offer little binding linguistic specificity, even those broadly 
empowered agencies will, through adjudications and other policymaking modes, 
identify social problems and devise remedial strategies that adjust and are 
 
9 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 575-
89 (1985) (analyzing how Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of United 
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. insisted on agency engagement with 
statutory criteria and rejected “interest representation” frame or model that would have 
allowed politics larger role in shaping agency actions). Judge Garland labeled the Court’s 
approach as focused on agency “fidelity to th[e] delegation.” Id. at 589. 
10 Chevron itself involved such a setting. See infra Section II.B (discussing Chevron). 
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refined over time.11 Such sequential development of policy will similarly 
identify and link to specified contingencies.12 
Attention to such contingencies, since they involve far more than just word 
games, also serves to constrain arbitrary agency change and dampen the 
frequency and magnitude of policy shifts. Sometimes a policy shift will be 
rooted mainly in mere linguistic analysis, but that rarely happens.13 And close 
parsing of legislation to assess if Congress anticipated agency policy 
adjustments will necessarily influence the legality of an agency policy shift. 
Importantly, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA14 rejected an agency 
policy change and declination to act that neglected statutory criteria and also 
avoided examination of relevant science.15 Some agency actions will be driven 
mostly by language, while others will be driven more by science or observations 
made salient by statutory language.16 Politics can, and indeed does, play a role, 
but not to the exclusion of other contingency variables and always subject to the 
need for conformity with statutory requirements.17 Administrative law doctrine 
 
11 See, e.g., POM Wonderful v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding FTC 
claims of false representations, reviewing genesis of statutory and evolution of agency policy, 
and also rejecting one remedial claim as beyond agency power in light of facts, constitutional 
concerns, and past agency precedents); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and 
the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586, 589, 648-66 (2014) 
(discussing development of FTC’s power and jurisprudence); see also infra Section IV.C 
(discussing permissible bounds of politics and deliberative integrity when agencies with broad 
delegations adjust policy). 
12 For discussion of how the FTC’s privacy law has evolved in a common law-like way, 
with increasingly specific criteria, see Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11. 
13 Professors Kozel and Pojanowski call such language-based policy derivation 
“expository.” Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 112. Statutory abnegation claims made 
by agencies under the Trump Administration—a new claim of no statutory power—has been 
a prevalent part of this Administration’s many deregulatory policy shifts. See infra Sections 
I.A, III.B, IV.F (discussing policy shifts initiated by federal agencies under Trump 
Administration). 
14 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
15 Id. at 534-35 (holding agency action was arbitrary and capricious as agency gave “no 
reasoned explanation” for its refusal to act). For further discussion of the ways that statutory 
language shapes the permissible bounds and deliberative integrity of policy change, see infra 
Part IV. 
16 As developed further below, see infra Part IV, the judicial role when reviewing a policy 
change will differ if language is broad or a statute requires an assessment of science, data, or 
(as commonly required) what is “best” among some category of risk creators. See Ronald M. 
Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 
565-66 (2011) (distinguishing judicial review task when statute requires agency to provide 
“factually grounded explanation” as opposed to one grounded in “value judgment[s]”). 
17 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6-8 (2009) (arguing there is “proper, even if limited, place for 
politics” in shaping policy choices beyond just “technocratic” approaches to policymaking, 
but also arguing that evidence and statutory criteria will limit room for presidential influence). 
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also creates some trans-agency and trans-law space for agency policy 
experimentation, but all policy changes are nonetheless cabined or shaped by 
what relevant statutory language dictates, as well as past regulatory choices and 
explanations.18 
The crucial point about consistency doctrine and agency policy change power 
is that, as a matter of logic and doctrine, deviations from a past policy choice or 
approach—whether to deregulate, adjust strategies, or increase regulatory 
stringency—will rarely, if ever, involve just a language game.19 If language 
requires one particular policy action, then change cannot be made. But that is 
exceedingly rare. Policy change is pursued where language leaves room for 
adjustment and something about the world is viewed as justifying the change. 
Scholars and judges debate the degree to which politics can influence agency 
regulation.20 Room for politics and the degree of judicial oversight will hinge on 
relevant law and the action at issue.21 But key governing precedents, whether 
new or old, always call for some variant of agency engagement with the past 
action, underlying facts, and earlier rationales or reason-giving explanations. 
Because facts and experience are a sticky reality that an agency virtually 
always documents in justifications for past actions, policy shifts cannot be 
carried out by executive fiat.22 As stated in key consistency precedents, 
 
Some have argued in favor of a more limited place for politics. See Mark Seidenfeld, The 
Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 144 
(2012) (distinguishing between political motivations and judgments, and agency justification 
under hard look review); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: 
Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1849-50 (2012) (arguing against Watts 
and favoring limited room for politicized influence on agencies, even if disclosed). 
18 For example, a new general interpretive presumption is that agencies should consider 
both regulatory benefits and costs. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705, 2715 (2015) 
(embracing in majority and dissenting opinions general requirement that agencies assess costs 
and benefits unless statute clearly indicates otherwise). The Court has also indicated that 
agency actions that harness the benefits of market-based regulatory tools and confer 
regulatory flexibility on states receive what appears akin to a reviewing court “bonus.” See 
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1601, 1605-07 (2014) (affirming 
legality of agency program that provides states with implementation flexibility and harnesses 
market incentives, and speaking favorably of such designs); William W. Buzbee, Federalism-
Facilitated Regulatory Innovation and Regression in a Time of Environmental Legislative 
Gridlock, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 474-75 (2016) (discussing these cases). 
19 As discussed below, the deregulatory strategy of agency disavowal of power previously 
claimed, which this Article calls “statutory abnegation,” can involve a claim that language 
alone justifies a new claim of no power. It can also involve a few variants of rejection of 
earlier power claims. See infra Sections I.E, IV.F. 
20 See sources cited supra notes 3, 8-9; infra Part IV (describing this debate). 
21 See infra Part IV (describing constraints on agency’s ability to change policy). 
22 Kozel and Pojanowski describe agency attempts to establish stable policy as “gam[ing] 
the system” or “administrative machinations.” Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 165-66. 
As explored below, this Article suggests that agency grounding of policy in strong evidence 
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including the recent decision, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,23 an agency 
must always supply a “good reason” for a policy revision, cannot leave 
“unexplained inconsistency,” and must address underlying “facts and 
circumstances” relevant to the earlier and new action.24 
The Supreme Court in Chevron did allow the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) to redefine a term and even embraced agency reconsideration 
of policies, stating that agencies “must” do so to engage in “informed 
rulemaking.”25 But room for change is separate from satisfying the conditions 
necessary to achieve it. Neither that case nor any other embraces untethered, 
erratic, or unjustified reversals or abandonment of statutory missions.26 
This theoretical frame’s deep doctrinal foundations have implications for 
strategies to reduce risks of erratic policy shifts and regulatory reversals. 
Agencies and others worried about subsequent regulatory backpedaling, ill-
considered policy shifts, or just plain old judicial reversal can—through diligent 
engagement with underlying science, data, and rationales for a chosen regulatory 
course—raise hurdles that subsequent agencies, presidents, and even reviewing 
courts must overcome.27 A lightly justified initial action, in contrast, will ease 
the path for a later policy shift. To succeed in making a policy change, agencies 
will always need to engage with, and with new persuasive reasoning explain, or 
perhaps explain away, the contingencies that underlay the past agency action. 
For a President like Donald J. Trump, who after his 2017 inauguration quickly 
and aggressively asserted directive power to mandate deregulatory lookback 
analysis and ordered agencies to revisit specified actions,28 the constraints of 
 
and reasoning will create resistance against change, but does not view this practice as 
illegitimate or problematic. 
23 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016). 
24 Id. at 2126; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) 
(“An agency may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that 
are still on the books.”). 
25 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-66 (1984). 
26 See id. at 853-66 (discussing impacts of old and new approaches, economics scholarship, 
and efforts to allow cost-effective regulation to achieve clean air as rational and consistent 
with statute in upholding EPA’s new “bubble” approach); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of 
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1268-69 (1997) (noting that 
although Chevron’s influential opinion alludes to task of “interpretation,” actual opinion 
involved assessment of how record supported agency’s reasoning). 
27 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505-07 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (reversing and remanding agency decision to carry out last-minute directive by 
White House Office of Management and Budget without any apparent justification in 
administrative record and requiring agency to utilize its expertise). 
28 See infra notes 88-157 and accompanying text (reviewing presidential orders and 
memoranda directing agencies to revisit and sometimes rescind or reverse past actions and 
agency policy changes and deregulatory actions that followed). For discussions of President 
Trump’s deregulatory attitude and initiatives, see Danielle Ivory & Robert Faturechi, The 
Deep Industry Ties of Trump’s Deregulation Teams, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2017, at A1 
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consistency doctrines and regulatory contingency analysis are of critical 
importance. If legal norms hold, these presidential requests should lead to far 
less radical agency actions than sought due to the constraints of statutory 
language and contingencies that must be engaged. Or, if agencies just acquiesce 
or follow presidential directions, such agency actions should provoke skeptical 
judicial review, as has been apparent in initial judicial opinions addressing 
deregulatory policy shifts.29 Due to the uniformity of recent policy change power 
claims and strategies by President Trump and agencies under his leadership, they 
likely reveal an intentional effort to recast this body of doctrine to increase room 
for politicized efforts to revise policy. Or they might reflect a political strategy 
to push for deregulation that is justified by political gains even if ultimately 
destined for legal rejection. 
Part I introduces standard views about agency policy change authority, 
reviews recent strong claims about such power made by Justice Gorsuch when 
he was a circuit court judge, and presents prevalent contrary observations about 
agency tendencies and expectations of the administrative state. Part I also 
introduces a substantial sampling of deregulatory actions taken by President 
Trump and agencies under his supervision, and the claims regarding the policy 
change authority they reveal. Part II then turns to the web of law governing how 
and when presidents and agencies can seek policy change. Part III assesses the 
legality of recent major policy shift proposals and actions, distills through a 
simplified schematic what agencies seeking to change policy must do, and offers 
a normative assessment of consistency doctrine. Part IV then reviews categories 
of agency actions, how consistency doctrine’s constraints apply, and why 
apparent efforts to change this body of doctrine should be met with opposition 
from both those generally concerned with agency overreach and those worried 
about imprudent deregulation. 
I. THE REGULATORY WHIM AND POLICY CHANGE POWER CLAIMS 
Claims of agency power to change policy range from matter-of-fact 
descriptions of agency policy flexibility and responsiveness as the norm, to 
condemnations of such change as evidence of agency arbitrariness and excessive 
and unaccountable agency authority. Proposals and orders for agencies to make 
policy changes also reveal change proponents’ claims about such power. This 
Part introduces such normative and manifested claims about room for agency 
 
(discussing industry ties of teams making deregulatory proposals and potential for conflicts 
of interest); Eric Lipton & Danielle Ivory, Trump Says His Regulatory Rollback Already Is 
the ‘Most Far Reaching,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2017, at A16 (summarizing President Trump’s 
goals and deregulatory statements and agencies’ many deregulatory actions).  
29 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 3, at 2534-35 (discussing New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 
1147, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and underlying regulatory history where political pressure for 
deregulation likely contributed to insufficiently justified regulatory action); see also infra 
Section II.H (discussing judicial responses to, and frequent rejection of, Trump 
Administration agency deregulatory policy shifts). 
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policy change, with special emphasis on broad recent claims. The Parts that 
follow question the accuracy of these broad claims of agency power to change 
policy, explaining how a focus on the contingencies underpinning agency 
actions melds the cross-cutting requirements and interests held in equipoise by 
consistency doctrine. 
A. The Congressional Expectation of Agency Policy Adjustment 
In most writing about rationales for the modern administrative state, room for 
policy change and reliance on agencies go hand in hand. Policy change is 
expected.30 Reliance on agencies rather than legislatures or courts to flesh out a 
body of law is linked to agency expertise and the related need for regulatory 
learning and adjustment in the development of sound policy.31 
Legislatures, in contrast, generally lack particular subject matter expertise and 
cannot enact laws with details sufficient to anticipate complexities and changing 
circumstances.32 Courts are even more generalist in focus and poorly suited to 
develop policy due to lack of knowledge of broader legal and societal context.33 
Courts are also often unfamiliar with affected constituencies’ practices and 
concerns, and lack institutional means to gather and assess data and science 
relevant to a regulatory goal.34 In addition, the ways in which webs of law and 
regulation work together will be known to agencies but seldom understood by 
legislators or judges.35 
Agencies are not directly subject to electoral accountability, but they answer 
to the President and are often held to account by congressional committees. 
Agencies are also subject to participatory and reason-giving modes of 
 
30 See Dotan, supra note 7, at 1031-32 (discussing this expectation). 
31 See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES & 
COMMENTS 1-50 (9th ed. 2011) (presenting rationales for reliance on agencies). 
32 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals explored agency power in the context of an agency 
adjusting its policies. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243-44, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (upholding most of FTC’s action alleging unfair and deceptive trade practice in 
setting of lax cybersecurity and discussing agency’s subject expertise and policy evolution). 
33 See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293, 1359-70 (2012) (discussing agencies’ expertise and institutional competence in 
comparison to courts in discussing administrative law’s development in common law-like 
manner). 
34 For a discussion of the relative roles of presidents and agencies in developing policy, 
but emphasizing congressional delegations to particular agency actors and the expertise-based 
underpinning of such delegations, see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 750-53 (2007). 
35 Id. at 750-52; see also Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in 
Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 
1099 (2015) (exploring nature of expertise and its underpinning of deference rationales, 
especially due to pragmatically developed “craft” expertise). 
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democratic accountability.36 Furthermore, neither courts nor legislatures are 
institutionally capable of implementing and enforcing laws; these two agency 
tasks result in at least tacit development and revelation of policy.37 
As a result, agencies will become experts in a delegated field.38 They will 
come to know deeply the web of laws that they are delegated to administer or 
those that intersect with their turf, plus subsequent implementing regulations, 
guidance documents, and court decisions.39 As repeat players in frequent 
political contact with congressional committees, the public, and more directly 
implicated stakeholders, agencies will come to know how various regulatory 
choices work or could be improved.40 In this polycentric and dynamic setting, 
they will develop a sensitivity to practical complexities and tradeoffs, the 
interacting players, and regulatory dynamics.41 Agencies over time will see how 
policy choices ripple through the law, linked markets, and underlying protected 
amenities, such as workplaces, markets, the environment, or educational 
institutions.42 
Due to this experience and these interactions, agencies will regularly adjust 
policy choices based on gained experience or new science or data, even though 
underlying statutes often remain unchanged. Regulating, under these views, 
should and ordinarily does involve sequential policy adjustments in light of 
 
36 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 96-99 (1985) (identifying ways agencies are more 
“responsive” and subject to more accountability and obligations to provide reasons than are 
legislatures). 
37 Here, the reference to “enforcing” is referring to monitoring and policing compliance 
with the law, not judicial enforcement of the law through a court decision. 
38 See generally Shapiro, supra note 35 (discussing functioning and creation of agency 
expertise). 
39 Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1843 
(2015) (analyzing constitutional duty to supervise and discussing courts’ lack of 
accountability and expertise compared to agencies). 
40 See Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise 
with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2026-27 (2015) (observing that 
“multiple, overlapping public and scientific processes constrain the agencies’ discretion and 
improve the rigor and transparency of their decisions” and seeing benefits in this “ deliberative 
approach” and how it subjects regulatory science claims to “rigorous questioning and 
constant, skeptical double-checking”). 
41 Jeffery A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 799, 849 (2010) (discussing polycentric policymaking and link to deference 
regimes). 
42 See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 1140 (stating that due to “cacophony of inputs,” 
“regulatory governance” by agencies requires them to “rely on craft expertise to arrive at 
satisfactory solutions to the regulatory problems that [they are] addressing”). 
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pragmatic learning and efforts to better achieve statutory goals.43 Political 
leanings and changing attitudes about regulations, often due to changes in 
presidential administrations, will further influence what political appointees 
heading agencies view as “better” or in need of change.44 What must accompany 
such attempted changes, however, is a separate issue discussed below. 
Analysts of the modern administrative state often divide into two opposed 
camps that clash in their sentiments about agency policy change authority. 
Regulatory skeptics often characterize agencies as tending to engage in 
overreach and excess in the form of expansive claims of power or too-frequent 
policy shifts.45 At the other end of the spectrum, many students of regulation 
highlight a near opposite set of problems, instead seeing agencies as tending 
more to inertia, neglect of newly emergent risks and areas of shared or uncertain 
regulatory turf, inaction in assessing the efficacy of old regulations, or craven 
deregulation due to capture or political pressure.46 These fundamental 
disagreements about regulatory proclivities lead to clashing policy prescriptions 
about the need to chill or encourage agency activity. 
Thus, despite disagreements about the value of regulation and the 
administrative state, the reality of at least some agency power to make policy 
changes should be a source of little consternation. Recent claims and actions, 
however, reveal dramatically different and changing views about agency power 
to change policy. 
B. The Justice Neil Gorsuch Regulatory “Whim” Theory 
Justice Neil Gorsuch, while on the Tenth Circuit, was far from sanguine about 
agency power to change policy. As a circuit court judge, he wrote several 
opinions that, in no uncertain terms, saw agency policy change as an extreme 
and constitutionally problematic power, especially if that agency shift followed 
some earlier judicial policy exegesis.47 And, in his rhetoric, his condemnation of 
agency power to change policies closely echoed broader condemnations of the 
 
43 See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 14-30 (2003) (exploring prevalence and benefits of 
pragmatic learning in regulation). 
44 The persistent question of limitations or constraints on such politicized oversight and 
control is a strain analyzed throughout this Article. See infra Section II.C, Part IV (describing 
such constraints). 
45 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 915, 923-37 (2005) (questioning agencies’ desire and ability to engage in overreach). 
46 See infra Section I.C (discussing problem of regulatory “inertia”). 
47 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149-58 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting retroactive application of agency interpretation because it represented executive 
attempt to wield legislative power without traditional limitations on scope of legislative 
action); United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 667-77 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing for reinvigoration of nondelegation 
doctrine). 
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administrative state and regulation heard from anti-regulatory think-tanks and 
others calling for reform of the world of regulation.48 
Then-Court of Appeals Judge Gorsuch condemned an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and the underlying policy shift regarding the immigrant 
status it reflected.49 But he also used the case as a vehicle to condemn more 
broadly agency policy inconsistency. In his majority opinion, he wrote that an 
agency can “exploit a gap in the statute to implement its own (continuously 
revisable) policy-influenced vision of what the law should be.”50 He alludes to 
the risk that an agency will retroactively shift policy based on “shifting political 
winds.”51 Further, he sees a broad risk that agency latitude to shift policies, even 
when earlier court precedents exist, means that agencies can 
“impos[e] . . . uncertainty on an entire class of persons with significant interests 
at stake.”52 
In an unusual concurrence to his own majority opinion, now-Justice Gorsuch 
writes in even broader strokes, characterizing the leading deference and 
consistency cases as permitting agencies to “swallow huge amounts of core 
judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems 
[hard] to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”53 He suggests it 
may be time to “face the behemoth.”54 
 
48 See, e.g., Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After 
(Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 323-24 (2017) (reviewing 
reasons why the federal judge-author finds Chevron deference problematic, especially 
ambiguity claims by agencies to “support the policy result that the agency wants to reach” 
that are akin to “judicial activism” and “arrogation” of power by agencies and agencies’ 
“palpable sense of entitlement” due to deferential review); Christopher J. Walker, Attacking 
Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 104 
(2018) (reviewing jurisprudence and scholarship criticizing deference regimes). Some offer a 
more journalistic and overtly anti-regulatory critique. See, e.g., Iain Murray, Stopping the 
Bureaucrats Requires an End to Chevron Deference, NAT’L REV. (May 11, 2016, 6:53 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/stop-bureaucrats-ending-chevron-deference-
through-sopra/ [https://perma.cc/FH6V-4X6Y]; see also infra Section I.C (further citing and 
discussing such concerns). For a critique focused on the applied indeterminacy and 
manipulability of Chevron deference, and suggesting a return to pre-Chevron deference 
regimes, see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why it Can and Should be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010). 
49 Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1150 (“If [the order] doesn’t qualify as an 
unconstitutional revision of a judicial declaration of the law by a political branch, I confess I 
begin to wonder whether we’ve forgotten what might.”). 
50 Id. at 1146 n.1 (majority opinion). 
51 Id. at 1146. 
52 Id. at 1147. The Tenth Circuit here is parsing the logic and consequences of the 
intersection of several major cases that together generally give agencies room to choose 
procedural modes and adjust policy. See id. Those cases are introduced and analyzed later is 
this Article. See infra Section II.B. 
53 Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
54 Id. 
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After parsing deference doctrine, he makes his strongest assertions about 
agency power to vacillate, linking policy change power to the risk of agencies 
“exploit[ing] ambiguous laws . . . for their own prerogative.”55 He says 
regulatory stakeholders “must always remain alert to the possibility that the 
agency will reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime based merely on the 
shift of political winds and still prevail.”56 He says that agencies may do so based 
on “their own preferences about optimal public policy when a statute is 
ambiguous.”57 Or, even more strongly, he says an agency can seek “to pursue 
whatever policy whim may rule the day.”58 
The claimed risk of day-to-day vacillation is a repeated theme, with Justice 
Gorsuch stating that “an agency can enact a new rule of general applicability 
affecting huge swaths of the national economy one day and reverse itself the 
next” and a few lines later repeats the “reverse itself the next day” claim.59 Later, 
he returns to the “whim” theme, reading the Chevron case as permitting 
“agencies to upset the settled expectation of the people by changing policy 
direction depending on the agency’s mood at the moment.”60 He suggests de 
novo judicial review of a law’s meaning as a way to provide assurance to the 
public or those regulated that “the rug will not be pulled from under them 
tomorrow, the next day, or after the next election.”61 
In this discussion, Justice Gorsuch relies on cases and case language with little 
attention to the underlying agency procedural mode or which framework and 
presumptions apply in which settings.62 Most of his cases and framework 
discussion err if they reflect an assumption that an agency policy generated via 
informal adjudication is governed by Chevron. This isn’t impossible, but after 
United States v. Mead Corp.,63 quasi-democratic participatory methods are 
 
55 Id. at 1152. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1153. Four Supreme Court dissenters articulated a somewhat similar concern with 
policy change based on “regulatory whim,” but argued that it is not permissible and advocated 
for a narrow reading of new Court language about such power. See FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 552 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where does, and why would, 
the APA grant agencies the freedom to change major policies on the basis of nothing more 
than political considerations or even personal whim?”). 
59 Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1154. 
60 Id. at 1158. 
61 Id. 
62 Professor Dotan correctly suggests that procedural modes do and must shape judicial 
review of agency policy changes. See Dotan, supra note 7, at 1062 (“The procedural approach 
acknowledges the relative advantage that agencies have over courts in terms of 
professionalism and democratic accountability.”). 
63 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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generally the antecedent to agency ability to rely on the Chevron deference 
framework.64 
Still, now-Justice Gorsuch seems to read doctrine to at least tempt agencies 
to make abrupt, whim-based policy changes and sees agencies as likely to abuse 
such power. He makes virtually no mention of how statutory choices, facts, 
agency reasoning, or current doctrine might already check such claimed agency 
power.65 As explained below, this is a major omission that perhaps explains 
these overly broad claims.66 
C. The Ossification and Agency Inertia Theories 
It is hard to reconcile these views about agency power, especially their alleged 
tendency to act on a “whim” and create uncertainty by changing policy day-to-
day, with the realities of onerous modern notice-and-comment rulemaking. They 
also run counter to most studies of actual agency behavior and agency 
proclivities. A prominent opposing normative and empirical claim is that 
agencies change policy too infrequently. Federal Register notices, especially 
final rules, are often lengthy and engage with massive rulemaking records. 
Major regulations typically follow years of work and include dozens or hundreds 
of pages of “preamble” explanation plus often additional referenced analysis and 
comment responses.67 And because promulgated regulations announcing a 
policy shift require notice, receive a wave of comments, and end with lengthy 
 
64 Mead itself calls for courts to analyze if Congress has given the agency power to act 
with the “force of law” and identifies legislative requirements of procedural formality and use 
of procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal agency adjudication as 
ordinarily a prerequisite for Chevron deference. Id. at 229-31; see also Daniel A. Farber & 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1171-
72 (2014) (discussing usual procedural prerequisites for agency claims of deference after 
Mead). 
65 Some of then-Judge Gorsuch’s rhetoric seems focused upon National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), and how 
it allows an agency to interpret a statute differently than an earlier judicial construction. That 
case, however, is more about the contours and logic of Chevron deference following an earlier 
judicial interpretation of a statutory provision than an important precedent about conditions 
shaping and constraining an agency’s ability to make a shift in its own policies. 
66 Then-Judge Gorsuch’s powerful anti-regulatory and anti-Chevron deference language 
did garner notice and support among anti-regulatory scholars. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Gorsuch 
Is Right About Chevron Deference, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/25/gorsuch-is-right-about-chevron-
deference/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.12429b0ec632 (noting Justice Gorsuch’s opinion and 
agreeing with its anti-regulatory underpinnings). 
67 For example, the EPA’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) rule was issued with a Federal 
Register preamble of 459 pages, plus accompanying memoranda on legal issues, empirical 
studies, and responses to particular comments. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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agency responses and explanations for their choices, regulations (whether new 
or policy shifts) neither come as surprise to anyone, nor emerge in anything 
remotely resembling a “day” or as a result of “whim.”68 As noted in recent 
scholarship, when agencies have failed to utilize participatory deliberative 
procedures, they have triggered significant Supreme Court rejections even when 
the actions were linked to presidents’ preferences.69 
Relatedly, the literature on the nature and roots of regulatory “ossification” 
clashes with Justice Gorsuch’s claims.70 Due to rigorous procedural and 
explanation requirements imposed by courts, presidents, and Congress, 
especially under modern “hard look review,” rulemaking tends to be a slow 
process involving massive documentation and written justification.71 
And if one digs deeper, especially into “new governance” and democratic 
experimentalism literature, but also into literature on regulatory slippage, the 
regulatory commons, and rulemaking “ruts,” one finds yet more contradiction 
of the abrupt whim-based change claim.72 Likewise, calls for agencies to 
 
68 For Justice Gorsuch’s “whim” and day-to-day change claims, see supra Part I.B. 
69 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 789-
90 (2007) (arguing that despite Chevron’s discussion linking deference to agency political 
accountability through Presidents’ electoral accountability, more recent cases reject actions 
where agencies “acted undemocratically” without opportunities for public input and where 
statutory cues raised authority questions). 
70 Ossification theory posits that demanding judicial review of agency action and other 
analytical hurdles imposed by statutes and executive orders lead agencies to engage in slow 
work, produce massive, detailed explanations, and even dissuades agencies from beginning 
rulemakings. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1462 (1992) (blaming judicial and political reversals for 
ossification); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity 
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 300, 300-02 (explaining causes and effects of agency ossification). Compare Jacob 
Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1357-59, 1369 
(2016) (questioning ossification thesis and arguing for less rigorous judicial review of agency 
reasoning), and Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: 
An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1481-82 (2012) (questioning ossification thesis), with Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1503 (2012) (arguing despite Professors Yackees’ research that 
ossification remains pervasive phenomenon), and Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the 
Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2420-21 (2018) (reading recent Supreme 
Court cases as invigorating judicial scrutiny and questioning claims of Gersen and Vermeule). 
71 See McGarity, supra note 70, at 1419-20 (stating that because “reviewing courts are 
inconsistent in the degree to which they are deferential, [agencies] are constrained to prepare 
for the worst-case scenario on judicial review,” leading to “resource-intensive and time-
consuming” work). 
72 See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, 
and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1711-15 (2008) (discussing 
problem of long-unamended regulations); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory 
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undertake “regulatory lookback” are rooted in concerns, often by anti-regulatory 
advocates, that old policies live on and on, causing confusion and hindering 
beneficial societal or market change.73 
These somewhat overlapping bodies of scholarship document problems of 
agency inaction, failure to update and improve policy, and agency reluctance to 
act. Instead of “empire” building, turf expansion, or overly frequent policy 
shifts, these empirical, historical, and sometimes theoretical explorations end up 
identifying the opposite problem.74 They identify such problems, then suggest 
means to overcome pervasive problems of agency inertia, inaction, and frozen 
law.75 
D. Agency Overreach Concerns and the “Major Questions” Canon 
Nonetheless, in calls for regulatory reform, critics of the administrative state 
often assert a similar mixed claim of agency overreach, concern with agency 
actions based on whim or mere political preferences, and regret that deregulatory 
policy change is not easier.76 Senator Orrin Hatch, for example, supported a 
regulatory reform bill with claims of regulatory excess and by characterizing 
 
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003) (identifying as 
“regulatory commons” challenges settings where multiple jurisdictions or entities have 
potential regulation over one issue, identifying areas of missing regulation, and analyzing 
incentives for potential regulators to leave social ills unaddressed); Michael C. Dorf & Charles 
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 297–98 
(1998) (identifying problems of rigidified law and regulation, and arguing for benefits of 
continuous generation of new information and adjustment and improvement in array of legal 
areas); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 304 (1999) (discussing 
delay among other forms of agency “slippage”); Levinson, supra note 45, at 956-57 
(challenging theory anticipating agency empire building and explaining why contrary 
proclivities are more likely). 
73 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579, 588-96 (2014) 
(describing arguments for regulatory lookback and extent to which it already occurs). 
74 See Levinson, supra note 45 (discussing and criticizing “empire building” thesis); see 
also MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 151-72 (2000) (questioning “rational actor” 
theory expectations of self-interested agency official behavior resulting in shirking and budget 
maximization, and observing “hunkering down,” “compliant,” and “cooperative” interactions 
between anti-regulatory political appointees and agencies’ top career officials). 
75 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and 
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1337 (2013) (identifying agency inaction as 
consequence of capture and suggesting solutions for limiting instances of such inaction). 
76 Some scholars suggest that greater presidential and political involvement could rectify 
several of these problems. See Levin, supra note 16, at 555 (reading FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. as allowing for greater agency policy latitude after elections and calling this 
“salutary” development); Watts, supra note 17, at 7-9 (supporting greater acceptance of 
politics’ place in regulatory decisionmaking, subject to respect for statutory constraints and 
facts). 
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Chevron deference as a disappointingly failed strategy to shield deregulatory 
efforts from judicial rejection.77 He stated that “experience has . . . seriously 
undermined the conservative case for Chevron deference,” especially past hopes 
that through Chevron, a “conservative administration would be able to 
administratively roll back the federal regulatory burden.”78 
Similarly, defenders of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”), which supervises regulatory cost-benefit analyses pursuant to 
executive orders, see OIRA and such analyses as a valuable check on regulatory 
excess.79 But regulatory power, rationality, stringency, and policy shifts or 
vacillations are distinct phenomena. They raise different concerns and are 
subject to somewhat different doctrinal and political constraints. 
Still, one doctrinal strain regarding agency change includes rhetoric and 
underlying concerns that, in their normative leaning, are fairly consistent with 
Justice Gorsuch’s indictment of agencies and regulation. This discussion is in 
the line of Supreme Court cases setting forth the “major question” and “power” 
canons.80 These deference-neutralizing canons of interpretation so far have been 
triggered by agency actions involving the confluence of a changed or new 
assertion of regulatory power, major economic impacts, and other statutory 
signals casting doubt on the logic and legality of a power claim which is usually 
also a policy shift.81 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Utility Air Regulatory 
 
77 The Second Hoover Commission’s 60th Anniversary, HOOVER INST. (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www.hoover.org/events/second-hoover-commissions-60th-anniversary 
[https://perma.cc/6TNM-V3SS] (containing comments of Sen. Orin Hatch at around 3:40:30). 
78 Id.  
79 The literature on OIRA and cost-benefit analyses is now massive. For two recent 
countervailing perspectives, compare Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840-41 (2013), in which 
a former head of OIRA explains and defends OIRA’s role and importance of cost-benefit 
analysis, with FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 91-122 (2004), which highlights the 
manipulability of cost-benefit analysis and questions its legality and morality. 
80 See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1933 (2017) 
(arguing that Supreme Court’s decisions in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, King v. 
Burwell, and Michigan v. EPA created new trio of canons of statutory interpretation which 
together “not only rearrange the Chevron-dominated relationship between the courts and 
administrative agencies; [but they] also realign the relationship between the courts and 
Congress”). 
81 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 543-46 (2012) (declining 
to defer to Internal Revenue Service regulation and judicially resolving question of statutory 
power due to contextual indications that there was no intent to grant such extensive power to 
agency); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (declining 
to afford usual Chevron deference to FDA regulation categorizing tobacco as drug due to 
conclusion that “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic 
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion”); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. 
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (discussing Chevron and finding it “highly 
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Group v. EPA82 (“UARG”) reads most like Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, 
especially in its blistering language criticizing the EPA as unlawfully “seizing 
expansive power” by claiming new authority to regulate thousands of air 
pollution sources.83 And UARG was itself substantially based on language in 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,84 which rejected the FDA’s new 
foray into regulation of tobacco products.85 
However, while these cases often condemn particular agency claims of power 
to change policy or reach new targets of regulation, these Supreme Court 
opinions do so en route to rejecting the agency power claims.86 Thus, while 
Justice Gorsuch as a judge assumed agencies under existing doctrine could get 
away with major self-serving policy shifts or actions based on a “whim,” the 
Supreme Court in the “major questions” cases has rejected such shifting agency 
claims of power and also reduced or eliminated deferential reviewing frames in 
such settings. Litigants opposed to regulation rely heavily on this line of cases.87 
 
unlikely” that Congress would entrust “essential characteristic” of statutory scheme to agency 
discretion). 
82 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
83 Id. at 2444. 
84 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
85 Id. at 160-61; see Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (quoting Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159). Professor Sharkey reads these cases, as well as Michigan v. 
EPA and Encino Motorcars, as revealing an appropriate Supreme Court move towards a form 
of Chevron Step Two review that incorporates the rigorous factual, responsiveness, and 
reasoning scrutiny required by State Farm and other cases articulating the requirements of 
“hard look review” and “reasoned decisionmaking.” Sharkey, supra note 70, passim; see also 
William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest 
for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1547-80 (2009) 
(finding Supreme Court review of agency claims of preemptive impact to resemble closely 
hard look review, especially in seeking agency engagement with and justification grounded 
in facts); infra Sections II.B, II.C, II.E (discussing these cases, their doctrinal overlap, and 
rigorous engagement they require of agencies making policy change). 
86 The Court in UARG stated that the “EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because 
it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority 
without clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant 
statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American 
economy,’ . . . we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.” Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159). 
87 For example, in litigation opposing Obama Administration regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, challengers relied heavily on this same blend of the “major questions” canon, 
claims of abrupt agency changes in statutory interpretation that also resulted in expanded 
agency power, and claims of massive economic impacts. See generally LINDA TSANG & 
ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44480, CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL 
BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA (2017) (describing 
underlying regulation and court challenges). 
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E. The Trump Administration and Embrace of Change Power 
Early proposals and actions by the Trump Administration, especially in the 
environmental law arena, reflect a broad claim of presidential and agency power 
to reverse course with little constraint. As of mid-2018, policy change orders, 
directives, proposals, or actions have overwhelmingly been in a deregulatory 
direction. Few have completed the regulatory process or been reviewed in the 
courts, but the proposals reveal the Administration’s view of policy change 
power. 
Under the Trump Administration, most agencies announcing policy change 
proposals or actions have offered little legal analysis, usually just referring to 
the result sought or quoting language acknowledging the role of politics in 
regulation and room for policy change.88 Presidential and executive policy shift 
proposals, as initiated by agencies, have reflected little effort to satisfy the 
conditions constraining such change.89 Most of these policy change actions or 
proposals have included minimal engagement with what this Article collectively 
labels “contingencies,” namely facts underlying earlier regulatory policies and 
the accompanying reasoning of earlier actions. This Part reviews such power 
claims. Later Parts critique their legal validity under governing doctrine and 
illuminate the legal importance of contingencies shaping past actions and 
proposed changes.90 
1. The Two-for-One Executive Order 
The largest scale action by the Trump Administration calling for agency 
policy changes is the “two-for-one” executive order. In Executive Order 13,771, 
President Trump “ordered” agencies, as a “policy of the executive branch,” to 
accompany any new regulation with identification of “two prior 
regulations . . . for elimination.”91 The only exception provided was if such 
 
88 See infra Section II.C. 
89 See infra notes 102-111 and accompanying text (discussing recent policy shift proposals 
justified on grounds that agencies lack power previously asserted, and noting how FCC has 
been more thorough on issues of law and fact than other executive agencies during the Trump 
Administration). 
90 With both chambers of Congress and the presidency in the same party’s hands, Congress 
passed, and President Trump signed, fifteen Congressional Review Act resolutions 
invalidating late Obama Administration regulations. See Thomas O. McGarity, The 
Congressional Review Act: A Damage Assessment, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 6, 2018), 
http://prospect.org/article/congressional-review-act-damage-assessment 
[https://perma.cc/G6K2-JKQF] (reviewing invalidations and their impacts). Because these 
involved a form of legislative action, they are not discussed here despite their major 
deregulatory impact. 
91 Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
  
2018] THE TETHERED PRESIDENT 1377 
 
elimination is “prohibited by law.”92 In addition, agency actions are to result in 
no increased regulatory costs and new regulations must to be “offset by the 
elimination of existing costs associated with at least two prior regulations.”93 
Thus, the President directed all agencies to make deregulatory policy shifts, but 
without regard to the net benefits, legislative edicts, and societal conditions that 
led to the earlier regulatory actions. Nothing in the Order’s text, apart from 
typical executive order boilerplate language about respect for other legal 
requirements and prohibitions, called for rigorous engagement with relevant 
law, facts, and earlier reasoning. 
Due to the Order’s asymmetry and lack of attention to the benefits of earlier 
regulation, let alone analysis of net regulatory costs or benefits, a broad coalition 
filed suit alleging that Executive Order 13,771 could never be followed in 
compliance with the law and would unavoidably taint all agencies’ actions.94 
That initial challenge, made before any agency had completed actions in 
compliance with the Order’s edicts that could be traced to particularized 
palpable effects, was dismissed on standing grounds despite the deciding judge’s 
critical comments and observations about the Order’s effects, legality, and 
logic.95 OIRA refined the Order’s skewed requirements, but still largely 
followed the President’s mandates.96 
 
92 Id. Section 5 of the order adds that it should not “be construed to impair or otherwise 
affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency” and notes that 
it “shall be implemented consistent with applicable law.” Id. at 9340. 
93 Id. at 9339. 
94 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Public Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, 297 
F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-cv-00253) (“Rulemaking in compliance with the 
Executive Order’s ‘1-in, 2-out’ requirement cannot be undertaken without violating the 
statutes from which the agencies derive their rulemaking authority and the Administrative 
Procedure Act ([“]APA[”]).”). The plaintiffs detail their theory regarding the order’s illegality 
in their Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Pub. 
Citizen, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 6 (No. 17-cv-00253). 
95 Pub. Citizen, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d at 20-22, 27 (dismissing for lack of standing mostly 
due to inability to trace particular harms to any potential future resulting actions or foregone 
actions, but also noting delay that will result and pointing out puzzling logic of assessing costs 
without regard to benefits). 
96 Memorandum from Dominic J. Mancini, Acting Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory 
Affairs, Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Executive Order of January 30, 
2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/interim-guidance-implementing-
section-2-executive-order-january-30-2017 [https://perma.cc/DS7K-URS3] (reviewing order 
and providing guidance on agency compliance, but repeatedly mentioning only “costs” 
without reference to “benefits” or “net benefits”). An OIRA memorandum setting forth 
agency obligations to prepare their regulatory agenda for the coming year alluded to the order, 
but in a few places also mentioned costs and benefits, although not in direct reference to that 
order’s instructions. See Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory 
Affairs, Data Call for the Fall 2017 Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda of Federal 
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions 1, 8 (Aug. 18, 2017) (quoting “cost” language of order 
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2. The Agency Stay and Delay Two-Step 
Numerous agencies pursued a two-step process to render inoperative existing 
regulations, often with a promise of some future replacement.97 In Federal 
Register notices and briefs, agencies referenced some future anticipated or 
possible policy change, but, in the meantime, sought to stay, suspend, and not 
implement pending regulations, or through similar language or strategies 
proposed to render an already finalized regulation a nullity. Here too, agencies 
or their attorneys cited cases mentioning presidential powers and acknowledging 
that agencies can seek policy change, but without attention to other 
requirements.98 As detailed and analyzed below, because these agencies did not 
yet seek to replace or justify the abandonment of the earlier regulation, but were 
effectively rendering it a nullity, reviewing courts during 2017 and 2018 
overwhelmingly rejected such a strategy.99 
3. Splintering Deregulatory Steps 
In other settings, Trump Administration agencies took initial steps to undo a 
regulation, but divided up the steps to getting there and, because of this division, 
sought to limit comments on the legality or overall wisdom of the earlier 
regulations’ choices or some future change.100 It is not yet clear if agencies in 
future finalized policy shifts will be attentive to the contingencies and antecedent 
regulatory actions in justifying some new policy.101 
4. Agency Statutory Abnegation Claims 
Numerous agencies’ policy reversals were quite summary, relying on what 
this Article calls “agency statutory abnegation” claims: the agencies newly claim 
 
and mentioning agency assessment of both “costs and benefits,” but in connection with 
another applicable order, Executive Order 12,866). 
97 See Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s 
Deregulatory Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 16-47 (2018) (describing array of stay 
and delay type of actions, judicial rejections, and analyzing such actions’ legality); Jennifer 
Dlouhy & Alan Levin, Trump Tests Legal Limits by Delaying Dozens of Obama’s Rules, 
BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2017 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-
13/trump-tests-legal-limits-by-delaying-dozens-of-obama-s-rules (identifying rules proposed 
for delay, stay, or non-enforcement); infra Section II.H (introducing and analyzing several of 
these actions). 
98 See generally Heinzerling, supra note 97 (discussing and analyzing such actions’ 
legality); infra Section II.H (discussing further such postponement, delay actions, and judicial 
rejections). 
99 See infra Section II.H (analyzing recent decisions). 
100 See infra Sections II.H, III.B (assessing some of Trump Administration’s deregulatory 
efforts). 
101 One finalized action delaying the “applicability date” of the Clean Water Rule still 
omits such analysis. See infra Section III.B (discussing Clean Water Rule and related divided 
deregulatory steps). 
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that they lack power previously asserted, and state that this new reading of the 
law requires a policy reversal. Agencies have occasionally used such a strategy 
in the past, most famously in the EPA actions during the George W. Bush 
Administration leading to Massachusetts v. EPA, but it also appears in other 
decisions.102 Its use exploded during 2017 and 2018.103 A few examples are 
reviewed here.  
 
102 See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35, 41-43, 45 & n.18, 50-51 
(D.D.C. 2003) (noting agency disclaiming power previously asserted, concluding one such 
view by Interior Department Solicitor was in error, though it was not adopted in final agency 
action, while another claim of no legal power over “unclaimed lands” was in error and 
required judicial rejection); supra note 8 and infra notes 215-224 and accompanying text 
(discussing Massachusetts v. EPA). 
103 During 2017 and 2018, many agency proposals and actions relied in whole or in part 
on claims of statutory abnegation. See, e.g., Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 
48,037 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing to repeal Clean 
Power Plan); infra notes 133-146 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Power Plan and 
actions taken to repeal it, including new interpretation of statute and claim of lack of power 
to regulate as claimed in 2015); infra notes 113-132 and accompanying text (discussing 
several divided steps taken to delay or abandon Clean Water Rule and proposing to adopt 
plurality opinion view of Justice Scalia that would substantially change and limit federal 
authority). Statutory abnegation was also a substantial element of many other policy change 
actions. Take, for example, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) Program. 
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1022-
23 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (reviewing history of DACA); infra notes 353-365 and accompanying 
text. There are yet more examples in the EPA context. See Memorandum from William L. 
Wehrum, Assistant Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency on Reclassification of Major Sources as Area 
Sources Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act to Reg’l Air Div. Dir. 2-3 (Jan. 25, 2018), 
available at https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/reclassification-major-
sources-area-sources-under-section-112-clean [https://perma.cc/BYP4-ST7Q] (abandoning 
twenty-two year old EPA view of when sources are subject to hazardous air pollutant 
regulation and calling previous policy “contrary to the plain language” of statute in using 
temporal variable that made old policy “once in, always in”). For analysis of the shift 
described in the Wehrum memorandum, see Michelle West, “Once In, Always In” Now Out: 
How the EPA Is Reducing Regulations on Hazardous Air Pollutant Emitters, GEO. ENVTL. L. 
REV. (Mar. 3, 2018), https://gelr.org/2018/03/03/once-in-always-in-now-out-how-the-epa-is-
reducing-regulations-on-hazardous-air-pollutant-emitters/ [https://perma.cc/E98G-33WK], 
which notes that the EPA’s new take on the “once in, always in” policy “will likely result in 
a remand, if and when it is challenged.”  
There are still more EPA examples. See, e.g., Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider 
Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,442, 53,443 (proposed Nov. 16, 
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1037, 1068) (proposing to reverse earlier policy that 
regulated air emissions from refurbished trucks and engines known as “gliders” and claiming 
that EPA had no such authority under language in Clean Air Act). The Department of Labor 
has also engaged in this practice. Tip Regulations Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”), 82 Fed. Reg. 57,395, 57,399 (Dec. 5, 2017) (proposing to abandon previous 
regulation regarding tips policy, claiming that agency had earlier misinterpreted extent of its 
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In the immigration arena, the Department of Homeland Security ended the 
Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) of citizens of two foreign nations.104 In 
those actions, however, the Department of Homeland Security not only changed 
 
statutory authority). The Department of Agriculture has engaged in this practice as well. 
National Organic Program (“NOP”); Organic Livestock and Poultry Practices—Withdrawal, 
82 Fed. Reg. 59,988, 59,988-90 (proposed Dec. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 205) 
(proposing to repeal regulation governing animal care practices and claiming agency lacked 
authority to issue regulation).  
The FCC’s repeal of net neutrality also claimed the earlier policy exceeded the agency’s 
power under the governing statute. Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568, 25,573 
(proposed June 2, 2017) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20) (concluding that there is 
“nothing in the [Telecommunications] Act that would extend [the FCC’s] jurisdiction” such 
that it could exercise utility-style regulation to Internet as it did in 2015 rule). The FCC 
revealed its likely policy change choice and rationale in a declaratory ruling. Declaratory 
Ruling, Report and Order, and Order on Restoring Internet Freedom, FCC Rcd. CIRC1712-
04. But the declaratory ruling document does not preclude further comment and FCC 
adjustment. Id. at 1. The Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) rescission and suspension 
of a rule about waste and royalties from oil and gas extraction was similarly based on a claim 
of illegal overreach of statutory authority, although included a fallback claim of discretionary 
authority to adjust the policy even if the earlier policy did not violate the statute. See Waste 
Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Delay and 
Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,050, 58,050 (Dec. 8, 2017) (to be 
codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170) (pointing out challenge of prior rule surviving judicial 
review); Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924, 7927 (proposed Feb. 22, 
2018) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170) (stating that “BLM is not confident that 
all provisions of the 2016 final rule [the previous rule] would survive judicial review” and 
highlighting critical comments arguing that “BLM’s proposed rule exceeded the BLM’s 
statutory authority”). 
104 Compare Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 
Fed. Reg. 23,830, 23,831-32 (May 24, 2017) (extending TPS due to lingering earthquake 
effects but also other risks to safety, such as compounding storm events, agricultural harvest 
problems, weak public health system, cholera epidemic, lack of safe water, extreme poverty, 
corruption, and government instability), and Extension of the Designation of El Salvador for 
Temporary Protected Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,645, 44,647 (July 8, 2016) (extending TPS status 
due to safety risks from initial TPS-triggering earthquake but noting other statutorily specified 
sources of risks to safety to explain extending TPS status), with Termination of the 
Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 2648, 2650 (Jan. 18, 2018) 
(terminating status because “conditions for Haiti’s designation . . . relating to the 2010 
earthquake . . . are no longer met” and limiting analysis to effects of that one event), and Press 
Release, Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Dept. of Homeland Sec., 
Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador (Jan. 8, 2018), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/01/08/secretary-homeland-security-kirstjen-m-nielsen-
announcement-temporary-protected [https://perma.cc/ZS8X-H34Z] (announcing termination 
of TPS status because “original conditions caused by the 2001 earthquakes no longer exist” 
and stating that therefore, “under the applicable statute, the current TPS designation must be 
terminated”). 
  
2018] THE TETHERED PRESIDENT 1381 
 
its longstanding interpretation of the underlying statute to justify the actions, but 
it failed to acknowledge that shift or to address additional risks to immigrant 
safety that it had earlier viewed as legally relevant to determining TPS status.105 
It now states that it “must” terminate the TPS designation when the conditions 
for it no longer apply.106 Under previous administrations and even in an early 
Trump Administration action, the agency considered all of the criteria that can 
justify TPS designations for a nation and ongoing risks to safety, not just the 
initial triggering event.107 
In 2017, the FCC, an independent agency, took substantial steps toward 
abandoning the net neutrality regulation it promulgated in 2015.108 This proposal 
and the later tentative final order engaged more than most of the other Trump 
Administration agencies with the earlier action’s content and rationales and 
relied heavily on “predictive judgment” about “increase[d] investment.”109 In 
the proposal and nominally final order, the FCC also stated that the earlier action 
was founded on unsound “statutory construction” and claimed the new action is 
based on a “better reading of the statute.”110 This order, in contrast to other 
actions of Trump Administration executive agencies, devoted substantial 
attention to the underlying regulatory history, identified relevant case law about 
the contours of agency authority, and devoted pages to satisfying the cases 
setting forth both the FCC’s power and the constraints of consistency doctrine.111 
While the substantive policy reversal is major and its ultimate fate uncertain, its 
approach to the law regarding policy change is much more consistent with the 
norm established over multiple administrations. 
5. Environmental Deregulating with Inattention to Science and Past 
Reasoning 
The Trump Administration’s efforts to reverse several high conflict 
environmental actions by the Obama Administration further reveal aggressive 
 
105 See Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. 
Reg. at 2650; Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 104. 
106 See Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. 
Reg. at 2649-50 (“If the Secretary determines that the foreign state no longer meets the 
conditions for TPS designation, the Secretary must terminate the designation . . . .”). 
107 See Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 23,832 (extending TPS due to lingering earthquake effects but also other risks, including 
“Haiti’s weak sanitation infrastructure”). 
108 See Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568, 25,573 (proposed June 2, 2017) 
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20). 
109 Id.; see also Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order on Restoring Internet 
Freedom, FCC Rcd. CIRC1712-04, ¶¶ 155-200 (reviewing both administrative law 
constraints and communications law provisions to justify policy change). 
110 Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,575. 
111 See id. at 25,570-72 (tracing history and rationales behind past policies and new policy); 
id. at 25,580-82 (reviewing consistency doctrine case law and explaining basis for its policy 
change). 
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views about broad presidential and agency power to change policy. These 
actions simultaneously use several of the change strategies just discussed, but 
most are especially notable in their minimal engagement with underlying 
science, past findings, and past agency reasoning. Here, they are reviewed for 
the power claims they manifest.112 
For example, in 2015 during the Obama Administration, the EPA and the 
Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) finalized the Clean Water Rule, which sets 
forth definitions and tests for determining if a particular “water” is subject to 
federal jurisdiction as a “water[] of the United States.”113 This status is of huge 
economic and environmental significance: it determines if industrial discharge 
permits are required for pollution (under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act) 
and if dredging and filling of such waters is subject to a strong prohibitory 
presumption (under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act).114 As part of 
generating this 2015 rule, the EPA and the Corps simultaneously sought 
comment on and finalized a massive document—the Connectivity Report—that 
summarized all peer-reviewed science regarding the functions of various sorts 
of waters.115 The Clean Water Rule itself followed the Supreme Court’s creation 
of an increasingly unsettled body of law due to three related decisions, one of 
which resulted in splintered opinions and questions about what constituted the 
majority view.116 The rule was finalized, but it engendered fierce attacks, 
including an expansive “Ditch the Rule” public relations campaign, and was 
subsequently stayed by a federal appeals court late in the Obama 
 
112 Analysis of their legal adequacy is provided later in this Article to apply and illuminate 
this body of doctrine and the contingencies they frame. See infra Part III. 
113 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,054 (June 29, 2015). 
114 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012). 
115 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO 
DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW & SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ES-1 (2015). 
116 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732 (2006) (stating, in plurality opinion 
announcing the Court’s judgment, that definition of “‘waters of the United States’ includes 
only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water” but with concurring opinion 
by Justice Kennedy and opinion of four dissenters finding broader federal authority and 
explicitly sharing common views on most rationales and waters that would be protected); 
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171-72 
(2001) (rejecting claim of federal jurisdiction under Clean Water Act (“CWA”) over wholly 
intrastate, isolated waters such as ponds, gravel pits, and seasonal waters due to their use as 
migratory bird habitats); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134-
35 (1985) (upholding broad definition of navigable waters with focus on unavoidable 
judgment calls in resolving border of land and water in complex hydrological system and due 
to Act’s integrity goals). 
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Administration.117 In early 2018, the Supreme Court entered the fray, ruling that 
challenges to this rule had to be filed in district court, not a court of appeals.118 
The Trump Administration targeted the Clean Water Rule shortly after the 
President’s inauguration. President Trump specifically referenced the rule in an 
Executive Order, asking the agencies to “review” the rule to “rescind[]” or 
“revis[e]” it “as appropriate and consistent with law.”119 But the President’s 
Order went further than just to tilt the agencies in a deregulatory direction. He 
asked the agencies to “consider interpreting the” underlying statutory language 
“in a manner consistent with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia” in Rapanos 
v. United States.120 
It is the next steps that reveal how consistency doctrine can be embraced—
even if distorted—by a President and agencies seeking a major deregulatory 
shift. In March 2017, the EPA—under the leadership of President Trump’s 
initial appointee as Administrator, Scott Pruitt—and the Corps published a 
Notice of Intent to reconsider the Clean Water Rule, referencing President 
Trump’s “directive,” and also stating that they would consider adopting Justice 
Scalia’s opinion rationales.121 The agencies cited FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc.122 (“Fox”) and Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.123 as confirming the agency’s power to 
reconsider a past “decision,” then went on to embrace the untethered view of 
 
117 Murray Energy Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 817 F.3d 261, 274 (6th Cir. 2016) (denying 
defendants’ motion to dismiss on procedural grounds by determining challenges to rule are 
subject to direct circuit court review), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 
138 S. Ct. 617 (2018). There have been public relations efforts to influence this and other 
regulatory actions. See, e.g., Rachel Augustine Potter, More Than Spam? Lobbying the EPA 
Through Public Comment Campaigns, BROOKINGS (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.broo 
kings.edu/research/more-than-spam-lobbying-the-epa-through-public-comment-campaigns/ 
[https://perma.cc/8KE2-FELE] (discussing interest groups eliciting massive numbers of 
comments and attributing “Ditch the Rule” campaign to American Farm Bureau Federation). 
118 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 138 S. Ct. at 624. 
119 Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017). The Order is titled 
“Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of 
the United States’ Rule.” Id. at 12,497.  
120 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion); Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. at 
12,497. Because Justice Scalia’s opinion represented a plurality of the Court, and two 
different majorities read the statute and regulatory power differently, it is questionable if the 
agency could adopt Justice Scalia’s approach. Moreover, unlike the agencies that issued the 
Clean Water Rule, Justice Scalia’s opinion was not grounded in science, hydrology, or the 
agencies’ expertise, but instead derived from his parsing of statutory and dictionary language. 
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731-32. 
121 Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,532, 
12,532 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
122 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
123 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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agency policy change power.124 This is apparent in both what the agencies said 
and what they omitted.  
Quoting portions of these cases, the agencies stated that “such a revised 
decision need not be based upon a change of facts or circumstances,” but can be 
based “on a revaluation of which policy would be better in light of the facts” and 
a “change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes.”125 
But the notice grappled with no past science, did not mention the Connectivity 
Report, did not proffer any analysis of the environmental impacts of dropping 
the Clean Water Rule, and did not include any legal analysis of the contours of 
what the agency thought in the past and at the time of the new proposal as to 
what it is permissible under the law. In proposing to adopt Justice Scalia’s view 
of what waters are protected, the agencies were engaging in another variant of 
statutory abnegation, substantially shrinking their claimed regulatory power 
from that asserted in 2015.126 
And in a related solicitation of public comments about pursuing this policy 
change in two steps, with the first characterized as restoring the law to where it 
stood before the 2015 Clean Water Rule, the agencies even sought to limit public 
comments such that they would not address underlying science or policy impacts 
or the overall repercussions of the regulatory shift.127 It, too, ignored science and 
environmental impacts. Yet a third notice and then finalized rule added an 
“applicability date” delaying any implementation of the Clean Water Rule for 
two years.128 That action also provided no engagement with science, facts, or 
 
124 Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 
12,532. These are two of the three recent major cases regarding policy consistency doctrine. 
Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (finding FCC’s policy on censuring language is acceptable on grounds 
that “it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute”); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 
42 (holding that “agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a 
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does 
not act in the first instance”). See Section II.C for further analysis of these cases. 
125 Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 
12,532 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 
2012)). 
126 Justice Scalia’s opinion did not garner a Court majority. See supra notes 115-120 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, in counting votes and positions, this quite clearly was a 
minority view on the extent of government power to protect waters. If adopted as the final 
view of agency power, it would also disclaim a substantial portion of federal authority earlier 
stated under the Clean Water Rule, federal briefing, and in light of relevant science and the 
Connectivity Report. 
127 Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 
Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,903 (proposed July 27, 2017) (stating that agencies were not seeking 
comment on pre-2015 rules or “scope of the definition of ‘waters of the United States’” until 
second step of two-step process). 
128 See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,542, 55,544-45 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (proposing 
applicability date and reiterating that agencies were not soliciting comment on scope of 
definition of “waters of the United States” “[b]ecause the agencies propose to simply add the 
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past reasoning, let alone law regarding agency policy change or judicial 
rejections of similar stay or postponement strategies.129  
Then, in June of 2018, EPA and the Corps published yet another waters-
related notice, this time a new “Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” 
that provided additional questions and proposals linked back to the July 2017 
repeal proposal, which remained pending a year after its proposal.130 This 
Supplemental Notice, for the first time in deregulatory actions related to the 
Clean Waters Rule, delved in more than a cursory manner into issues of science 
and also discussed the Connectivity Report.131 Similar language and advocacy 
relying on language snippets from Fox and State Farm appeared in several other 
EPA policy change notices.132 
A similar combination of citation, justification, limiting of comment, 
splintering of regulatory actions, and lack of engagement with materials 
previously viewed as central was evident in the late 2017 and 2018 EPA 
proposals to repeal the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”). The 
CPP regulation was finalized in 2015. It was designed to limit greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions from power plants due to their climate impacts.133 The CPP 
was issued following three Supreme Court decisions that affirmed EPA 
authority to regulate GHGs, one of which specifically referenced Section 111(d) 
of the Clean Air Act as providing EPA authority to regulate existing power plant 
 
applicability date and ensure continuance of the legal status quo and because it is a temporary, 
interim measure pending substantive rulemaking”); see also Definition of “Waters of the 
United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 
5200, 5202-03 (Feb. 6, 2018) (emphasizing lack of associated costs and benefits due to 
claimed maintenance of legal status quo of Clean Water Rule finalized but not yet in effect 
due to judicial stays). For a discussion of the legal adequacy of this rule and its judicial 
rejection, see infra note 372 and accompanying text. 
129 Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 
Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5205 (addressing public comments on delay and avoiding 
any discussion of substance of underlying rule by claiming that agencies satisfied their duty 
under APA by explaining their rationale as “provid[ing] for regulatory certainty 
and . . . maintain[ing] the legal status quo” and seeking public comment). 
130 Definition of “Waters of the United States—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,231-50 (July 12, 
2018). 
131 Id. at 32,228-29, 32,240-42 (focusing on science issues, “significant nexus” analysis, 
and implications of Connectivity Report). 
132 See infra note 368-369 and accompanying text (reporting on Federal Register notices 
relying on similar foundation). 
133 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (“[T]his 
action . . . establish[es] final emission guidelines for states to follow in developing plans to 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating 
units . . . .). 
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emissions.134 Furthermore, the EPA had, in a separate finalized and judicially 
upheld rulemaking, extensively documented climate science and associated 
health and environmental “endangerments” resulting from GHG emissions and 
climate change.135 That finding, plus the Court’s precedents, had been viewed 
by EPA as triggering a mandatory duty to regulate due to the “shall” language 
in Section 111(d).136 
In 2017, however, the EPA proposed to repeal the CPP. Its notice proffered a 
different read of the statute that focused on coal plant hardships and claimed 
consistency with an earlier “inside the fenceline” EPA approach to sources 
regulated under Section 111(d).137 The EPA proposed a complete repeal of the 
CPP, but without committing to any replacement rule.138 It too cited a few 
consistency doctrine precedents and, as with the Clean Water Rule repeal 
proposals, sought to limit public comment.139 It offered a new power-limiting 
interpretation of the statute similar to other agencies’ statutory abnegation 
 
134 See William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate 
Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1071-81 (reviewing cases and regulatory actions leading 
to creation of CPP). 
135 Id. at 1075 (reviewing risks of climate change and “the ‘car deal’ that was issued with 
industry, state, and federal agreement to future auto emissions reductions to comply with 
transportation and environmental laws”). 
136 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
64,707-25 (summarizing legal history and basis for design of CPP). In the CPP, the EPA 
explained its approach as consistent with past rulemakings that required pollution control in 
light of each industries’ particular attributes. It emphasized that power plants were already 
adjusting pollution levels through use of the interconnected and integrated energy grid. Id. at 
64,727-33 (reviewing “measures available because of the integrated electricity system”). 
137 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,038 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) 
(explaining that EPA proposal to repeal CPP is based on its determination that “performance 
standards that the CPP established for existing sources” were based upon three inputs, two of 
which “exceed the EPA’s authority under CAA section 111”). The CPP rejected an “inside 
the fenceline” approach, looking instead at pollution and energy use reductions achieved 
through trading and adjustments linked to the interconnected electrical grid. Carbon Pollution 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64723-27, 64758-60, 
64768-69. News releases accompanying the repeal proposal explicitly characterized the repeal 
as abandoning reliance on actions “outside the fence line.” Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
U.S. EPA Takes Another Step to Advance President Trump’s America First Strategy, 
Proposes Repeal of “Clean Power Plan” (Oct. 10, 2017), available at 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-
america-first-strategy-proposes-repeal [https://perma.cc/ZLM4-LWTM] (stating EPA would 
return to its “traditional[] . . . inside the fence line” approach). 
138 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. at 48,036. 
139 E.g., id. (“EPA is not soliciting comments on such information with this proposal”); 
see also id. at 48,039 (citing change power cases). 
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rationales referenced earlier.140 In the repeal proposal, the EPA did not cite other 
relevant statutory language, cases, and past rulemakings the EPA analyzed in 
2015; ignored the EPA’s detailed 2014, 2015, and 2017 studies of the electricity 
sector; ignored state regulatory trends and accomplishments; and nowhere 
engaged with the EPA’s own earlier pro-CPP reasoning.141 The EPA did not 
compare or quantify environmental and health costs flowing from the repeal 
proposal. While an accompanying Regulatory Impact Analysis contained some 
relevant numbers and comparisons, the agency there also shifted its analytical 
framework.142 In 2017, the EPA also sidestepped discussion of predicted 
increases in particulate matter pollution accompanying GHG emissions and 
thousands of additional predicted deaths, though it had previously viewed such 
impacts as legally relevant to the CPP due to statutory language requiring agency 
consideration of the impacts on public health.143 
Then, in August 2018, the EPA proposed a substantially weakened 
replacement rule for the CPP, labeling the new proposal the Affordable Clean 
Energy (“ACE”) Rule.144 This proposal and accompanying documents again 
claimed that the CPP exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority.145 In summary 
 
140 Id. at 48,035-39. 
141 The proposed repeal ignored a 2017 action finding post-2015 to 2017 acceleration of 
clean energy trends and at decreased costs than predicted in 2015. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, BASIS FOR DENIAL OF PETITIONS TO RECONSIDER AND PETITIONS TO STAY THE CAA 
SECTION 111(d) EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND COMPLIANCE 
TIMES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 22-30 (2017) (explaining how, in wake of 
CPP, there was growing trend toward low- and zero-emitting energy). 
142 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF 
THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: PROPOSAL 27 (2017) (“This [Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”)] 
addresses the avoided regulatory compliance costs, forgone emission reduction benefits of the 
final emission guidelines that are the focus of this action. Additionally, this RIA includes 
information about potential impacts of the proposed rule on electricity markets, employment, 
and markets outside the electricity sector. The RIA also presents a discussion of uncertainties 
and limitations of the analysis.”). 
143 The CPP discussed such impacts on health. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,682-
83 (Oct. 23, 2015) (discussing how “climate change is expected to increase ozone pollution 
over broad areas of the U.S. . . . with impacts on other areas of public health, such as the 
potential for increased deaths, injuries, infectious and waterborne diseases, and stress-related 
disorders”). The repeal proposal, however, does not discuss them despite CAA Section 
111(a)’s mandate that the agency consider “health . . . impact[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) 
(2012). 
144 Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Revisions to Emissions Guidelines Implementing Regulations; Revisions 
to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,716 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018). 
145 Id. at 44,748 (referring to CPP’s “legal flaws”); id. at 44,752-53 (stating that CPP 
“generation shifting” strategy violated statute that EPA in new proposal views as 
“unambiguously intended to be source specific” (citation omitted)). In other discussion, it 
characterizes its new focus on “unit-specific” or “within-the-fenceline” improvements as 
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form, EPA alluded to electricity sector trends and resulting lowered emissions, 
but did not cite or discuss in detail the EPA’s own January 2017 petitions denial 
that discussed acceleration of clean energy trends and also lower than expected 
associated costs.146 The EPA seemed to assume that the CPP created no reliance 
interests or effects–none are discussed. Apples-to-apples comparisons of the 
CPP versus the ACE proposal and their benefits and costs, especially GHG 
reductions, were partly avoided because the EPA in the ACE proposal declined 
to set an emissions cap for the sector as it had in the CPP. Other comparisons of 
costs and benefits were analyzed under a different, solely domestic focus, but 
with changed and largely unexplained estimates of costs and lives lost under the 
CPP, earlier related proposals, and under the ACE proposal itself.147 Unlike in 
several of the other proposals discussed, the EPA did not in this proposal seek 
to limit the public’s comment or overall arguments about the new proposal’s 
comparative merits. 
The Clean Water Rule, the CPP rollback, the replacement proposals, and the 
final waters “applicability date” rule as described here are only the beginning of 
lengthy legal battles. Nonetheless, they reveal broad change power claims. The 
initial wave of actions engaged minimally with previous agency reasoning 
justifying the preceding actions, limited comments, did not quantify the impacts 
of their actions, provided scant information on environmental effects, and 
divided their regulatory steps. They mentioned some relevant case law, but only 
to emphasize presidential change power. By the summer of 2018, EPA actions 
(under the leadership of a new administrator, Andrew Wheeler), provided 
greater justifications and more attention to the usual practices of agencies 
proposing a policy change.148 Most neglect the more recent Encino Motorcars 
case that spoke in a clear, singular majority opinion and required agencies 
proposing change to do far more than just point to votes or a view of “better” 
policy, but also provide “good reasons,”149 a “rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made,”150 and leave no “[u]nexplained 
 
within EPA’s power or reasonable and past CPP approach “unreasonable.” Id. at 44,753-54, 
47,775. 
146 See BASIS FOR DENIAL OF PETITIONS TO RECONSIDER AND PETITIONS TO STAY THE CAA 
SECTION 111(d) EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND COMPLIANCE 
TIMES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS, supra note 141. 
147 Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Revisions to Emissions Guidelines Implementing Regulations; Revisions 
to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,783-96 (discussing impacts); see also 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED EMISSION 
GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING 
UNITS; REVISIONS TO EMISSIONS GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO 
NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM (2018). 
148 For these more fleshed out change proposals, see supra notes 130, 144. 
149 Encino Motorcars LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016) (quoting FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). 
150 Id. 
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inconsistency.”151 And by fragmenting the undoing of rules and often seeking to 
limit comments, most of these actions avoided the fundamental regulatory 
rescission question: should the agencies be abandoning a past finalized 
regulation and, if so, why and at what costs? 
In a significantly different procedural setting that also involves the 
environment, President Trump ordered the Corps to reverse its previous 
commitment to undertake additional environmental review prior to deciding on 
an easement permit needed for the conflict-laden Dakota Access Pipeline.152 His 
memorandum directed the Corps to “approve in an expedited manner” the 
project.153 The memorandum contained language retaining some role for law and 
facts—“to the extent permitted by law and as warranted”—but clearly stated the 
outcome sought.154 A couple of weeks later, with a reference to President 
Trump’s “direction,” the Corps announced it would grant the easement, rely on 
earlier analyses, reverse itself, and not undertake any of the additional review it 
had earlier said was needed.155 Here, the President was directing an agency 
outcome in an adjudicatory setting—albeit an informal adjudication—where 
private stakeholders were in conflict over a wealth-generating, but also risk-
creating, project. As explained below, this sort of explicit presidential direction 
in an adjudicatory setting is problematic and likely unprecedented.156 Legal 
skirmishing over this permit and pipeline continued, but one court ruling, in a 
mixed opinion, faulted the agency for bypassing analysis required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).157 
 
151 Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
981 (2005)). For analysis of the key consistency precedents, see infra Section II.C. 
152 Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, Memorandum for the Secretary of the 
Army, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,129 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Letter from Paul D. Cramer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Army, to Representative 
Raul Grijalva, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Nat. Res. (Feb. 7, 
2017) (providing notice to Congress of Army’s intent to grant Dakota Access easement). 
156 Despite broad agreement that presidents cannot claim directive authority over—or have 
ex parte contacts in connection with—formal adjudicatory procedures, informal adjudicatory 
actions are generally viewed as providing more latitude for presidential directions and 
political nudges, but with risks remaining due to bias and prejudgment in settings of 
competing interests and fact and context-specific judgments. For further analysis see infra 
Section IV.D. See also Percival, supra note 3, at 2487-532 (tracing assertions of directive 
authority and regulatory review by presidential administrations from Nixon to Obama); 
Strauss, supra note 3, at 967-68 (questioning whether President’s role in, and potential control 
over, rulemaking should be cause for concern). 
157 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 136-
43 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding several elements of Corps’ analysis of its environmental risks 
arbitrary and capricious, but rejecting arguments of illegal failure to follow policy change 
precedents’ requirements). 
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This Article now turns to an analysis of the most relevant governing 
precedents and bodies of law making up consistency doctrine. It returns later to 
assess the legality and accuracy of these strong claims of largely unfettered 
agency change power. 
II. AGENCIES, PRESIDENTS, AND POLICY CHANGE CONDITIONS 
It is indisputable that the baseline norm is that agencies can change their 
policies over time as they gain experience.158 Nonetheless, the power to adjust 
policy is separate from the conditions and requirements an agency must satisfy 
to justify such changes.159 This Article suggests that the conception of a tethered 
president, and tethered agencies as well, is an important frame to emphasize that 
while there is ordinarily room for some policy movement, that movement is 
always subject to constraints. And under an array of cases and linked doctrine, 
the obligation of agencies to engage with regulatory contingencies is at the heart 
of tethering constraints and analysis of the legality of agency policy shifts. 
A. Enabling Act Constraints 
The first and most important constraint is the statutory language that 
authorizes the disputed regulatory act.160 The most fundamental obligation of a 
President and executive branch agencies is to “take Care” that the thousands of 
laws they must implement and enforce “be faithfully executed.”161 Such faithful 
legal execution includes several necessary elements.162 First, statutes reflect a 
congressional choice of delegate. Sometimes they confer authority and 
obligations on a President, but, more often, such enabling acts confer authority 
on a particular department or regulator.163 The specificity or breadth of that 
delegation is itself an implicit constraint on the President.164 
 
158 See supra Section I.A (discussing expectation and reasoning behind agencies creating 
and changing policy). 
159 See infra Section II.C (reviewing major decisions regarding consistency doctrine and 
agency justification for change); Section II.G (discussing pitfalls of poorly explained policy). 
160 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-33 (2007) (emphasizing centrality of 
statutory criteria in guiding agency action); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 
374 (1986) (stating “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress 
confers power upon it”). 
161 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
162 Metzger, supra note 33, at 1332-42; Metzger, supra note 39, at 1875-78 (discussing 
President’s role in supervision of agencies and parsing Take Care Clause). 
163 See Stack, supra note 3, at 267 (documenting different congressional statutory choices 
to delegate power to President or to agencies and arguing that President only has statutory 
authority to act under statutes that directly grant such authority to him). 
164 See Percival, supra note 3, at 2495 (“Traditional principles of statutory interpretation 
dictate that if Congress deems it necessary in some circumstances to specify when the 
President may exercise authority to override an agency decision, such authority should not be 
inferred when Congress has not so specified.”); Stack, supra note 3, at 267, 284 (arguing for 
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Second, statutes will state their purposes and in operative provisions the 
particular tasks, means, and criteria shaping how the agency is to achieve 
statutory goals.165 And barring an enabling act offering some additional or 
contrary process, the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) notice-and-
comment procedures must precede an agency promulgation of a rule that ends 
up being explained in the Federal Register and finally codified in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.166 Importantly, as reviewed below, these notice-and-
comment obligations exist for brand new regulations, revisions to them, or 
deregulatory rulemakings. Hence, laws provide goals, criteria, and procedural 
choices. Any agency making new policy, whether a new initiative or a change 
to an existing one, will need to abide by this combination of substantive and 
procedural constraints.167 
One caveat is necessary here. Barring statutory or regulatory language 
mandating action, a line of cases dating back to the 1970s gives the President 
and agencies presumptive control over when and how they will implement and 
enforce the law, especially where that choice involves resource allocation 
 
enforcement of congressional choices despite President’s role as head of executive branch, 
due to varying congressional choices regarding delegations to agencies or presidents); cf. 
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 115 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (stating that broad 
statutory language provides room for statutory coverage beyond “principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils” and is not limited by “the principal concerns of our legislators” 
(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998))). Both linguistic 
breadth and specificity can impose constraints since an agency might claim expansive or 
limited powers. In either setting, the delegation language would shape the reasonableness of 
those power claims. For a defense of delegations of broad authority to agencies due to their 
expertise, transparent process, and rigorous judicial review and the “public trust” thereby 
engendered, see Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 637-40, 
672 (2018). 
165 Professor Metzger argues that congressional structural, procedural, and agency role 
allocations should be given more weight by reviewing courts. Metzger, supra note 33, at 
1366-69. The Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA did focus on such factors and rejected 
agency reliance on other considerations. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526-28 
(2007); supra note 8 (citing scholarship analyzing Massachusetts v. EPA and its statutory and 
expertise-based focus); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 244 (2006) (rejecting 
authority of interpretive rule issued by Attorney General in light of specificity of allocated 
and preserved regulatory roles for several regulators, federalism concerns and divisions 
reflected in statute, and also rejecting claim of deference due to lack of process preceding 
rule’s issuance). 
166 See Metzger, supra note 33, at 1348-52 (discussing role of APA and how it sometimes 
constrains courts’ ability to develop administrative law doctrine in common law-like manner). 
167 See Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21-23, 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(analyzing statutory goals guiding National Park Service agency power and discretion to 
revise policies, but stating “that discretion is ‘bounded by the terms of the Organic Act itself’” 
and rejecting as inadequate agency’s attention to facts behind old and new actions (citations 
omitted)). 
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choices delegated by Congress to the agency.168 A degree of deregulatory impact 
can be achieved simply through non-enforcement, although citizen suit 
provisions and other private causes of action, plus enforcement by state and local 
governments, often ensure the law does not become a dead letter.169 Weak 
implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations that may remain 
unchanged is often difficult or even impossible to challenge in court.170 It might, 
however, be different if an agency overtly adopted a policy of legal “abdication,” 
as noted in Heckler v. Chaney.171 Such agency and presidential choices about 
priorities and their regulatory agenda are likely at the apex of room for 
discretionary choice.172 Nonetheless, as strongly stated in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
when an agency does act, it must root its choices in what the underlying statute 
requires.173 
B. Policy Change Process, Deliberative Opportunities, and Integrity 
When agencies seek to change policy, they will ordinarily be subject to 
stakeholder input either because it is required or to strengthen the agency’s 
position when reviewed in court.174 Agencies that short-circuit such processes 
and deliberative opportunities, as seen in major policy change actions just 
reviewed, make their actions vulnerable to judicial invalidation.  
Agencies can change policies under an unchanged enabling act due either to 
intentional congressional conferral of power that mandates periodic 
reassessments, or statutory language that confers substantial discretion to 
agencies, or often by virtue of implicit delegations of authority. Long before 
 
168 For an analysis of agencies’ latitude to choose procedurally how to make policy, see 
M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004). 
For an analysis of general unreviewability of agency choices not to enforce or how to allocate 
resources, see Ronald Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 
MINN. L. REV. 689, 702-34 (1990). 
169 See generally Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2008) (arguing that there 
is no real difference between decision to regulate or not to regulate under APA); Daniel T. 
Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2010) 
(discussing issue and citing to Biber and other scholars analyzing inaction law). 
170 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 55 (2004) (unanimously 
holding that APA only allows courts to examine government agencies’ failures to act where 
action is required and discrete); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 821 (1985) (concluding 
that nonenforcement choices by agencies are presumptively unreviewable in federal courts); 
Levin, supra note 168, at 704-05 (discussing Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe and its treatment of unreviewability under APA). 
171 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985). 
172 See Watts, supra note 17, at 2 (arguing for legitimacy of political involvement and 
considerations in setting priorities and allocating resources if not subject to countervailing or 
constraining congressional framework). 
173 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
174 See Bressman, supra note 69, at 776; Magill, supra note 168, at 1390. 
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modern deference framework cases, courts deferred to agency interpretations of 
their enabling acts due to their expertise and congressional choice of the 
regulators, even without explicit delegation of agency power to act through 
rulemaking.175 Today, which deference framework shapes judicial review 
generally hinges on the procedural mode through which the agency acts.176 
An agency’s procedural choices about how to act and make policy, unless 
constrained by statute or an agency’s own regulations or policy developed over 
time, have long been viewed as within the agency’s discretion.177 Agencies can 
make policy through regulations, usually using a notice-and-comment process, 
but also can make policy on a case-by-case basis through adjudications or also 
through guidance and policy documents not vetted in a notice-and-comment 
process.178 The authoritativeness of the derived policy, its durability, and 
deference frames will vary depending on the policymaking mode.179 
A meta-rule is critical to understanding consistency doctrine: an agency can 
only change policy through an equal or more formal procedural mode than 
initially utilized.180 And in the modern era, when formal agency actions are a 
rarity, this usually means that regulations generated through a notice-and-
comment process stand at the top of the authority hierarchy. To state it more 
simply, to amend a fully effective rule promulgated through a notice-and-
comment process requires another rulemaking–it takes a regulation to displace 
 
175 There are two foundational pre-APA cases explaining rationales for judicial deference 
to agencies, but with analysis that blends review of legal and factual determinations. See 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, 140 (1944) (explaining why agency views about 
law and facts deserve “respect,” deference, and “in some cases decisive weight” since agency 
will have “more specialized experience”); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 
(1944) (stating that “it is not the court’s function to substitute its own inferences of fact for 
the [NLRB’s]” because “Congress entrusted” to NLRB such determinations). 
176 See infra notes 182-197 (discussing deference frameworks). 
177 See Magill, supra note 168, at 1398 (acknowledging “ability of agencies to choose 
among a range of policymaking forms”). 
178 See id. at 1386-97 (describing and evaluating process and effects of different modes of 
policymaking); see also, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) 
(holding that federal agencies need only utilize notice-and-comment procedures when 
enacting or changing “force of law” legislative rules, not when altering interpretive rules); Vt. 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 520 (1978) 
(holding that APA imposes maximum procedural requirements that courts can impose on 
agencies unless more is required by enabling act or agency’s own regulations); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (stating that “choice made between proceeding by 
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed 
discretion of the administrative agency”). 
179 See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992). 
180 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association confirms this basic proposition, although it 
does so in reversing a lower court decision calling for notice-and-comment rulemaking before 
abandoning a policy announced in a guidance interpretive document. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 
1206. 
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another regulation.181 And, as further analyzed below, that basic rule of law 
proposition involves a requirement that an agency fully engage with the issues, 
disputes, and past reasoning of the linked earlier agency action. 
When an agency is construing substantive provisions of an enabling act, 
versus choosing procedurally how to act, it will receive deference too. After the 
Mead and State Farm decisions, agencies hoping to maximize judicial deference 
generally will act through a notice-and-comment process.182 Due to the 
prevalence of statutory gaps, silences, and ambiguities, most agency regulations 
involving interpretation of statutory language will trigger deference under Step 
Two of the Chevron framework.183 If the disputed policy and underlying 
interpretation is generated through some less formal mode, such as in a guidance 
document, in a brief, or through other modes lacking an advance participatory 
vetting process, then review will usually be under the Skidmore v. Swift & Co.184 
standard.185 Skidmore provides for a “sliding scale” review looking at numerous 
factors, especially the thoroughness of the agency’s consideration and its 
persuasiveness.186 As further developed below, the more thorough the process 
and agency reasoning accompanying notice-and-comment rulemaking, the more 
the agency will be aided when subsequently faced with judicial “hard look 
review” and linked “reasoned decisionmaking” obligations that focus on 
disputed contentions and agency responsiveness.187 But the very thoroughness 
of resulting agency process and explanation erects hurdles for later proponents 
of policy change. 
 
181 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (stating that “amendment to a legislative rule must itself be legislative” (quoting 
Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (highlighting APA Section 551(5)’s inclusion of “repeal of a rule” as among 
forms of rulemaking). 
182 See Magill, supra note 168, at 1384-85 (describing shift from agencies mostly deciding 
individual cases to agencies promulgating more legislative rules). 
183 Levin, supra note 26, at 1254 (explaining Chevron two-step framework and noting 
second step’s overlap with “arbitrary and capricious review”). 
184 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
185 Id. at 140. For non-notice-and-comment rules or other forms of agency action, the 
framework for judicial review is generally stated in Skidmore. Id. Perez affirmed this. See 
Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (noting that “interpretative rules do not have the force and effect of 
law” (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). For an exploration of the differences between the logic and analyses required 
under Chevron and Skidmore, see Peter L. Strauss, “Deference is Too Confusing—Let’s Call 
Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1153-72 (2012). 
186 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (noting factors for review are “thoroughness evident in [the 
rule’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . .”). 
187 See infra Section II.E (explaining “reasoned decisionmaking” requirement). 
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When it comes to consistency and agency latitude for change, Chevron and 
Skidmore are in tension in their language. In Chevron, a notice-and-comment 
rulemaking resulted in a major change in policy that was upheld by the Supreme 
Court.188 The agency shifted from interpreting “stationary source” to create a 
stack-by-stack trigger for pollution control upgrade obligations to allowing 
states to utilize a “bubble” strategy.189 Under the bubble strategy, polluters 
could, through internal pollution trading, save money by not triggering 
heightened pollution control obligations.190 The agency explained how the 
stack-by-stack approach could chill new investments and raise costs, but at little 
or perhaps no environmental benefit since upgrades might not be made.191 
Instead of viewing the policy change by the EPA as a problem, the Chevron 
Court actually saw policy reconsiderations, and especially the EPA shift under 
review, as laudable. To engage in “informed rulemaking,” the Court declared, 
an agency “must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy 
on a continuing basis.”192 And this obligation, and accompanying judicial 
deference, was viewed as especially necessary “in the context of implementing 
policy decisions in a technical and complex arena.”193 But, importantly, the 
Court also emphasized that, under the statute, the agency unavoidably had to 
reconcile competing policy goals of economic growth and clean air, and found 
that rulemaking comments, empirical observations, and economic theory 
supported the agency’s policy shift.194 
In contrast, the Skidmore case retains “consistency” as one of its sliding scale 
factors weighing in favor of the agency’s policy, and, after Mead, the Skidmore 
framework applies to pretty much all modes of agency action other than formal 
action or notice-and-comment rulemaking.195 However, despite Chevron’s 
language, judges often still consider consistency when assessing the 
reasonableness of an agency decision, even in settings that seem to fall into the 
 
188 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) 
(upholding regulation and articulating deference framework now known as Chevron Two-
Step). 
189 Id. at 840-42, 851-59, 863 (reviewing derivation of “bubble” strategy and reasons for 
its adoption). 
190 See id. at 863 (noting economic growth as justification for agency’s rule). 
191 Id. at 855-63 (emphasizing policy rationales for rule). 
192 Id. at 863-64. 
193 Id. at 863. For discussion of this Chevron language, see Kozel & Pojanowski, supra 
note 7, at 125. This element of Chevron has spawned a massive body of scholarship. See, e.g., 
JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 970-92 (3d 
ed. 2017) (reviewing leading scholarly analyses of Chevron). 
194 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64. 
195 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting “consistency” as factor for 
review). Mead made clear that Skidmore provides the scope of review framework when the 
underlying law or agency’s procedural choices render Chevron deference inapplicable. United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001). 
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heart of Chevron deference.196 One recent study found that consistency was a 
still a prevalent, if not dominant, factor assessed by reviewing courts.197 
C. Inconsistency, Politics, and Facts 
Three major, modern Supreme Court decisions contain extended analyses of 
consistency doctrine and, in particular, the role that politics versus fact-linked 
contingencies can play when agencies seek to justify a policy shift. And a fourth, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, also involved a policy change and discussion of 
permissible grounds for such a shift, although with less of a focus on consistency 
doctrine. In ways that are either being overlooked or mischaracterized in the 
recent change power claims reviewed in Part I, these cases do not embrace 
politics as a sufficient rationale for a policy shift. They do not permit regulatory 
shifts based on regulatory whim. Instead, they note that politics can motivate a 
reexamination of policy, that policy shifts are possible, and say that close policy 
judgment calls go to the agency. But these decisions also emphasize the need for 
an agency to confront fully its earlier actions, its past explanations, and 
especially facts or circumstances relevant to the old and possible new policy. 
Agencies cannot ignore the contingencies—which are made relevant by the 
applicable statutes—that underlie initial actions proposed for later policy 
change. 
The foundational modern case is the Supreme Court’s decision in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm. The case is most known for 
its embrace of “hard look review” and its articulation of the key elements of 
“reasoned decisionmaking.”198 Nonetheless, in its rejection of a Reagan-era 
rescission of promulgated car safety standards, the Court set forth the key 
elements of consistency doctrine.199 The Court was confronted with the National 
 
196 See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (rejecting 
EPA’s newly claimed authority due to several factors, among them its novelty under 
longstanding law); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-75 (2006) (declining to uphold 
Attorney General’s interpretive regulation in part due to inconsistency with past authority 
claims, lack of adequate notice and opportunity for comment, and statute’s allocation of 
particular roles to particular actors); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 747 
(1996) (upholding bank regulation as reasonable under Chevron framework); Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991) (rejecting consistency-based challenge to deference and 
upholding new interpretation of Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) regulation); INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423-24 (1987) (rejecting Chevron deference due to change 
in statutory construction that contradicted clear congressional intent and historically held 
agency interpretation). 
197 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1150 (2008) (finding correlation between win-rate and use of consistency as factor, 
even in cases where Chevron is applied). 
198 Id. at 42-52 (embracing and setting forth key elements of “hard look review” and 
“reasoned decisionmaking”). 
199 Id. at 41-44. 
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Highway Traffic and Safety Administration’s rejection of Standard 208, a 
regulation that required cars to be equipped with either air bags or automatic 
seatbelts.200 The agency, however, only offered an explanation for one of the 
regulatory reversals and argued for minimal judicial scrutiny of its deregulatory 
action.201 
The Court rejected this argument for minimal scrutiny, emphasizing the need 
for an agency to confront its old policy and offer explanation for the change. An 
agency, the Court stated, when “changing its course” is required to “supply a 
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an 
agency does not act in the first instance.”202 Half of the agency’s action was easy 
to find arbitrary and capricious because the agency “apparently gave no 
consideration whatever” to keeping one of the safety strategies.203 “Not one 
sentence of its rulemaking statement discusses the airbags-only option,” the 
Court emphasized.204 
The State Farm Court explained why it declined to subject a deregulatory 
policy change to some less rigorous standard of review. First, the APA made no 
such distinction.205 Second, the enabling act language made no distinction 
between initial regulatory actions and rescissions of past actions.206 Third, the 
Court explained that the usually minimal review of agency declinations to act 
was “substantially different” from an agency’s “revocation of an extant 
regulation.”207 Such revocation “constitutes a reversal of an agency’s former 
views as to the proper course.”208 And, quoting an earlier precedent’s language, 
the Court stated that a “settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s 
informed judgment” that the earlier action “will carry out the policies committed 
to it by Congress.”209 This creates “at least a presumption that those policies will 
be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.”210 
 
200 Id. at 34. 
201 Id. at 41. 
202 Id. at 42. The tail clause, stating that more is required than “when an agency does not 
act in the first instance,” is rejecting arguments that a deregulatory act is akin to an agency’s 
choice not to act or regulate, a setting subject either to no judicial review or deferential review. 
Id.; see supra notes 168-172 and accompanying text (discussing literature and cases on 
unreviewability). 
203 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46. 
204 Id. at 48; see also id. at 50 (stating that “agency submitted no reasons at all”). 
205 See id. at 41. 
206 Id. (noting that National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act “expressly equates 
orders ‘revoking’ and ‘establishing’ safety standards”). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 41-42 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 
412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
210 Id. For an analysis of statutory interpretation and judicial review standards for 
“longstanding” agency law interpretations, see Anita Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency 
Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015). Professor Krishnakumar calls for more 
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Of course, the Court continued, agencies can seek to change policy.211 But 
even with that language, the Court linked the possibility of change not to politics 
or just examination of statutory language, but to the need for “ample latitude to 
‘adopt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’”212 It 
reiterated the “changing circumstances” language and stated that the 
presumption is “against changes in current policy that are not justified by the 
rulemaking record.”213 Hence, the State Farm Court left room for agency policy 
change, but emphasized how past agency reasoning, the record, and underlying 
circumstances would need to be engaged and overcome to justify a change. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a partial dissent, suggested that a change of 
administration and policy priorities could be among the grounds for an agency 
policy shift, although his embrace of politics as a justification for change is 
actually quite modest. He only stated that they could be a “reasonable basis for 
an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and 
regulations.”214 This view did not gain majority support. 
The Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision did not focus on doctrine 
governing consistency and policy change, but it too involved a policy change 
grounded in both a new statutory interpretation, as well as presidential priorities 
and discretion.215 A petition sought EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act of 
GHG emissions from motor vehicles.216 The EPA had earlier claimed authority 
to regulate GHGs as an “air pollutant” in two agency general counsel 
memoranda and related affirmations to Congress.217 Under the new George W. 
Bush Administration, however, the EPA reversed itself, grounding this policy 
change in both a statutory abnegation strategy under which the EPA disavowed 
authority it had earlier claimed, as well as variables linked to presidential 
priorities.218 
The Supreme Court rejected the EPA’s interpretation of the statute as 
unsound.219 It also faulted the EPA for justifying that declination with reference 
 
rigorous review of agency change if based on political factors, but deference if rooted in 
analysis of changing facts, expertise and “experience-based reasons,” and workability. Id. at 
1877-79. 
211 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42. 
212 Id. (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)). 
213 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
214 Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. (“As 
long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess 
administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
215 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510-14 (2007) (describing background of 
how EPA came to its decision not to regulate). 
216 See id. at 505. 
217 See id. at 510-14 (chronicling history of EPA’s interpretation of Clean Air Act). 
218 Id. at 511-14 (describing EPA’s change in policy). 
219 Id. at 528-35 (explaining why EPA’s interpretation was untenable). 
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to factors unrelated to the governing statute’s criteria.220 The agency, the Court 
held, had to base its decision on the statutory criteria and relevant science, not 
extra-textual considerations and politics. It could not “rest[] on reasoning 
divorced from the statutory text.”221 The Court viewed the statute’s broad reach 
and specificity regarding criteria for action as “constrain[ing]” the agency and 
the President–this was “the congressional design.”222 The agency had to make a 
“reasoned judgment” based on the science, “ground[ing] its reasons for action 
or inaction in the statute.”223 The Court required the agency to base its choices 
on the contingencies made relevant by the Clean Air Act, namely whether the 
effects of GHGs and climate change caused “endangerment” within the meaning 
of the statute.224 
The more recent Fox decision and the 2016 Encino Motorcars case further 
flesh out the general framework for the permissible role of politics in agency 
policy change.225 In Fox, the agency had penalized a broadcaster based on a 
policy change regarding “fleeting use” of obscenities on television.226 The 
splintered opinions in Fox render difficult the determination of exactly what 
views regarding policy change garnered majority support.227 Change itself was 
stated not to trigger any significantly heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, 
but all agreed the agency would have to confront the old policy and explain the 
new policy.228 The Justices differed on what had to be weighed. Politics could 
play a part, and for Justice Scalia and an apparent majority aligned with him, 
agencies would have to “show that there are good reasons for the new policy.”229 
All Justices appeared to agree on this need for “good reasons.”230 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, ostensibly for a majority but eliciting some pointed 
differences in the Justice Kennedy concurrence, also stated the following: the 
agency “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the 
 
220 See id. at 532-35 (“The . . . basis for EPA’s decision . . . rests on reasoning divorced 
from the statutory text.”). 
221 Id. at 532. 
222 Id. at 533. 
223 Id. at 534-35. 
224 Id. at 534. 
225 For a review of cases between State Farm and Fox discussing policy change and 
justification, see Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 129-32. Encino Motorcars post-dates 
that article’s analysis, as do the recent policy change power claims reviewed here. 
226 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 505-10 (2009) (reviewing 
history of policy and agency action). 
227 See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 129 (highlighting reasons for splintered Fox 
opinion, especially differences between opinions of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and 
characterizing result as “both thought provoking and deeply enigmatic”). 
228 Fox, 556 U.S. at 514 (reaffirming holding in State Farm, which held that change in 
policy has to be explained by agency). 
229 Id. at 515. 
230 The dissenters would have required more, but indicated no disagreement with the need 
for “good reasons.” See id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new 
policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that 
the agency believes it to be better . . . .”231 The opinions of Justice Scalia and 
Justice Kennedy both also acknowledged that because past policies will tend to 
change the status quo by engendering reliance interests and because prior agency 
actions often involve “factual findings,” reviewing courts may have to look at a 
more developed record with a policy change than with a policy generated 
anew.232 The dissenters argued that agencies will always have to explain why 
the change was made, sharing the expectation that agencies must engage with 
prior facts and justifications.233 
The Encino Motorcars decision, in a majority opinion by Justice Kennedy 
post-dating the death of Justice Scalia, linked this line of cases into one quite 
coherent exegesis that also lacked the uncertainty in Fox that was created by 
multiple opinions. Agencies making a policy change must, as always, “give 
adequate reasons” for their decisions.234 And that, as under typical “hard look 
review” articulated in State Farm, means an agency “must examine the relevant 
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choices made.”235 The Court again 
emphasized the need for assessment of any “reliance interests” and, quoting 
from Fox, stated that a “‘reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts 
and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.’”236 An 
“[u]nexplained inconsistency” is a justification for holding a new agency action 
“arbitrary and capricious.”237 The Encino Motorcars Court notably did not quote 
or refine the Fox language about the agency change not needing to be “better” 
or that an agency’s belief that the new policy was better would be enough, 
leaving its precedential weight and exact meaning still uncertain.238 
 
231 Id. at 515 (plurality opinion). This language appears to have garnered majority support, 
but Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which was needed to form a majority, more heavily 
emphasized the importance of factual justification and the need to check agencies from 
exercising “unbridled discretion” or ignoring contrary or “inconvenient” facts, especially 
since many agency actions are built on “factual findings.” Id. at 536-37 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Encino Motorcars did so with even greater 
emphasis. See infra notes 234-241 and accompanying text. 
232 See Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (noting some cases in which change in policy will require 
more explanation than for initial rule). 
233 Id. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
234 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016). 
235 Id. at 2125 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
236 Id. at 2126 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515-16 (plurality opinion)). 
237 Id. at 2125 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 981 (2005)) (alteration in original). 
238 This language, however, is probably best read to embrace a deferential judicial attitude, 
not permission for unfounded agency action based merely on “belief.” Combining the “good 
reasons” language and “believe it to be better” language is best read to require something akin 
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Importantly, all of these cases share the requirement that agencies engage with 
the “facts and circumstances that underl[ay]” an earlier action.239 Such 
underlying facts and circumstances—which constitute a substantial part of what 
this Article collectively refers to as “contingencies”—will usually be repeatedly 
stated and linked to relevant law by agencies. These cases hence require 
substantial engagement with these contingencies by the later agency proposing 
the policy change. Such underlying facts, linked reasoning, and agency choices 
are virtually always discussed in referenced agency studies, the notice of 
proposed rulemaking, the preamble explaining the final agency rule choices, and 
agency responses to comments that must be provided to satisfy the requirements 
of reasoned decisionmaking.240 They are usually relevant to the assessment of 
the problem triggering agency regulation and also discussed in the agency’s 
justification of the ultimate regulatory choice. 
Hence, under the Court’s express language, a subsequent agency effort to 
amend or roll back a previous regulatory policy will require engagement with 
these materials and related sources of contestation. “Unexplained inconsistency” 
is not permissible.241 As introduced above and analyzed in greater detail below, 
several major deregulatory proposals emphasize the possibility of policy change 
and a place for politics, but barely acknowledge the Supreme Court’s persistent 
doctrinal emphasis over thirty years that an agency must address contingencies, 
namely underlying facts, science, circumstances, the record, and the agency’s 
past reasoning. 
D. Additional Consistency Meta-Rules 
Several other administrative law meta-rules further constrain agencies, 
especially if they are tempted to deviate from past policy and practices but 
sidestep contrary evidence, arguments, or try to avoid direct declaration that they 
are doing so. 
Perhaps most important is the agency’s obligation to act consistently with its 
own commitments and practices. If an agency has, in a promulgated regulation, 
made a substantive or procedural choice, then it (along with affected 
stakeholders and courts as well) will, under the United States ex rel. Accardi v. 
Shaughnessy242 doctrine, have to abide by that commitment.243 Change, if it is 
 
to “reasonable belief” in the proffered good reasons for the policy change, not proof that it is 
“better” than the initial policy. This makes it like most deference regimes, leaving agencies a 
space within which they can make and remake policy, if they provide adequate justifications. 
See Levin, supra note 16, at 573 (interpreting this language as consistent with Chevron, Brand 
X, and basic requirements of explanation under arbitrary and capricious review standards). 
239 Fox, 556 U.S. at 516. 
240 In fact, as explained below, during litigation, those justifications will be reiterated and 
likely sharpened. See infra notes 275-280 and accompanying text. 
241 Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981). 
242 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
243 Id. at 265-68. 
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to be made, will need to be done at the same level of procedural formality.244 
Until changed, the agency and all others will need to follow that rule–the 
promulgated regulation remains governing law until validly changed.245 
Even without a promulgated regulatory commitment, agency practices and 
policies revealed or declared over time through other modes, especially 
adjudications, create the agency’s working law and will also constrain an agency 
and require ongoing consistency or rational explanation for change.246 Only by 
confronting and, in a reasoned explanation, justifying some change can an 
agency deviate.247 Agencies cannot vacillate all over the map.248 They must treat 
similarly situated people alike. Should agencies be erratic, they will usually be 
held arbitrary in their policies.249 And, as clarified in the Allentown Mack Sales 
& Service v. NLRB250 decision, if an agency has declared one rule but perhaps 
deviated in practice, the Supreme Court has declared that the governing standard 
must be what is declared: “the rule announced [must be] the rule applied.”251 
As further revealed by Judulang v. Holder,252 erratic agency actions in the 
form of overall inconsistency, or consistent inconsistency, will also lead to 
judicial rejection.253 Agency action cannot “hang[] on the fortuity of an 
 
244 See Sierra Club v. EPA, 873 F.3d 946, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Am. Mining Cong. v. 
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
245 Judicial rejection of postponement and stay strategies emphasize this point. See infra 
Section II.G. 
246 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 
(1973) (stating agency adjudications can “serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency 
policies” and that agency departing from established policy must “explain its departure from 
prior norms”); see also supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (analyzing more modern 
cases involving court scrutiny of agencies changing policy over series of adjudicatory actions 
and related policy revelations). 
247 See Atchison, 412 U.S. at 802, 807-08 (stating that there is “at least a presumption that 
those policies will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to” but then identifying 
permissible grounds for policy). 
248 Todd D. Rakoff, Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB—A First Circuit Opinion, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 477, 478-79 (2014) (discussing then-Judge Breyer’s opinion in Shaw’s 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1989), and its call for agencies to 
“follow[] or consciously change[]” policy but not “have one rule for Monday, another for 
Tuesday” (citations omitted)). 
249 See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“But where the 
agency has failed to provide even that minimal level of analysis, its action is arbitrary and 
capricious . . . .”). 
250 522 U.S. 359 (1998). 
251 Id. at 375. 
252 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
253 See Id. at 61 (emphasizing that “longstanding capriciousness receives no special 
exemption from the APA” and finding that “BIA has repeatedly vacillated in its method for 
applying § 212(c) to deportable aliens”). 
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individual official’s decision.”254 The Court condemned the agency tribunal (the 
Board of Immigration Appeals) for lacking decisional criteria connected to “the 
goals of the deportation process or the rational operation of immigration laws,” 
making it a “sport of chance.”255 Such agency policy, or really lack of a 
consistent policy, was hence illegal arbitrary and capricious action under the 
APA.256 
In addition, a related meta-rule is evident in the practices of government 
rulemaking itself. Agency rulemakings must give all fair notice of what is 
proposed.257 A final rule that differs too much from a proposal can be rejected 
as not a “logical outgrowth” of the proposal and remanded for more adequate 
notice-and-comment opportunities.258 Courts will also decline to defer to an 
agency’s newly declared policy if it goes beyond what the public would have 
expected and addressed in comments. This is especially evident in recent 
preemption case law. Agencies that claim preemptive impact of federal 
approvals or actions in litigation or possibly regulatory preambles will be 
ignored or reviewed with no deference if that preemption claim is inconsistent 
with the earlier noticed commitments.259 Hence, a vague or conclusory proposal 
to change policy, or major changes between a proposal and final rule, can also 
lead to rejection of a changed policy. Yet again, courts expect and police for 
agency consistency with procedural norms and with the agency’s stated 
commitments or proposals. 
E. Reasoned Decisionmaking as a Constraint 
Perhaps most importantly, the long-established requirement that agencies 
engage in “reasoned decisionmaking” provides a brake on erratic or unexplained 
sudden change, or actions that disregard statutory criteria and process. The 
obligation of agencies to engage in reasoned decisionmaking is among the most 
 
254 Id. at 58. 
255 Id. (citing Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
256 See id. at 59. 
257 See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985). 
258 See id.; Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 733, 744-46 (2016) (characterizing modern “logical outgrowth” doctrine as 
requiring that proposals “be detailed and specific enough to alert potential commentators,” 
including initial disclosure of “key data and studies they relied upon”). 
259 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (rejecting FDA claim that its less 
stringent FDA actions could preempt stricter state requirements, but in opinion focusing on 
lack of notice of such plan); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (rejecting Attorney 
General’s claim of power without express statutory authority, specific statutory allocations of 
regulatory authority, and no preceding notice or deliberation over such power claim). Some 
have analyzed these rejections as partly attributable to lack of agency opportunities for 
political input. See Bressman, supra note 69, at 775-89. For a discussion of how courts 
reviewing agency claims of preemptive impact utilize a variant of “hard look review,” see 
Buzbee, supra note 85, at 1547-80. 
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durable of administrative law tenets due to its roots in several overlapping facets 
of the APA and the doctrine framing judicial review of agency action.260 This 
term and the obligations it imposes involve an overlapping amalgam of statutory 
interpretation frames, Chevron Step Two “reasonableness” review, the fleshing 
out of arbitrary and capricious review and, relatedly, what “hard look review” 
requires of courts and agencies subjected to judicial review, especially regarding 
a policy change.261 
First, reasoned decisionmaking law establishes—as do virtually all 
administrative law doctrines—that all agency decisionmaking must be framed 
by what governing statutes identify as relevant goals, criteria, and process.262 
Any failures to abide by those statutory mandates will flunk. Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe263 (“Overton Park”) and State Farm both require 
agencies to base their decisions on the “relevant factors.”264 Likewise, in 
rejecting the agency’s explanation for turning down a petition, the Supreme 
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA emphasized that the agency had to base its 
actions (or choices not to act) on assessments called for by statutory criteria.265 
By so rejecting reliance on non-statutory political considerations, agency 
latitude to follow the political winds or expediency was constrained. As others 
have noted, the case called for a more expertise-based mode of decisionmaking 
that required attention to facts made relevant by the governing statute.266 
Second, SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I)267 requires that agencies provide 
a reasoned contemporaneous explanation when they act and then consistently 
 
260 Much of this doctrine is rooted in judicial constructions of the APA’s judicial review 
provisions. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2012). 
261 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-44 
(1983) (linking cases and explaining contours of required agency explanation and judicial 
review). For an analysis of, and argument in favor of, the overlap of Chevron Step Two 
reasonableness review, State Farm “hard look review,” and the need for courts to distinguish 
language interpretation choices from factually-contingent and expertise-based derivation of 
policy governed by “reasoned decisionmaking” precedents, see Sharkey, supra note 70 at 
2384, 2394-96. 
262 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007), similarly confirms the importance of 
reasoned decisionmaking by emphasizing the agency obligation to ground its actions in 
assessment of factors in the statutory text. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
263 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
264 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (linking Overton Park and other precedents and factors that 
are now referred to as heart of “hard look review”). 
265 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532-33 (stating agency cannot rely on “reasoning 
divorced from the statutory text” and rejecting political “laundry list of reasons not to 
regulate”). 
266 See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 54, 66, 99-101 (describing Massachusetts 
v. EPA as “expertise forcing” and constraining influence of politics); Watts, supra note 17, at 
21-22 (same). 
267 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
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stick with that explanation.268 Agencies in any rulemaking thus cannot 
strategically adjust their rationales to fend off attacks, but will also have to 
amplify on the reasonableness of the initial explanation.269 Hence, an agency 
considering a policy change will not only confront an earlier initial agency 
choice that necessarily grapples with underlying contested issues and facts, but 
also later consistent, though likely more fulsome, explanation defending that 
policy in court.270 
Furthermore, Overton Park creates similar incentives.271 It authorizes more 
intrusive judicial review of agency actions, and possibly even court testimony 
and cross examination of regulators, when an agency does not adequately 
explain its choices initially or make clear reference to a supportive record.272 To 
avoid such judicial probing, agencies are usually careful to provide findings or 
explicitly stated rationales that engage relevant law, comments, and facts.273 
Because stakeholders know the importance of an agency getting its initial choice 
right, all will make sure that studies, comments, data, and supporting 
submissions to the agency (and later, courts) weave an additional, but still 
consistent, supportive tapestry of rationales and evidence.274 
 
268 Id. at 90. 
269 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 
(1973) (stating that courts “must rely on the rationale adopted by the agency if we are to 
guarantee the integrity of the administrative process”). 
270 Justice Kennedy’s Fox concurrence appears to be describing this sort of agency 
amplification of the factual grounds for an initial action. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
556 U.S. 502, 537 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(explaining why agency record “may be much more developed”). 
271 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417-19 (1971). 
272 See id. at 419-20. 
273 See generally Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls 
Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992) 
(discussing politics influencing Overton Park battle and incentives created by Court’s 
decision). 
274 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council goes 
further, in the NEPA context, by requiring commenters to make clear their views or later be 
foreclosed. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 554 (1978). NEPA-specific “hard look” obligations now overlap in logic and language 
with “reasoned decisionmaking” requirements and “hard look review” as embraced in State 
Farm. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374-78 (1989) (stating that 
NEPA requires agencies to take “hard look” at environmental effects of planned action and 
citing APA precedents for roots of judicial review under NEPA); WildEarth Guardians v. 
Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 302-03 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (describing NEPA as “essentially procedural” 
statute that obligates agency to consider every significant impact of proposed action and 
requires “informed decision making”); Powder River Basin Res. Council v. U.S. Bureau of 
Land Mgmt., 37 F. Supp. 3d 59, 71 (D.D.C. 2014) (stating that reviewing court must ensure 
that agency acting under NEPA has examined relevant data, articulated rational connection 
between facts found and choices made, and that agency made no “clear error of judgment”). 
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Relatedly, reasoned decisionmaking scrutiny often focuses on how the agency 
responded not just to disputes over statutory interpretation, but disputes over on-
the-ground realities such as relevant risks, business practices, science, costs, and 
the like. An agency that ignores salient issues or sweeps away cogent challenges 
and criticisms faces quick and easy rejection in the courts.275 A well-counseled 
agency, assuming the agency has a firm legal and factual basis for its regulatory 
choice, will therefore directly engage with its challengers’ and supporters’ key 
claims and issues in dispute and explain why the agency’s action is well 
justified.276 This will occur both within a rulemaking procedure and again in the 
courts. 
This process of contestation and cogent response results in a dialectical, 
iterative sort of tightening of explanations due to close engagement with 
contested claims and arguments.277 Much as reply briefs often provide the most 
incisive analysis, fiercely challenged regulations result in ever more cogent 
agency explanations that virtually always engage and reject the very facts and 
claims that later change advocates embrace. 
This hybrid of substantive and process review of an agency’s initial regulation 
results in a hefty body of reason-giving and related identification of which 
studies, facts and related policy predictions matter. When, at a later time, a 
president or agency seeks to reverse course and jettison the old rule, all of those 
contingent facts and reasoning will need to be engaged. It is a near certainty that 
the circumstances in Encino Motorcars will arise again, such that changes will 
require substantial agency explanation. Not only are reliance interests likely, but 
“facts and circumstances that underlay” the initial action will also be many and 
will have been repeatedly identified, articulated, and sharpened during the 
regulatory and later adversarial process.278 
 
275 For a discussion of lead cases on such rejections in the setting of policy changes, see 
infra Sections II.G, II.H. Judicial rejections of agency actions due to lack of adequate notice 
or agency failures to respond to salient comments and criticism are legion. See, e.g., Am. 
Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236-41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting agency 
action for failure to provide adequate notice regarding studies relied on and failure to respond 
to comments); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 
494 F.3d 188, 199-206 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (faulting agency for failing to provide adequate 
notice, especially for undisclosed change in methodology); Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ 
Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 813-18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (remanding regulation because 
agency failed to explain rejection of alternatives identified in salient comments made by state 
officials, and discussing State Farm’s confirmation of agency obligation to explain its 
choices). 
276 Scholarship on regulatory ossification links such frozen or slowly changing regulation 
to the rigor of such review. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
277 See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative 
Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011) (analyzing how sequences of cases over same or linked 
agency actions can lead to agency-court dialog providing deliberative benefits and sharpening 
of analysis). 
278 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2008).  
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An agency pursuing a policy change will thus have to confront outside 
stakeholders’ submissions and explain its own rejection of materials, 
explanations, and arguments that it previously identified as justifying a contrary 
earlier choice.279 Even if the agency hopes somehow to avoid such engagement, 
stakeholders supportive of the initial policy will put the agency’s own earlier 
words and logic back before it and again later before the courts. With such 
comments and arguments back before it, the agency will need to respond, leave 
no “unexplained inconsistency,” and justify its choice with “good reasons” or 
face judicial rejection.280 
Policy change is thus possible, but an agency that proposes a policy change 
while also trying to sidestep science, studies, data, and the agency’s own past 
explanations will, due to these linked facets of reasoned decisionmaking’s 
requirements, be vulnerable to judicial rejection. Because few agencies will set 
themselves up for failure, cases involving agency policy change and addressing 
inadequate explanation and engagement are rarer than might be expected. Still, 
their conclusions are remarkably consistent.281 
F. Agency Record and Deliberative Conformity 
One sometimes overlooked facet of consistency doctrine is how agencies, in 
a sequence of deliberations leading to action, will create a constraining set of 
materials, especially where they are based on conclusions about evidence, data, 
or science. Much of this law arises out of the early doctrinal development of 
administrative law, building on the declaration in Universal Camera Corp. v. 
NLRB282 of what “substantial evidence” review requires.283 Courts had to devise 
rules guiding the obligations of agencies and courts where administrative law 
judges or other subordinate agency officials assess evidence underpinning an 
action that then moves up the regulatory hierarchy. 
Although the nuances of this early law are of little significance to this Article, 
one central tenet remains settled and important: agency officials cannot 
disregard the evidentiary, science, or data-based judgments generated by, and 
 
279 Justice Kennedy notes this. Id. at 535, 537 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (discussing “reasoned explanation” obligation, and stating that 
“agency cannot simply disregard contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made 
in the past, any more than it can ignore inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate”). 
280 See supra Section II.C (discussing this element of Fox and Encino Motorcars). 
281 See infra Sections II.G, II.H (discussing cases of judicial rejection of agency policy 
changes). 
282 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
283 Id. at 491 (clarifying that courts must look at supportive and contrary evidence, and 
also indicating that reviewing courts need to include subordinate administrative judge’s 
finding in evidence assessed). This logic has been applied to tax court decisions. See Ballard 
v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 59 (2005) (holding that record on appeal must include special tax 
court judges’ reports). 
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then moving through, the agency’s process and hierarchy.284 Some types of 
determinations may be binding while others may not be, but senior regulators 
cannot wholly disregard what was generated earlier by hierarchical 
subordinates. Here too, like the requirements of reasoned decisionmaking, 
agency decisionmakers must engage with what came before. 
The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA285 case is 
illustrative, although with a state-federal wrinkle. The Supreme Court upheld the 
EPA’s power to issue orders declaring that a state air pollution permit was 
illegally lax, in part because career state regulators, and then EPA officials, 
documented better methods of pollution control. State political leadership had 
embraced a more relaxed approach with little factual support.286 The Court, like 
the EPA, looked at the underlying regulatory stringency with close attention to 
the findings of regulatory subordinates and how senior regulators grappled with 
that information.287 The EPA and the Supreme Court rejected the unfounded 
politicized state embrace of laxity.288 
Similarly, and also in a federalism-laden case, the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. 
Levine289 rejected FDA’s new claim that its regulatory approvals preempted 
common law regimes, but without the agency offering advance public notice of 
such a plan.290 The Court noted the agency’s failure to notify the world of this 
possible claim of preemptive impact, as well as the agency’s failure to explain 
what justified the change in policy, failure to engage contrary views, and other 
lack of factual and reasoned justification.291 
G. The Losing Track Record of Poorly Explained Policy Changes 
Several key precedents, in applying these intertwined bodies of doctrine, 
illuminate both what agencies can and should do in changing policies, but also 
illuminate grounds for judicial rejection. These precedents also reveal that the 
rigor with which administrations justify their policy changes shapes the judicial 
reception. Courts take this body of doctrine seriously. 
 
284 See, e.g., Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting EPA licensing use of pesticide due to failure to reconcile earlier statements about 
needed additional analysis and final action taken without such data). 
285 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
286 See id. at 484-88 (contrasting professional staff’s conclusions and contrary lax decision 
by heads of state agency and noting lack of record support for business hardship claim seeking 
permit in Court opinion upholding EPA’s powers to reject permit). 
287 Id. 
288 See id. at 485. 
289 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
290 Id. at 581. For a discussion of how Wyeth embraces a variant of “hard look review” and 
emphasizes need for adequate agency process and engagement with claims about impacts of 
policy choices, see Buzbee, supra note 85, at 1566-73. 
291 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563-581. 
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Both advocates of politically-driven policy change and critics of the alleged 
ease of change, such as Justice Gorsuch, refer to the Chevron case to confirm 
their views.292 It is true that the Supreme Court in Chevron upheld an agency’s 
(the EPA’s) policy change, and even praised agency policy reconsideration as 
something an agency “must” do.293 However, the change at issue—allowing 
states regulating “stationary sources” to utilize a facility-wide bubble strategy 
that allowed internal pollution trading instead of a stack-by-stack regulatory 
approach—actually was far from radical and was not justified based on some 
version of presidential power to rule by fiat.294 The agency utilized a notice-and-
comment process, still pursued cleaner air, and still was regulating the 
sources.295 The agency, and later the Supreme Court, justified the new bubble 
strategy as appropriately “reconciling” dueling goals of the Clean Air Act, 
namely clean air and economic growth.296 Moreover, the agency and 
commenters directly engaged with the earlier approach in explaining the new 
bubble strategy, offered economic analyses and observations about how 
previous stack-by-stack regulation could deter operational improvements, and 
explained how such a bubble strategy should lead to more cost-effective 
regulation.297 The case involved changed means to achieve a consistently 
defined end, with careful hewing to the statute’s relevant factors, and basis in 
logic and the record for the choice. A rule was replaced with another rule. 
As a case upholding a policy change, therefore, Chevron does provide 
guidance. But it is rooted in far more than just identification of a linguistic 
ambiguity or presidential leanings.298 In upholding the new approach under what 
today would be called Chevron Step Two, the Court and agency both examined 
the rationales for the old and new policy, and looked for and found good reasons 
for the new policy. Its logic and conclusions neatly fit within the consistency 
law frameworks set forth years later in Fox and Encino Motorcars, although 
 
292 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
293 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984). 
294 See id. at 855-66 (reviewing policy rationales, incentives for new investments created 
by policy options, economics literature, record support, and legislative history as part of 
Court’s upholding of EPA’s bubble rule as reasonable). 
295 Id.  
296 Id. at 865. 
297 Id. at 863; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
298 The Court did identify presidential electoral accountability as among the grounds for 
deference to the agency’s new policy. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“While agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for 
this political branch of the Government to make such policy choice.”). Mead later emphasized 
the quasi-democratic accountability of notice-and-comment rulemaking as a usual 
precondition for Chevron deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-31 
(2001). 
  
1410 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1349 
 
those two cases’ policy shifts met varied fates due to the inconsistent rigor of 
their agencies’ change explanations.299 
State Farm is at the other end of the lessons spectrum, illustrating what 
agencies absolutely cannot do in changing policy.300 The abandonment by the 
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) of the 
previous regulatory requirement of seatbelts or airbags, with no explanation for 
the abandonment of the airbag alternative, was firmly rejected.301 Similarly, the 
agency’s poor logic in abandoning the requirement of seatbelts also led to 
rejection.302 
Agencies still sometimes fail to heed the guidance provided by these cases, 
seeking to change policy but without full engagement with the earlier rules’ 
rationales, evidence, and finalized requirements. Courts reject such agency 
actions. Several appellate cases addressing regulatory policy shifts under several 
different presidential administrations offer such analysis after Fox and even in 
one case after Encino Motorcars as well. 
For example, in North Carolina Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm 
Workers’,303 the Fourth Circuit rejected as unlawful an action during the Obama 
Administration by the Department of Labor.304 The Department sought to 
suspend current regulations and return to earlier regulations, while also trying to 
restrict comments so they would not focus on the substance of the regulations to 
be abandoned or the overall regulatory result.305 The agency lost across the 
board.306 First, it made no difference that the agency claimed to be “reinstating” 
an old rule; a rule change was a rule change and had to surmount the same 
 
299 Fox involved a new interpretation of a broad authority grant, and a “value judgment” 
about policing of obscenity on television. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 
502, 512 (2009). The Court upheld the policy shift, noting how the FCC had engaged with its 
past policy and explained its new choice. Id. at 513-16. Encino Motorcars rejected the 
Department of Labor’s policy shift, emphasizing the need for full and forthright agency 
acknowledgment of its past policies and explanation for a policy shift. Encino Motorcars, 
LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2123-24, 2126-27 (2016). 
300 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
301 Id. at 46-51. 
302 Id. at 51-57 (reviewing and rejecting seatbelt reversal logic and factual basis); see also 
GOLDEN, supra note 74, at 40-60 (exploring internal NHTSA dynamics leading to this poorly 
pursued policy change, with political appointees pursuing pre-ordained outcome and failing 
to allow agency professionals input or opportunity to strengthen deregulatory shift). 
303 702 F.3d 755 (4th Cir. 2012). 
304 Id. at 759 (“[W]e hold that the district court did not err in invalidating the Department’s 
action on the ground that it was arbitrary and capricious.”). 
305 See id. at 760-62. 
306 Id. at 759. 
  
2018] THE TETHERED PRESIDENT 1411 
 
process to be effective.307 The court also restricted the agency justification to 
that offered at the time, as required by Chenery I.308 
Of greatest importance to this Article, the court in North Carolina Growers 
stated that the agency’s effort to constrain comment content while trying to 
change a policy violated both the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions and the 
core “reasoned decisionmaking” requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in 
the State Farm case.309 Because an agency has to “consider . . . important 
aspect[s] of the problem” underlying the regulation, it must allow comment on 
and respond to “relevant, significant issues raised during those proceedings.”310 
The court further faulted the agency for refusing to receive comments on issues 
“integral” to sorting out the rationales for the actions under reconsideration. This 
denied commenters the “meaningful opportunity” for comment required by the 
APA and hence “ignored important aspects of the problem.”311 
In a concurrence, Judge Wilkinson offered a concise but powerful essay.312 
He distinguished between an agency’s power to revisit a policy—a “seesaw” he 
said was permissible since “[n]o one expects agency views to be frozen in 
time”—and “changes in course” that “cannot be solely a matter of political 
winds and currents.”313 A policy “pivot” must be “accomplished with at least 
some fidelity to law and legal process.”314 If not, then “whim and caprice” will 
rule and “business planning” will be disrupted.315 Agency change must be 
accompanied by “a measure of deliberation and, hopefully, some fair grounding 
in statutory text and evidence.”316 To allow the agency’s sidestepping of 
comment and engagement with the record would “generate a blueprint for 
agency unaccountability.”317 Judge Wilkinson’s formulation closely tracks the 
logic and requirements of the Supreme Court’s consistency cases, 
acknowledging the change power but pointing out why policy change must be 
accompanied by full and adequate process, show engagement with past facts and 
rationales, and find justification in the law’s text and relevant evidence. Unlike 
Justice Gorsuch, he views the prevailing law as not allowing such policy shifts 
without full participation, engagement, and agency justification. 
 
307 See id. at 765 (“We are not persuaded by the Farm Workers’ textual argument that, 
under the APA, the act of ‘reinstating’ a rule does not qualify as ‘formulating’ a rule.”). 
308 Id. at 767-68 (“We consider an explanation for good cause that the agency has advanced 
at the time of the rule making.”). 
309 Id. (citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
23 (1983)). 
310 Id. at 769. 
311 Id. at 769-70 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
312 Id. at 771-72 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
313 Id. at 772. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. 
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Similarly, in the Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson318 case from 
the Reagan Administration, the D.C. Circuit firmly rejected an Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) action for violating several 
fundamental tenets of consistency doctrine, emphasizing an agency’s obligation 
to engage with salient issues and choices it or stakeholders raised.319 The agency 
had proposed, but ultimately did not issue, a short-term workplace exposure 
standard for ethylene oxide.320 In explaining its own precedents as applied to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act’s “substantial evidence” standard, the court 
emphasized the agency obligation “to identify relevant factual evidence, to 
explain the logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state 
candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present its reasons for 
rejecting any significant contrary evidence and argument.”321 Even though the 
agency choice involved the cutting edge of knowledge, and imperfect science 
and predictive judgment, the changed agency choice had to be rejected because 
the agency “simply [did] not exercise[] its expertise.”322 By failing to engage 
with key questions, OSHA had violated the State Farm mandate that agencies 
cannot “entirely fail[] to consider an important aspect of the problem.”323 
H. The Trump Administration Regulatory Shortcuts and Judicial Rejections 
In several of the Trump Administration’s early regulatory actions, agencies 
similarly sought to sidestep engagement with evidence and rationales 
underpinning earlier finalized actions, usually promulgated notice-and-comment 
regulations. These agencies proposed in one form or another to stay, suspend, or 
postpone these earlier finalized regulations or in other ways sought a shortcut to 
achieve deregulation.324 They also sometimes intimated that they might later 
issue a new rule. In seeking to undo earlier finalized regulations in this several-
step manner, they also sought to limit comment. This appears to be a strategy 
pursued in over a dozen regulatory settings.325 By mid-2018, this strategy 
 
318 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
319 Id. at 1481, 1507. 
320 See id. at 1482. 
321 Id. at 1485 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 
1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
322 Id. at 1505. 
323 Id. at 1507 (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
324 See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text. 
325 See, e.g., Dlouhy & Levin, supra note 97. The EPA’s 2018 promulgation of an 
“applicability date” rule suspending the effect of the still-valid Clean Water Rule utilized a 
similar strategy. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. Just before this Article’s 
publication, a federal district court invalidated the “applicability date” regulation—referred 
to as the Suspension Rule—due to splintering of the regulatory process, failures to provide 
“meaningful opportunity for comment,” and failures to comply with the APA, including 
minimal engagement with science underpinning the Clean Water Rule. S.C. Coastal 
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resulted in numerous judicial rejections similarly concluding that such 
sidestepping of earlier regulatory substance, rationales, and basic APA 
procedures is an illegal circumvention of fundamental administrative law 
precepts.  
These cases substantially followed the reasoning of decisions from the 
Reagan era that rejected several agencies’ efforts to postpone or sidestep the 
effect of finalized regulations, but without full use of a new notice and comment 
process.326 A few are summarized here.327 
After the EPA in 2017 granted industry stay and reconsideration petitions 
regarding a final promulgated rule regulating methane leaks from oil and gas 
operations, the D.C. Circuit in Clean Air Council v. Pruitt328 (“Clean Air 
Council”) found that the agency’s action suffered from several illegalities.329 It 
ran afoul of the particular statutory requirements of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 
the implications of the underlying record, and administrative law principles.330 
The agency could not rely on a special CAA provision authorizing 
reconsideration and stays for overlooked issues, which were both raised and 
 
Conservation League v. Pruitt, No. 2:18-cv-00330, slip op. at 6-18 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2018); 
see also infra notes 329-337 and accompanying text. 
326 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 808, 814-18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting 
agency’s postponements and deferrals of regulatory obligations under finalized regulation as 
inconsistent with obligation to change rule with rule, and discussing cases addressing same 
issue and reaching same result). 
327 Several notable other 2017 and 2018 rejections of deregulatory actions involving 
assorted shortcuts from usual full notice-and-comment process are not discussed in the text. 
See Pineros Y Campesinos Unidos Del Noroeste v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1066-67 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting pesticide application regulation delay as unlawful and 
emphasizing need to allow comment on substantive change to finalized regulation); Sierra 
Club v. Pruitt, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1057-61 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (rejecting yearlong delay in 
implementation of formaldehyde emissions regulation as violation of enabling act and APA); 
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 570-76 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (rejecting for APA and 
statutory violations multi-agency effort to create expansive new exemptions from Affordable 
Care Act contraceptive coverage mandate but without providing any advance notice-and-
comment process). One decision linked to the BLM methane waste prevention rule issued a 
judicial stay of the rule’s “phase-in provisions” during the pendency of a timely challenge to 
that rule and in light of a pending substantive revision expected to be completed “within a 
period of months.” Wyoming v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 2:16-cv-0280, slip op. at 10 
(D. Wyo. Apr. 4, 2018). The rejection of the Suspension Rule in South Carolina Coastal 
Conservation League v. Pruitt includes text and footnote collection of judicial rejections of 
other “hastily enacted rules.” S.C. Coastal Conservation League, slip op. at 11-12 & n.2. 
328 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
329 Id. at 14 (holding that EPA’s decision to grant industry stay was arbitrary and 
capricious). 
330 See id. (holding that administrative record made clear that “industry groups had ample 
opportunity to comment” during notice-and-comment period and Clean Air Act “did not 
authorize” EPA to issue stay). 
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addressed.331 Petitioners and the agency also could not claim some agency final 
rule surprise flunking “logical outgrowth” requirements as justification for a 
stay.332 Furthermore, the Clean Air Council court stuck with long established 
law that an agency cannot “suspend” a rule’s compliance deadlines or alter the 
effective date because “such orders are tantamount to amending or revoking a 
rule.”333 Any such amendment or revocation required a new notice-and-
comment process because “an agency issuing a legislative rule is itself bound by 
the rule until that rule is amended or revoked[,]” and that would require notice-
and-comment.334 To allow such a stay of a rule would be contrary to APA 
consistency and rule of law norms, would lack a statutory basis, and could only 
be upheld on grounds contemporaneously offered by the agency.335 None were 
offered that were legally sufficient. The stay was therefore itself arbitrary and 
capricious.336 The court acknowledged that policy change remained a 
possibility, but quoted the Supreme Court’s Fox opinion and its call for “good 
reasons” for a change.337 
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit later rejected with similar logic and substantially 
overlapping statutory analysis another CAA-based rule, in this case an effort to 
promulgate a “Delay Rule” to delay the effective date of the 2017 “Chemical 
Disaster Rule” for twenty months.338 The court found that the statute set forth 
constraining and specific conditions for delayed regulatory effectiveness and 
allowed only a limited three month delay, both of which were violated by the 
EPA’s Delay Rule.339 The court also faulted the EPA for not engaging with its 
own earlier “determinations and findings,” or its new “departure from its 
[earlier] stated reasoning.”340 It thereby violated its “reasoned decisionmaking” 
obligations under consistency cases and other foundational APA precedents, 
rendering its action arbitrary and capricious.341 
 
331 Id. at 9-14 (discussing four issues raised during notice-and-comment period and 
observing that EPA incorporated comments directly into final rule). 
332 Id. (holding that EPA’s initial final rule proposed for change did not fail logical 
outgrowth test). 
333 Id. at 6. 
334 Id. at 9 (quoting Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 
227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
335 Id. (holding that EPA did not establish it had inherent authority to issue stay of final 
rule under statute). 
336 Id. at 14. 
337 Id. (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
338 Air All. Hous. v. EPA, No. 17-1155, slip op. at 19-36 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 2018). 
339 Id. at 19-27 (reviewing statutory limitations on delaying effectiveness of initial rule, 
even if done through another rulemaking). 
340 Id. at 27-36. 
341 Id. at 31-37; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 
829 (9th Cir. 2018). The Wheeler case reviewed and rejected another accelerated EPA 
regulatory action–a reversal of course by the EPA in deciding not to regulate chlorpyrifos. 
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Becerra v. United States Department of the Interior,342 a district court 
opinion, involved a similar agency attempt to stay and not enforce a final 
regulation through a “postponement.”343 The government’s lawyers heavily 
relied on Section 705 of the APA, a provision that authorizes, in specified 
settings, an agency to “postpone the effective date of action taken by it . . . .”344 
But following one earlier decision addressing this argument, the court held that 
this provision by its terms does not apply to a finalized rule that has “gone into 
effect.”345 
The Becerra court, like Clean Air Council and Air Alliance Houston v. 
EPA,346 drew support from the same rule of law and administrative regularity 
principles reviewed above: the judge found “no precedent or legislative history 
to support a Congressional delegation of such broad authority to bypass the APA 
repeal process for a duly promulgated regulation.”347 To allow the Department’s 
postponement would undercut fundamental tenets about the binding nature of 
regulations and the need for a new rulemaking to undo an earlier rule.348 
Otherwise, an agency could, with lengthy postponements in effect, abandon a 
rule but without opportunities for “comment on the wisdom of repeal,” or agency 
justification of a policy change.349 
A fourth decision similarly faulted a regulatory stay effort by the Bureau of 
Land Management as an illegal effort to circumvent the binding nature of 
finalized regulations.350 Judge Elizabeth LaPorte’s decision was especially 
 
Under EPA’s reversal, it declined to revoke permissible “tolerance” levels for the pesticide 
after several preceding notices and findings indicated that its substantial health risks required 
revocation of such tolerances. Id. at 818-21 (reviewing regulatory history). The court rejected 
EPA’s claim that the court lacked jurisdiction, noted that it received no pro-government merits 
arguments, but concluded that the EPA’s failure to engage with contrary past findings and 
science coupled with the statute’s protective mandates rendered the action unlawful. Id. at 
821-29. 
342 276 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
343 Id. passim (discussing state agency’s postponement action). 
344 Id. at 963 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012)). 
345 Id. at 963-64. The earlier decision was Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). 
346 No. 17-1155, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 2018). 
347 Becerra, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 964-65. 
348 Id. (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 762 (3d Cir. 1982), and 
Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 446 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), aff’d mem., Process Gas Consumers v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 
463 U.S. 1216 (1983)). 
349 Becerra, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 966 (quoting Consumer Energy Council of Am., 673 F.2d 
at 446). Air Alliance similarly stated that EPA may not employ “delay tactics” to effectively 
repeal a final rule while sidestepping the statutorily mandated process for revising or repealing 
that rule on the merits. Air All. Hous. v. EPA, No. 17-1155, slip op. at 27 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 17, 
2018). 
350 California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
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thorough in linking precedent regarding reasoned decisionmaking to analysis of 
when and how an agency can abandon a previous regulation. “New presidential 
administrations are entitled to change policy decisions, but to meet the 
requirements of the APA they must give reasoned explanations for those 
changes and ‘address [the] prior factual findings’ underpinning a prior 
regulatory regime.”351 Failure to do so is arbitrary and capricious.352 
Although involving a different sort of regulatory sidestep and hence a 
different setting for judicial review, the Trump Administration in 2017, through 
a legal opinion of the Attorney General and then action by the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”), declared it would abandon the Obama 
Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) 
program.353 Unlike the initial regulations underlying the three earlier decisions 
just reviewed, the DACA program was not a finalized notice-and-comment 
regulation, but instead a written, factually explained policy of regulatory 
forbearance.354 The Obama Administration had justified this program with 
reference to precedents supporting such agency forbearance and prioritization of 
activities, as well as statutory language providing this latitude.355 And, in 
explaining itself, it discussed the children’s plight and ways DACA would be 
sound policy and comply with the law.356 
Under the Trump Administration, the 2017 DHS policy change, like other 
stay and postponement actions that sidestepped the usual policy change process, 
similarly was rejected for flouting the requirements of the consistency 
doctrine.357 President Trump’s DHS relied only on a largely conclusory 
statement rooted substantially in the view that DACA had violated the 
Constitution.358 Here too, the Trump Administration did not engage with the 
policy and factual underpinnings of the earlier policy.359 
 
351 Id. at 1123 (alteration in original) (quoting Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). 
352 Id. 
353 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1025-
26 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (reviewing history of rescinding DACA). 
354 Id. at 1022-24 (discussing DACA Program as announced in June 15, 2012 memo issued 
by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano). 
355 Id. (describing Obama Administration’s DACA memo legally justifying program). 
356 See id. (“Secretary Napolitano found leniency ‘especially justified’ for the DACA-
eligible, whom she described as ‘productive young people’ who ‘have already contributed to 
our country in significant ways.’”). 
357 Id. at 1045 (holding that DHS failed to provide “reasoned explanation” for its change 
in position). 
358 See id. at 1025-26 (reviewing rescission’s stated legal grounds). 
359 The statutory and constitutional views offered to justified DACA’s abandonment 
constituted a form of statutory abnegation, since the agency’s new legal view substantially 
undercut its earlier claimed authority. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text; infra 
Section IV.F (introducing and analyzing such statutory abnegation justifications for 
deregulatory actions). 
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Judge William Allsup analyzed the legal underpinnings of the DACA 
program and found that all were legally sound.360 Hence, the claim of illegality 
was rooted in a “flawed legal premise” and, because a court cannot supply a 
rationale not supplied by the agency, the action had to be rejected.361 Since the 
agency had failed to engage with underlying facts and the Obama 
Administration DHS’s stated policy rationales, the Trump Administration 
regulatory reversal also failed to pass muster under Encino Motorcars and 
Fox.362 The Judge further noted that an agency action that altogether fails to 
assess overall benefits and costs, or advantages and disadvantages, also runs 
afoul of the Supreme Court’s new default rule in Michigan v. EPA363 that 
agencies must engage in such broader analysis unless it is statutorily 
precluded.364 The agency’s failure to engage with the particular facts and 
administrative record justifying the earlier policy was fatal to the Trump 
policy.365  
III. DEREGULATION AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF AGENCY CONTINGENCY 
Consistency doctrine shapes the contours of when and how agencies can 
pursue policy change, as well as how courts should police such change. As just 
shown, these legal constraints are derived from a complex, intertwined, but 
remarkably consistent and mutually reinforcing body of doctrine. Presidents and 
agencies usually have latitude to pursue policy change, but that change must 
follow what is substantively and procedurally required by enabling legislation 
and the APA. Agencies must fully engage with both their own original findings, 
data, reasoning, and the arguments and data offered by outside parties. These 
intertwined sources of doctrine all call for agencies to confront the contingencies 
 
360 See Regents of Univ. of Cal., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1037-43. 
361 Id. at 1042. 
362 See id. at 1046 (finding rescission “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion 
under Encino Motorcars”). 
363 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
364 Id. at 2707; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1046 (citing Michigan 
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707) (holding that EPA did not adequately consider reliance interests). 
365 See Regents of Univ. of Cal., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1043-45 (applying principles from 
Encino Motorcars, Fox, and State Farm). This decision shares attributes with the other 
decisions rejecting deregulatory actions pursued through delay and splintering of the process, 
but because agency actions rooted in forbearance and enforcement discretion are generally 
open to later changes in regulatory attitude, the ultimate fate of DACA is far from uncertain. 
If an appellate court or the Supreme Court disagrees with the judge’s “mistake of law” 
conclusion, the decision could be reversed. Even if the decision is upheld, the Trump 
Administration DHS on remand could, by offering a correct view of the law, engaging with 
relevant facts and policy decisions, and offering “good reasons” for its change, possibly reach 
the same result. See also NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 235-44 (D.D.C. 2018) 
(holding DACA rescission illegal due to failure to provide analysis required by consistency 
precedents and finding agency rationale inadequate). 
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that underlay the initial action, provide opportunity for comment, and provide 
“good reasons” for a policy change. 
That these constraints on erratic or unjustified agency policy change derive 
from a web of interrelated doctrine has both salutary and challenging effects. On 
the positive side, this web of mutually reinforcing doctrine makes it unlikely that 
substantial doctrinal change will suddenly occur and allow the sort of erratic, 
day-to-day abrupt, and unjustified policy shifts that Justice Gorsuch condemned. 
These rule of law benefits of consistency doctrine in all fields of regulation are 
unlikely to disappear. To put it more plainly: consistency doctrine is itself deeply 
rooted, enduring, and likely to remain consistent. 
Part III first offers a schematic distilling of the workings of consistency 
doctrine. Then it turns to an analysis of a few of the major deregulatory policy 
shifts proposed by the Trump Administration but that have not yet resulted in 
judicial opinions. This Part concludes with normative discussion of the merits 
of consistency doctrine before Part IV closes the Article with an assessment of 
a range of agency settings and the room they leave for political influence. 
A. Distilling and Diagramming Consistency Doctrine’s Requirements 
 
As shown, these many interrelated doctrinal strains governing agency policy 
change and consistency obligations share a cross-cutting element that is 
sometimes neglected, especially in recent deregulatory change proposals: an 
agency seeking to make a policy change always must address the contingencies 
it originally addressed en route to offering its reasoned elaboration for its initial 
policy choice.366 And it must allow commenters to engage with them as well. 
Similarly, those and later contingencies—changes in related conditions, the 
regulatory track record, or reliance interests, for example—will also need to be 
directly and rationally addressed by the agency proposing change. By 
recognizing and continuing to enforce this simple but consistent agency 
obligation—that agencies must forthrightly engage and rationally address past 
and current contingent factors relevant to the statutorily delegated task—courts 
substantially reduce the risks of erratic, unjustified action or skirting of science 
or stakeholders’ arguments. Nonetheless, the views and actions reviewed above 
in Parts I and II indicate either that this body of law is misunderstood or that 
administrations are sometimes eager to recast or dodge consistency doctrine. 
Advocates of policy changes and doctrinal adjustment appear to seek greater 
room for politics and presidents to shape policy changes. Or perhaps change 
proponents who skip required and challenging antecedent conditions see 
political gain in granting regulatory relief to their supporters, even if destined 
for future judicial rejection. 
This agency obligation under current doctrine can be captured by two simple 
diagrams, one setting forth what is required for ordinary “reasoned 
 
366 See supra Section II.C (discussing cases that require agencies to address underlying 
contingencies when changing policies). 
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decisionmaking” generating an initial policy, and the other analytical obligations 
of agencies pursuing a later change in policy. 
Diagram 1 illustrates what agencies necessarily engage in setting an Initial 
Regulatory Policy (“IRP”). Agencies will always identify what they view as the 
most relevant Statutory Language (SL1, SL2, etc.) and linked Policy goals and 
predictions (P1, P2, etc.), and will need to engage with issues that are central to 
and often contested about the regulatory choice. These are often the focus of 
stakeholder Comments (C1, C2, C3) and frequently concern facts, empirical 
claims about conditions or regulatory impacts, and science. The Policy (“P”) and 
Comment (“C”) factors are often what this Article calls contingencies. However, 
because an agency’s legal analysis often involves judgments melding law and 
facts, it is in some sense contingent too, but more in the sense that it reflects an 
agency choice about statutory issues to emphasize. That choice, in turn, will 
shape the final agency action. And, finally, in the regulatory preamble (and often 
other accompanying memoranda and appendices), the agency will weave its 
final choice into a Reasoned Decision (“RD”) that will engage with all of these 
SL, P, and C factors or else will risk judicial rejection. 
 
Diagram 1. Initial Regulatory Policy. 
 
SL1, SL2, SL3 
+ 
P1, P2, P3, P4 
+  
C1, C2, C3 
 Initial Regulatory Policy Reasoned Decision (“IRP RD”) engaging 
these factors and setting the IRP 
 
Diagram 2 shows how all of the Diagram 1 elements will necessarily become 
part of the Regulatory Policy Change Proposal (“RPCP”), plus other elements 
will be added. Those supporting the IRP will surely draw on all explanations 
provided in the IRP, including the Reasoned Decision itself, while those 
advocating change will argue against those factors, in comments supplying new 
facts and arguments, and also questioning the wisdom of the RD justifying the 
IRP. The RD and IRP will themselves become new mandatory analysis elements 
because they will be contested, as will any intervening change or IRP impacts. 
The new agency leadership proposing policy change may focus on new language 
and likely some new science, data, or empirical claims about the world, even 
though it will need to address the old justifications. 
Hence, consistency doctrine’s web of law will require the agency to address 
the following in seeking to make a policy change. 
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Diagram 2. Regulatory Policy Change Proposal.  
 
SL1, SL2, SL3 plus new SL4  
+ 
P1, P2, P3 plus new P4, P5 
+ 
C1, C2, C3, C4 plus new developments, facts, science, regulatory experience, 
and reliance interests C5, C6 
+ IRP RD and IRP 
 RD for Policy Change 
 
 
As illustrated by these simple diagrams, the basics of reasoned 
decisionmaking and consistency doctrine mean that policy changes will require 
more analysis and justification by an agency. Note that this does not mean that 
policy change triggers a different standard of review; instead, an agency 
proposing a policy shift must engage in more explanation to provide “good 
reasons” for the change and explain why the choice is reasonable.367 
B. Assessing Major Deregulatory Proposals by the Trump Administration 
The Trump Administration’s many deregulatory actions constitute the most 
concerted deregulatory push since the State Farm decision and linked 
deregulatory efforts of the Reagan Administration.368 Where agencies and 
lawyers have addressed policy change law, they have usually relied on near 
cookie-cutter citations to State Farm and Fox in deregulatory actions that 
provide a rationale, often also including some references to Chevron.369 
 
367 This logic illuminates the “more is needed” language in State Farm, Fox, and Encino 
Motorcars. See supra Section II.C. (analyzing these cases). 
368 See President Donald J. Trump Is Delivering on Deregulation, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump 
-delivering-deregulation/ [https://perma.cc/D9RU-ZLYB] (stating deregulatory goals and 
tallying claimed deregulatory progress). 
369 As of January 2018, a Westlaw search limited to the Trump Administration Federal 
Register notices finds twenty policy change proposals citing to some or all of these cases. The 
Trump Administration has claimed a vast number of deregulatory actions. See id. But early 
analysis indicates some are quite minor, some are preliminary, and many are merely finalizing 
policy shifts that had started under earlier administrations. See Press Briefing by Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs Administrator Neomi Rao on the Unified Agenda of 
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-office-information-
regulatory-affairs-administrator-neomi-rao-unified-agenda-regulatory-deregulatory-actions/ 
[https://perma.cc/M78V-AQMZ] (summarizing 2017 deregulatory actions, anticipated 2018 
actions, and providing numerical tallies of such action); The Trump Assault on Our 
Safeguards, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, http://www.progressivereform.org/ 
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Administration advocates describe these cases as allowing policy change due to 
a change in administrations and presidential priorities, but so far provide little 
effort to satisfy the other legal requirements set forth in these cases.370 They are 
correct that change is possible and is not subject to some special heightened, 
skeptical standard of review.371 However, several recent major regulatory policy 
change actions fail to engage with most of the contingencies—especially 
“underlying facts” and past agency reasoning—that the same agencies in earlier 
actions identified to justify their initial actions. Although, as reviewed in Section 
II.H, a raft of rapid deregulatory actions that involved regulatory shortcuts and 
avoidance of usual APA process resulted in judicial rejections, several of the 
highest visibility and high stakes actions are, as of this Article’s publication, 
either in the regulatory pipeline or not yet reviewed. This Part assesses their 
conformity with consistency doctrine’s requirements. 
As introduced earlier, the two most significant environmental policy reversal 
initiatives seek to abandon the Clean Water Rule, a rule defining what sorts of 
waters are jurisdictional “Waters of the United States,” and the Clean Power 
Plan, a rule regulating existing power plants to restrict their emissions of 
GHGs.372 Both were initially pursued with little effort to satisfy consistency 
doctrine’s requirements for agencies making a policy change. 
For example, the one finalized action of these various proposals is the EPA 
and the Corps adding a new “applicability date” that would delay any application 
of the finalized 2015 Clean Water Rule. Yet despite litigation and regulatory 
claims of the Clean Water Rule’s opponents that it would impose massive 
hardship, the agencies in this final action claimed that a return to the pre-2015 
landscape would result in no costs.373 They identified no changes in 
environmental conditions that would result from the 2015 rule going into effect, 
versus its suspension for two years. In this action, they nowhere even mentioned 
the implications of the Connectivity Report the EPA had earlier created that 
summarized categories of waters and their functions.374 Hence, in this one 
 
trumpassault.cfm [https://perma.cc/KF8X-6VMS] (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (analyzing 
President Trump’s use of executory power for regulatory actions).  
370 See supra Section I.E (discussing Trump Administration’s deregulatory proposals and 
frequent lack of reasoning or engagement with facts in policy changes sought). 
371 Fox and State Farm make explicit that the usual standard of review applies, but both 
also explain why policy change will usually require greater explanation than creation of an 
initial policy. See supra Section II.C (discussing these cases). 
372 See supra Sections I.E, II.C (introducing and analyzing legality of Clean Water Rule 
and Clean Power Plan change proposals). 
373 Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 
Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,542, 55,544 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (stating that there 
are “no economic costs or benefits associated with this action”). 
374 In the 2018 Supplemental Notice, the EPA and the Corps did—for the first time in the 
sequence of actions linked to the Clean Water Rule’s repeal or change in the effective or 
“applicability” date—refer to and raise some questions about the Connectivity Report and the 
agencies’ reliance on it. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of 
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finalized action, the agencies omitted any discussion or concession of real-world 
impacts of the two legal choices on the table: application of the Clean Water 
Rule or its suspension and possible eventual revocation.375  
Clean Power Plan change proposals by the Trump Administration have also 
been splintered, with most providing little or no discussion of clean energy 
trends or impacts of abandonment.376 The EPA’s initial explanation in 2017 for 
preferring its “inside the fenceline” approach nowhere provides textual and fact-
based analysis of how this interpretation, in the setting of power plants integrated 
into the grid, satisfies the statutory requirement that pollution limitations be set 
based on the “best system of emissions reduction . . . adequately 
demonstrated.”377 Hence, with this rule change too, the earliest documents 
indicate a declination to engage with salient contingencies and, by limiting 
comment, fracturing the change proposals, and offering no replacement, squelch 
commenters from raising them.378 Late 2018 agency proposals regarding both 
“waters” jurisdiction and power plant GHG regulation, which followed a string 
of judicial losses for these and other agencies pursuing deregulatory impacts 
through shortcuts, provided more substantial justifications and at least passing 
engagement with earlier science, findings, and impacts.379  
Most of these splintered proposals in their texts failed to address the 
fundamental questions and tasks called for by consistency doctrine: Are there 
“good reasons” for the change? What is the agency’s current view of “underlying 
 
Preexisting Rule, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,227, 
32,241-42 (July 12, 2018). 
375 As this Article goes to print, a federal district court had rejected the legal sufficiency of 
the Applicability Date rule (which it called “the Suspension Rule”), focusing on the 
consistency doctrine infirmities addressed in the text and connecting the action’s legal 
inadequacies to other “hastily” crafted deregulatory actions. S.C. Coastal Conversation 
League v. Pruitt, No. 2:18-cv-00330, slip op. at 6-18 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2018). That court did 
not address the merits of Clean Water Rule itself or latitude for a revised rule. See id.  
376 The EPA under the Trump Administration appears to have removed from its own active 
public databases studies and analytical memoranda that accompanied and explained the final 
CPP. 
377 See Clean Air Act § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (2012) (providing definitional 
language that ties into § 111(d)). 
378 Several recent decisions on other regulatory policy shifts in the form of postponements, 
stays, or summary policy shifts without notice-and-comment rulemaking opportunities reject 
similar sidestepping of agency obligations to directly confront and explain a policy shift. See 
supra Section II.H (discussing these decisions). 
379 See Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Revisions to Emissions Guidelines Implementing Regulations; Revisions 
to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746, 44,746 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018) 
(proposing to replace CPP with unit-based focus and technological improvements, offering 
more substantial analysis and justification, and imposing no comment limitations); Definition 
of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, Supplemental Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,231-50 (engaging more fully merits of Clean 
Water Rule and its proposed repeal). 
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facts” that justified the initial action? Are there any changes in conditions or 
reliance interests? Has the agency made sure there are no “unexplained 
inconsistencies” between the new and old policy?  
In fact, by trying to effect change without required legal and factual 
engagement, the string of Trump Administration regulatory actions seeking to 
undo these two major environmental rules present circumstances similar to those 
underlying the many 2017 and 2018 judicial rejections of agency stays and 
postponements that had in effect sought to render finalized regulations 
ineffective.380 The EPA has sought to accelerate regulatory change by 
abandoning the old rules, but without required engagement with the 
contingencies that justified the earlier actions and where such science or facts 
might be difficult to overcome.381 These larger-impact policy shifts hence also 
seem vulnerable to judicial rejection.382 Other agencies’ deregulatory actions 
have also triggered criticism for agency dodging of studies that contradict their 
claimed benefits.383 However, one agency, the independent Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), unanimously declined a request by the 
Department of Energy to change policies to support the coal industry, finding it 
legally and factually without merit.384 
In later final agency rules and related court briefing, agencies and their 
lawyers may engage more fully with the contingencies addressed earlier.385 They 
 
380 See supra Section I.E.5 (presenting these actions); supra Section II.H (discussing these 
judicial rejections of Trump agency deregulatory efforts). 
381 In particular, both initial actions were accompanied by massive empirical studies that 
would be hard to controvert. See supra notes 113-50 and accompanying text (discussing Clean 
Water Rule and Clean Power Plan rollbacks and lack of justification by Trump 
administration). 
382 See supra Sections II.B, II.C (reviewing two-step deregulatory efforts by Trump 
Administration and earlier administrations’ unsuccessful efforts to shift policy without full 
engagement with relevant facts and past reasoning). 
383 See, e.g., Ben Penn, Labor Dept. Ditches Data Showing Bosses Could Skim Waiters’ 
Tips, BLOOMBERG L. DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://bnanews.bna.com/ 
daily-labor-report/labor-dept-ditches-data-showing-bosses-could-skim-waiters-tips 
[https://perma.cc/K8L9-PE69] (reporting that Labor Department “scrubbed an unfavorable 
internal analysis” showing that change to tip retention regulations would result in employees 
“los[ing] out on billions . . . in gratuities”). There was an underlying regulatory proposal. See 
generally Tip Regulations Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 82 Fed. Reg. 57,395 
(Dec. 5, 2017). The proposal traces the earlier regulation’s history but provides little detail on 
impacts of the old rule or under the new rule. Id. at 57,396-401 (reviewing history of proposal 
and stating that department “lacks data to quantify possible reallocations of tips” and hence 
presents “primarily qualitative approach”). This regulatory skirmish was ultimately resolved 
with a legislative deal. 
384 Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceeding, and 
Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC ¶ 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018) (ordering federal 
agencies to submit additional information supporting proposed rulemaking). 
385 For example, the FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom action is near final and more 
carefully addresses legal requirements regarding policy change. See supra notes 108-111 and 
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should learn from the judicial rejections, as perhaps reflected in the EPA’s more 
substantial proposals published in late 2018. However, when an agency splinters 
its actions, sidesteps or cherry-picks relevant studies, and constrains comment, 
the agency has likely already doomed the actions to judicial rejection due to an 
agency’s obligations at the notice stage to disclose its planned action and 
rationale.386 
C. Consistency Doctrine’s Policy Merits 
The question remains, of course, whether this body of consistency doctrine 
and the agency obligation to address policy contingencies add up to a sound 
policy result. This Article argues that the very consistency of the consistency 
doctrine over many years, especially its many mutually reinforcing elements, 
reflects its soundness and deep rule of law roots. It also reflects the compromises 
and balancing acts that pervade administrative law. Congress can set policies 
leaving room for policy adjustments by agencies, and presidents can in an array 
of ways seek to nudge agencies in a particular direction. But congressional 
delegations regarding chosen actors, procedures, and criteria for action must be 
respected by presidents, agencies, and reviewing courts, regardless of whether 
the agency is setting an initial policy or seeking change. Current doctrine 
balances stability with responsiveness, and provides comfort to those worried 
about either overregulation or unwarranted deregulation. 
Further, by prohibiting erratic or abrupt policy shifts and requiring agency 
engagement with facts, this body of doctrine checks sloppy, corrupt, or 
opportunistic regulatory capitulation to powerful stakeholders.387 Congressional 
goals and means set forth in statutes are protected and enforced by consistency 
doctrine. It is rooted in respect for legislative supremacy. By compelling 
agencies to engage with underlying facts, science, and points of contestation 
underlying a choice (be it an initial choice or a later change proposal), this body 
of law buttresses the quasi-democratic virtues of stakeholder voice, agency 
explanation obligations, and related accountability and rule of law virtues.388 If 
an agency cannot confront data or science and justify a regulatory change under 
 
accompanying text (discussing FCC’s abandonment of Net Neutrality regulation promulgated 
in 2015 and noting agency’s proffered reasoning for policy change). 
386 See supra Section II.H (describing recent judicial rejections of such agency actions); 
supra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing “logical outgrowth” obligations and policy 
change). 
387 See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 70, at 1396 (stating that agency obligations to 
engage comments and justify choices serves to “flush out illicit motivations”); Short, supra 
note 17, at 1821-23 (exploring how rational public explanation serves to discipline agencies); 
Stiglitz, supra note 164, at 637-40 (analyzing how agency obligations to provide process 
transparency, explain choices, and surmount judicial review address public distrust and 
concerns about comparatively less open legislative process). 
388 Cf. Bressman, supra note 69, at 764-66 (noting that Supreme Court values political 
accountability in form of electoral accountability, quasi-democratic participatory 
opportunities, and agency responsiveness to input and criticisms). 
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relevant law, then the proposed change should be abandoned. By requiring 
agencies to engage with “circumstances” and the “record,” and provide a 
“reasoned analysis for the change,”389 consistency doctrine largely prevents an 
agency from ignoring or sweeping under the rug a salient and potent criticism or 
contrary study.390 And when an agency makes a policy change with full and 
adequate explanation, then all facets of political accountability are reinforced. 
The agency is subject to political accountability when it respects legislatively-
set priorities, engages with relevant data, science and stakeholder comments, and 
takes political responsibility for its own regulatory choices.391 
Similarly, when Fox and Encino Motorcars state that agencies must offer 
“good reasons” for a change, and must address “facts and circumstances that 
underlay or were engendered by the prior policy” and address “findings that 
contradict” the prior policy, the Court also is precluding agencies hoping to 
dodge reality.392 And in stating that “unexplained inconsistency” is grounds for 
rejection, the Encino Motorcars Court (drawing on the Brand X case’s language 
and logic) is necessarily stating that the agency proposing a policy change must 
engage with the previous action and its rationales and explain the later change.393 
Could agencies and departments substantially revise the many rules that 
during 2017 and 2018 were subject to delay proposals, proposed for rescission, 
or under reconsideration? Probably so. Neither agencies nor presidents are 
obligated to stick with earlier administrations’ regulatory choices if they lean in 
a different direction. But they must satisfy other prerequisites for a change, 
especially compliance with statutory criteria and procedures. Even if the 
President weighs in, the agencies would need to fully confront the earlier 
rationales, science, disputes, and allow full ventilation of comments, usually in 
a notice-and-comment process. Some degree of change is almost always 
possible because statutes, regulatory design choices, and underlying science or 
data rarely point only to one acceptable action.  
But as emphasized in these cases, especially in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
agencies need to ground their policy choices or changes in what the statutes set 
forth as criteria for action.394 By requiring “fidelity” to underlying statutory 
requirements as well as open and reasoned deliberation and justification, 
 
389 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 42 (1983). 
390 See supra Section II.C (discussing relevant case law regarding consistency doctrine). 
391 Judge Bates stated in NAACP v. Trump, “an official cannot claim that the law ties her 
hands while at the same time denying the courts’ power to unbind her. She may escape 
political accountability or judicial review, but not both.” NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 
209, 249 (D.D.C. 2018). 
392 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (quoting FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009)); Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. 
393 Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)). 
394 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007); supra notes 8 and accompanying 
text (discussing requirements set forth in Massachusetts v. EPA). 
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consistency doctrine reinforces the three types of political accountability that 
underpin regulatory legitimacy: (1) legislative supremacy (in Congress choosing 
the regulator and devising criteria and procedures for the agency’s work); (2) 
responsiveness to presidential leadership; and (3) an open, transparent process 
and reasoning that constitutes a form of responsive and quasi-democratic 
action.395 
Hence, to satisfy the law and judicial statements about policy change, 
agencies must avoid gamesmanship and show frank and accountable 
engagement.396 They must engage in reasoned decisionmaking that frankly 
addresses both supportive and contrary evidence, shaped as always by what 
statutes allow. Political predilections of a president and his leadership can shape 
choices at the margins, and often will have major latitude to shape general 
agency directions and priorities.397 No cases or laws, however, allow an agency 
to short-circuit the regulatory process or dodge salient contingencies. In 
requiring agencies and presidents to make policy with integrity and respect for 
what the law allows and what the data and science indicate, and provide “good 
reasons” for a change, this body of law creates sound incentives. If properly 
understood and followed, this body of law should address fears of critics focused 
on overregulation and arbitrariness, as well as those focused on political 
overreach or unjustified deregulation. 
IV. DELIBERATIVE INTEGRITY AND TETHERING’S DEGREES 
Despite the clear collective import of consistency doctrine’s multiple facets, 
a remaining task is to identify policy change contexts and the degree of tethering 
constraints faced by agencies, political appointee leadership, and presidents. The 
degree of tethering links to the obligation of agencies to pursue policy change in 
ways reflecting what this Part will refer to as “deliberative integrity.” These 
elements of deliberative integrity are drawn from the cases creating consistency 
doctrine and the linked enduring requirements of reasoned decisionmaking.398 
Deliberative integrity in the setting of a policy change involves three central 
elements: (1) the action must be congruent with the underlying statute’s 
substantive choices and mandated procedures; (2) it must fairly address the 
factual underpinnings and reasoning behind the earlier policy action, and justify 
 
395 See Garland, supra note 9, at 553-56 (describing State Farm’s requirements as designed 
to ensure agency “fidelity” in sense of prioritizing legislative policy choices set forth in 
statutes over mere political responsiveness to presidential or agency views); Stiglitz, supra 
note 164, at 649-72 (exploring how trust-creating legitimacy in agency process and 
subsequent judicial review can explain legislative reliance on agencies). 
396 For a similar emphasis on integrity, see Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 7, at 148-49 
which emphasizes the need for agency “sincerity,” “fidelity,” and “candid reason-giving.” 
397 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (citing Watts, Seidenfeld, and Short 
regarding balance of politics and rationality in shaping agency actions). 
398 See supra Part II (discussing requirements of consistency doctrine and of “reasoned 
decisionmaking”). 
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the new action with “good reasons”; and (3) it must provide meaningful 
opportunities for engagement of all affected by the earlier and proposed new 
policy. The following Sections start with the least constrained settings and move 
to contexts where agencies and presidents face the greatest hurdles in changing 
policy. 
A. The Presidential Nudge and Enforcement Prioritization 
Scholars and doctrine share the view that agencies can appropriately be 
subject to presidential nudging and politicized input in selecting priorities for 
action, especially when setting a regulatory agenda.399 Few laws set priorities 
among the many assigned agency tasks. Even rarer are laws that instruct 
agencies how to juggle tasks delegated under multiple laws. Because most 
agencies have hundreds of finalized regulations on the books, typically those 
agencies and the President face no statutory constraint in deciding which are 
most in need of reexamination. 
Justice Kagan (then-Professor Kagan) noted and applauded presidential 
involvement in rulemaking rollouts and agency initiatives.400 Similarly, 
presidential agenda-setting and oversight, nowadays usually through OIRA, is 
also generally unproblematic. On the other hand, where a statute sets a deadline, 
an agency cannot disregard it due to an administration’s anti-regulatory leanings 
or cost-benefit analysis delays or hurdles.401 
A tougher question concerns prioritization of cost-benefit analysis in driving 
regulatory revisions.402 For almost forty years, presidents of both parties have 
ordered agencies to weigh costs and benefits of major rulemakings and subjected 
rulemakings to OIRA’s oversight.403 Such considerations and oversight are not 
necessarily or blatantly illegal, but their legality is critically reliant on their 
stated and actually applied subservience to statutory requirements.404 Whether 
 
399 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing to and discussing scholarship regarding 
extent of presidential authority over agencies). 
400 See Kagan, supra note 3, at 2333 (characterizing President Clinton’s high degree of 
involvement in rulemaking process as “more desirable”). 
401 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (enforcing 
deadlines and invalidating suspension of regulation for lack of required preceding process); 
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 571-72 (D.D.C. 1986) (stating agency cannot 
miss statutory deadline due to Office of Management and Budget review); Jacob E. Gersen & 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 966 
(2008) (analyzing use and constitutionality of deadlines in administrative law statutes). 
402 President Trump’s two-for-one deregulatory order raises this issue. See supra notes 91-
96 and accompanying text (discussing two-for-one deregulatory order). 
403 Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship 
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 327 
(2014) (discussing agencies’ use of cost-benefit analysis throughout presidential 
administrations since Reagan). 
404 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (stating that order’s 
requirements do not apply if contrary to other law). 
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OIRA, agencies, and presidents respect this primacy of statutory choices is far 
from clear.405 Presidents can indicate their personal priority of cost-benefit 
justified regulations and minimization of regulatory costs, and easily provide 
input on regulatory actions to undertake. In addition, Michigan v. EPA has 
created a default rule that broad delegations to agencies should be read to leave 
room for balanced assessments of both regulatory benefits and costs. It provides 
agency leaders and presidents with enhanced latitude to nudge agencies to 
consider such effects.406 Within each action, however, such orders can only be 
interpreted as requests due to the stated primacy of statutory criteria and 
procedures.407 Through appointments and perhaps also appropriations requests, 
the President can legitimately stack an agency with personnel sharing such 
leanings. Similarly, a President’s request for agencies to report on their work is 
a constitutionally rooted power, as Professor Strauss observes.408 
But to avoid questionable assertions of power, a President and agency 
political appointees must still respect the congressional choices of the delegate 
for assigned tasks and the criteria for those tasks.409 They must allow action 
based on that delegate’s application of those criteria, through congressionally 
devised procedures, applying the contingent factors and in light of contingent 
facts made relevant by law.410 The more the statutory language sets forth 
specifics about what is required, the less agency leadership or the President 
(perhaps through OIRA) can seek to change the agency action.411 
One common setting involving generally permissible political considerations 
is agency decisions to accelerate or delay discretionary regulatory actions that 
are underway, but not yet finalized or in effect. The APA, in Section 705, allows 
agencies to take such action before rules take effect.412 And many agencies start, 
but never finish, regulatory proceedings. It is, of course, quite different if a 
 
405 For analysis questioning the legality of OIRA’s oversight as actually applied, see 
Heinzerling, supra note 403. 
406 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-11 (2015). 
407 But see Heinzerling, supra note 403, at 325-27 (questioning legality of OIRA’s actual 
work). 
408 See Strauss, supra note 3, at 977-79 (discussing amount of discretion delegated to 
President regarding administrative state). 
409 See supra Sections I.D, II.A (discussing this issue). 
410 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA); supra 
Section II.A (discussing enabling act constraints on agencies). 
411 Executive Order 12,866 even if followed as written, adds a decisionmaker not 
empowered by Congress in the enabling act, changes the criteria for decision (or at least adds 
a final additional cost-benefit filter), and changes congressionally set process. Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Consequently, a strong argument exists that 
OIRA’s work is inherently illegal whenever it goes beyond calls for analysis. 
412 Administrative Procedure Act § 705, 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). For discussion of agencies 
relying on this section and judicial responses, see Section II.H. 
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statute sets deadlines for required actions—courts will enforce such mandates.413 
One caveat remains: agencies that generate data, studies, and reasoning, even if 
resulting in an abandoned action, could later need to engage with those materials 
if taking a related action where they remain relevant.414 
B. Turf Conflicts 
Agencies and presidents can broadly engage in politicized direction when 
agencies come into conflict over particular actions, or perhaps conflict over who 
has primacy over a regulatory turf. Such settings of uncertain and potential 
overlapping turf are quite common and can create problems of conflicting 
mandates and inefficient duplication of work.415. Regulatory obligations can 
accumulate over time.416 Such overlaps can also result in “regulatory commons” 
dynamics, where stakeholders and potential regulators fail to act either out of 
fear of waste, free riding incentives, or because the magnitude of need for action 
may not be apparent to any single actor.417 Statutes may create rules of decision 
for how to handle conflicts. But if such regulatory overlaps and collisions are 
not anticipated by the statutes, then White House leadership provides one of the 
few means to sort things out. No statutory language would guide and hence 
constrain the president or affected agencies in resolving turf conflicts. And, as 
with agenda-setting and determination of priorities, this reality means turf 
conflicts are often legitimately subject to a degree of politicized presidential and 
agency problem solving that is subject to few constraints, provided that each 
agency’s congressionally delegated role is respected. 
C. Broad New Deal Delegations 
Many agencies, often in the form of commissions dating back to the New 
Deal, have long acted under statutes with remarkably broad delegations. Such 
laws often do little more than empower an agency with broad regulatory goals, 
such as to act in the public interest, to protect the integrity of markets, to police 
 
413 See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 814-18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(discussing and enforcing deadlines, and rejecting claimed postponements that had effect of 
undoing valid regulations but without required process). 
414 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505-07 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (requiring agency engagement with earlier studies in changed agency action). 
415 See Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV. 67, 69 
(forthcoming 2018) (identifying many settings of overlap but also congressional awareness 
and rules for resolving conflict). 
416 See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of 
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003) (discussing how 
regulations accrete in modern administrative state). 
417 See Buzbee, supra note 72, at 5 (explaining that regulators often leave social ills 
unaddressed due to uncertain regulatory domains and resulting political and economic 
incentives). 
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unfair marketing, or to provide a safe workplace.418 At first blush, one might 
think that broad delegations would automatically imply broad latitude for 
politicized redirection of policy. However, agencies pursuing policy change are 
constrained both by the tasks assigned by legislation and by the line of preceding 
policies and actions taken by an agency, as well as possibly relevant judicial 
precedents. Such agencies often engage in technical and context-sensitive policy 
creation about, for example, what workplace actions are veiled threats and hence 
unfair labor practices, or which market actions are the result of legitimate 
aggressive competition, or reflect illegal, unfair, or anticompetitive behavior.419 
Policy devised through a sequence of adjudicatory actions and resulting 
opinions, usually with some additional guidance documents and perhaps linked 
notice-and-comment rulemakings, can create a complex web of policy with 
diverse policy rationale contingencies.420 As a result, such an agency pursuing a 
policy change may face little constraint from broad statutory language, but that 
does not mean lack of tethering. Constraining contingencies may be many and 
hard to overcome. Even if each preceding policy step is modest and clear, their 
sequential accumulation and their on-the-ground effects can create a formidable 
hurdle to any large-scale abrupt policy change.421 And due to the development 
of reliance interests, stakeholders will rarely sit out a possible regulatory 
upheaval. As a result, the agency pursuing change will be forced to engage with 
its own accumulated regulatory law, empirical data, and stakeholders’ advocacy 
about the implications of retaining or changing a policy. 
D. Science-Based Judgments and the “Best” 
Since the late 1960s, many statutes have, at great length and detail, regulated 
risks to safety, health, and the environment.422 The specificity in these laws’ 
criteria and procedures constrain agencies and presidents who might otherwise 
weigh politics heavily in making a regulatory choice. In contrast to broad New 
 
418 Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (rejecting delegation 
doctrine challenge while citing to cases upholding constitutionality of broad delegations). See 
generally Magill, supra note 168, at 1400-02 (reviewing broad delegation language and its 
implications for agency choice); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11 (reviewing FTC policy 
development under broad language). 
419 See, e.g., Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d. 34, 37-41 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(discussing NLRB’s policy evolution regarding “bargaining from scratch” threats but 
requiring agency to “follow[] or consciously change” policy with explanation). See generally 
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11 (discussing FTC’s policy evolution). 
420 See generally, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11 (analyzing such policy 
development). 
421 See generally Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 416 (explaining dynamics leading to 
regulatory accretion). 
422 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ 
FAIRE REVIVAL 18-32 (Yale Univ. Press 2013) (describing establishment of modern 
administrative state’s protective regimes in book tracing emergence of opposing “laissez faire 
revival”). 
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Deal delegations, these modern risk regulation laws often include micro-
managing instructions about the assigned task, triggers to justify action, and 
criteria for the agency to apply in regulating.423 Moreover, many such laws, 
especially in the environmental area, require agencies to set performance 
standards benchmarked against what the “best” in some category can achieve, 
often to meet some health or endangerment-based target.424 Because such 
standard setting is data-based and often fiercely contested, policy revision efforts 
are laden with every imaginable constraint. The actor is usually specified, the 
criteria for action chosen by Congress, and data about the risk intensively 
gathered and distilled to meet the inevitable judicial challenge to any high-stakes 
economic regulation. Such legal criteria are unlike laws that call for broad value 
judgments, such as the FCC’s changing views of obscenity on television in Fox, 
or laws calling for agencies to juggle many potentially clashing mandates.425 
In the setting of these science and data-based “best” determinations, nothing 
is likely to present clean questions of law interpretation untethered to a raft of 
contingencies and stated agency rationales. Agencies draw on their knowledge 
of the regulatory regime’s interconnections, affected stakeholders’ interests, 
relevant science and data, and the results of different choices.426 Little is left to 
political discretion in its broadest sense, or to mere agency analysis of words. 
Deliberative integrity in such settings will involve respect for congressional 
choices of delegate, procedures for action, compliance with often highly 
reticulated criteria for action, and grappling with contingent data.427 Agencies 
cannot, out of nowhere, put procedures and substantive choices all back in play, 
especially if at the direction of the President or a political appointee, without 
raising warning flags for later reviewing courts.428 Of course, some change at 
the margins will seldom present a problem. But pre-judging, political pressures, 
dodging of comment on a de facto regulatory abandonment, or ignoring of a 
body of science or data previously viewed as determinative, will all raise 
 
423 See, e.g., Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: 
A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 175-82 
(1992) (analyzing increasing statutory specificity). 
424 See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1963 §§ 109, 111, 112, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7411, 7412 
(2012) (setting up such “best” achievable benchmarked regulation for different sorts of 
pollution, sources, and contexts). 
425 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 505-10 (2009) (reviewing 
history of policy and agency action); Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in 
Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 191, 196 (1986) (discussing prevalence of laws requiring 
agencies to “weigh . . . competing policies” and latitude they provide for regulatory changes). 
426 See supra Section I.A (describing Congress’ reliance on agencies to develop regulatory 
policy based on their respective expertise). 
427 See Stack, supra note 3, at 284 (arguing courts and presidents should respect different 
congressional choices about delegation to President versus to an agency); Strauss, supra note 
3, at 968. 
428 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 56-57 (2011); see also supra notes 252-256 and 
accompanying text (discussing Judulang). 
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concerns about lack of deliberative integrity and reasoned decisionmaking, 
thereby increasing the odds of judicial rejection.429 
For this reason, the initial high-stakes efforts by the Trump Administration to 
abandon environmental regulations have foundered and are likely to continue to 
do so. Most of these actions did not directly engage or engage in depth in the 
merits of earlier policy choices.430 Deliberative comment was constrained.431 
Agencies often avoided comment on the fundamental issue of whether an agency 
can or should abandon an earlier regulatory choice.432 Or the agency proposed a 
fundamental new limiting construction of statutory language, yet without 
explaining why this new read was better or even required.433 
E. Presidential Adjudicatory Interventions 
Not all presidential nudges or agency weighing of politicized considerations 
are unproblematic. Most policy shifts discussed in this Article involve policies 
developed through rulemakings or over a series of regulatory actions. These are 
settings where some degree of presidential or political appointee involvement is 
typical. However, presidential interventions can occur in adjudicatory 
settings.434 As mentioned above, President Trump issued a legal memorandum 
that indicated the outcome he sought in a highly-publicized battle over a pipeline 
threatening Native American lands and waters.435 The Army Corps subsequently 
complied, even referring to the President’s memorandum as constituting a 
presidential “direction,” but the Army Corps’ minimal regulatory analysis and 
explanation were later found lacking in a court.436 
 
429 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 884 F.3d 1185, 1195-97 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (rejecting EPA 
changes to rule regarding industrial boiler pollution due to record inadequacy, especially 
unexplained inconsistencies in characterization of reliability of data in earlier and changed 
rule explanations). 
430 See supra Sections I.E, II.H, III.B (describing Trump Administration’s claims of broad 
agency authority to reverse course with little constraint, courts’ treatment of such claims, and 
analyzing constraints on agency policy change). 
431 See supra Sections I.E, II.H, III.B (describing Trump Administration’s change power 
claims); see e.g., supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text (discussing splintering of 
deregulatory moves and agency instructions for commenters to limit focus, and judicial 
rejection of such limitations). 
432 See supra Sections I.E, II.H, III.B (presenting and analyzing Trump Administration’s 
policy change authority claims and how many such change efforts have not included 
discussion of relative merits of old policy to be abandoned or new replacement policies). 
433 See supra Sections I.E, II.H, III.B (presenting many such actions); supra notes 102-111 
(presenting such authority-limiting actions, including many agency statutory abnegations that 
have often included only summary explanation, as well as cases rejecting poorly justified 
changes); infra Section IV.F (explaining unlikelihood of success of such proposals). 
434 See Percival, supra note 3, at 2534. 
435 See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text. 
436 See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text. 
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This disputed Dakota Access Pipeline permit did not involve a formal 
adjudicatory action. Due to the APA’s protections against ex parte 
communication, bias, and prejudgment, an agency action driven by politicized 
variables or presidential pressures in such a formal setting would have clearly 
been illegal.437 Still, even in an informal adjudicatory setting involving 
numerous diverse opportunities for input, a presidential directive is 
problematic.438 After all, the deciding agency will, as with the Pipeline, face 
competing interests with substantial localized and personalized stakes hanging 
in the balance. A President is exceedingly unlikely to know about the risks, 
choices, and competing interests in play. A President is similarly unlikely to 
have any exposure to record materials that a delegated, responsible agency 
would have before it. A presidential directive about the desired outcome in such 
settings could, if obeyed, taint the regulatory action by introducing risks of bias 
or prejudgment violating the obligation of agencies to maintain an “open 
mind.”439 
This action by President Trump—seeking to direct an outcome in a 
contentious informal adjudicatory setting over a permit—may have been without 
modern precedent. Other than a possible intervention in a formal proceeding, it 
is at the most problematic end of the spectrum, involving a micro-scale 
politicized intervention raising questions about legal fealty and attention to 
facts.440 
F. Statutory Abnegation and Dodged Facts 
Whether problematic policy change efforts reviewed above reflect well 
counseled strategic choices or blundering is hard to know. At least a few 
misguided or poorly justified policy change efforts are found during almost all 
administrations, and all have been met with a harsh judicial reception.441 But 
 
437 See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding illegal White House interference with formal procedures required for 
deliberations of Endangered Species Committee). 
438 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 397-410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reviewing huge 
number of communications from private entities, Congress, and executive branch officials in 
connection with notice-and-comment rulemaking, rejecting claim that they constituted illegal 
ex parte contacts, but stating unrecorded communications would raise different concerns in 
an adjudicatory context and that adequacy of rulemaking record was a separate issue). 
439 “Open mind” and anti-bias constraints exist even in informal agency settings. See, e.g., 
Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting anti-bias 
constraints); Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(discussing bias concerns and holding that Chairman of FTC could participate in pending 
rulemaking proceeding concerning advertising to children). 
440 See Percival, supra note 3, at 2509-10, 2536-37 & n.395 (discussing and citing 
literature on risks of presidential involvement in adjudications, facts as constraint, and 
discussing differences in formal and informal proceedings). 
441 See supra Sections II.G, II.H (discussing judicial hostility to insufficiently explained 
agency policy change, including those initiated by Trump Administration). 
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when a series of policy change proposals over a short period and under the same 
leadership reveal a fairly uniform series of justifications and strategies, then they 
may reflect a considered, intentional effort to move the law in a new doctrinal 
direction.442 The Trump Administration’s many deregulatory actions share a 
fairly uniform set of justifications and even often the same citations. As 
discussed above, State Farm and Fox are often cited, with emphasis on the 
power of a President to push a new attitude about regulation, and then the 
somewhat questionable citation to the disputed Fox language from Justice 
Scalia’s opinion about an agency not needing to show “better” reasons for the 
action.443 Some actions include the “underlying facts” language from Fox, but 
agencies have generally omitted analysis of consistency doctrine as articulated 
in Encino Motorcars—that majority opinion did not focus on the “better” 
language, but on the more standard need for agencies to provide “good reasons” 
for a change, leave no “unexplained inconsistency,” and engage with 
“facts . . . underlying” the initial action.444 None consider the implications of 
Massachusetts v. EPA, or the implications of the majority’s rejection of the 
policy change at issue in State Farm due to the lack of an adequate explanation. 
In these Trump Administration proposals and actions, however, agencies 
proposing change only cursorily engaged with the extensive documentation of 
facts and rationales provided by the very same agencies under the leadership of 
previous administrations. Instead, in a substantial number of major recent 
deregulatory actions, the agencies engaged in statutory abnegation, claiming 
either limited power due to a new statutory interpretation, or sometimes claiming 
they completely lack earlier claimed power.445  
In positing such new constraining legal reads but then not engaging with 
previously critical facts and agency reasoning, these agencies implicitly seem to 
have manifested the following belief: that if an agency claims new limits on its 
own power through a new statutory interpretation, then it can avoid engagement 
with the empirical and scientific data earlier gathered and relied upon, the earlier 
reason-giving by the agency, and assessment of the effects of the different 
regulatory choices. 
Such a strategy is unlikely to succeed, although in one highly unlikely narrow 
setting might be found acceptable despite its apparent violation of consistency 
 
442 During the presidency of George W. Bush, an analogous series of fairly uniform shifts 
in preemption policy triggered scholarly and judicial scrutiny. See generally PREEMPTION 
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION (William W. 
Buzbee ed., 2009) (analyzing these preemption policy developments). 
443 Encino Motorcars’s more recent clear majority opinion omitted this language. See 
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016) (focusing on need for 
explanations and attention to underlying facts). 
444 See supra Section II.C (discussing Encino Motorcars decision). 
445 See supra Sections I.E, II.H (discussing Trump Administration policy reversals and 
claims of lack of statutory authority). 
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doctrine precedents.446 The strength or vulnerability of this revealed new 
strategy hinges on both the reasonableness of the agency’s statutory view as well 
as ongoing judicial fealty to Supreme Court precedents requiring agencies 
proposing a policy change to engage with “underlying facts” and leave no 
“unexplained inconsistency.”447 
If both the old and new statutory interpretations are tenable, then under the 
consistency-linked doctrines above, the agency cannot just embrace a new 
statutory view and policy yet not explain why it has done so. All of the 
consistency doctrine cases require the agency to provide a reasoned comparative 
analysis. The obligation to provide “good reasons” will require assessment of 
the rationales for and consequences of the new read and explanation why it is 
congruent with what the statute sets forth. The agency will need to offer “good 
reasons” for the change despite its previous embrace of a different policy.448 A 
claim about a new “better” or “belie[ved] to be better” policy provides some 
policy space for agency judgment, but requires agency discussion that compares 
the old and new approaches.449 None of these cases state that an agency’s 
reliance on a changed view of statutory powers excuses the need for such 
analysis. Instead, they insist upon “good reasons.” 
 Furthermore, if an agency errs about the nature of its authority, including an 
erroneous claim of lack of statutory ambiguity or erroneously narrow view of its 
own power, that is itself grounds for judicial rejection.450 A close judgment call 
will always go to the agency, but even such an agency victory requires correct 
statutory analysis, engagement with earlier actions, and persuasive explanation. 
It is important to note that the EPA’s statutory abnegation in Massachusetts 
v. EPA was a claim of no power to act regarding GHGs as an air pollutant, 
coupled with arguments rooted in agency and presidential discretion regarding 
policy priorities and even foreign policy.451 The EPA basically constructed an 
argument, built off of the Brown & Williamson decision. It argued in its Federal 
Register preamble that, due to the breadth of the regulatory impacts, the 
generality of the statutory language, and the specificity of a few climate-related 
legislative authorizations, Congress had sent a collective legislative signal that 
 
446 See infra note 454 and accompanying text (describing possible narrow use of such 
strategy that might be successful). 
447 See supra Section II.C (reviewing cases setting forth these obligations). 
448 See supra Section II.C. 
449 See supra Section II.C; supra text accompanying notes 226-233 (discussing key 
language in Fox and various Court opinions). 
450 See NextEra Desert Ctr. Blythe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 852 F.3d 1118, 
1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding agency erred regarding its own statutory authority); Daniel 
J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 818-21 
(2017) (analyzing cases holding that agency errors about nature of their own authority must 
be rejected). 
451 See supra notes 215-224 and accompanying text (discussing actions leading to 
Massachusetts v. EPA and Court’s ultimate decision). 
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the agency had no power at all to regulate GHG emissions.452 The Supreme 
Court, however, rejected the reading as erroneous, and saw no space for the other 
claimed political factors to excuse inaction. The Court insisted that the agency 
ground its decision in a correct application of the statute’s criteria and required 
the agency to engage with relevant underlying science and make the judgments 
mandated by the statute.453 
The only possible doctrinal space for a successful statutory abnegation move 
that neglects earlier contingencies is if both the agency and the reviewing court 
agree that the abnegating agency was correct, as a Chevron Step One matter, that 
the agency never had any power to act in any way as it earlier claimed and did.454 
Perhaps in the setting of a complete regulatory turf disavowal, a later reviewing 
court would, despite the absence of supporting Supreme Court consistency 
doctrine language, allow the policy change without full provision of “good 
reasons,” or full engagement with “underlying facts” and possible reliance 
interests. The argument would likely be that such context-specific contingency 
analyses were always legally irrelevant or illegal. And, were the abnegating 
agency and a reviewing court later to agree that the agency, in taking its earlier 
actions, had no such power to act in the first place, perhaps that limited rationale 
and reasoning would suffice. 
The very circumstance of such agreement is unlikely, however. After all, the 
agency would need to successfully claim, contrary to its own earlier fully 
explicated view, that only a single contrary reading of the law is tenable. 
Moreover, if the abnegation is in any way factually contingent, or is really a 
claim of past overreach in a particular application, it would be far from a power 
disavowal that might arguably excuse a lack of agency justification and lack of 
engagement with regulatory contingencies. A later agency claim of initial illegal 
excess is actually, at most, either a new slightly different read of the agency’s 
power, or a mere professing of past arbitrary and capricious action. Or, most 
likely, it would actually involve a Chevron Step Two interpretation proffering a 
new and (allegedly) better read and policy.  
If such statutory abnegation is actually rooted in such claims of agency excess 
or a new choice among several options, then the agency would still need to fully 
explain and justify itself. Such actions would involve an agency choice to change 
 
452 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512-13 (2007) (referencing EPA’s reliance on 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)). This sort of interpretive 
move under the “major questions” or “power” canon is sometimes characterized as a 
conclusion of no power under Chevron Step One, but in others as a setting that leads to “no 
power” or “no deference” conclusions, basically bypassing the Chevron framework 
altogether. See generally Heinzerling, supra note 80 (discussing what author calls “power 
canons”). 
453 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534 (holding that proffered reasons for lack of 
action by EPA were arbitrary and capricious). 
454 For discussion of Chevron and its implication for policy change, see supra notes 183-
197 and accompanying text. For additional discussion of the “major questions” or “power 
canon,” see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. 
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policy, not mere compliance with what statutorily must be. As stated in the major 
consistency doctrine cases, an agency choosing to change policy must provide 
“good reasons” for the change.455 Such policy changes would really not be 
driven by language, but by claims about what range of choices are legally 
allowed or best. 
And when one considers the “major questions” or “power” canon’s 
foundations and logic, even those possible rationales for abnegation would, upon 
closer examination, not logically excuse an agency’s lack of engagement with 
key contingencies and past reasoning. Much of that canon’s reasoning is based 
on claims that particular interpretive choices would result in massive regulatory 
consequences.456 If a new agency action is designed to mitigate claimed 
regulatory excess, then there too the apparent claim of “no power” might 
actually just involve a degree of agency forbearance or pullback. To draw that 
line between illegal excess or prudent self-limitation in asserting regulatory 
authority would logically, under the consistency cases, call for the agency and 
reviewing courts to engage fully in comparative analysis of statutorily relevant 
contingencies and regulatory consequences. Hence, a later complete disavowal 
of agency power to act is highly unlikely to thread this jurisprudential needle.  
Where the relevant statutory language mandates that an agency engage in 
some variant of “best” achievable analysis, an agency abnegation claim is 
especially unlikely to succeed.457 The nature of the statutory requirement creates 
substantial constraint.458 Undoubtedly, some judgment calls shape agency 
definition of the relevant category for comparison.459 But leapfrogging back to 
some claimed consistency with a distant “best” benchmarking while ignoring an 
intervening agency interpretation, justifications, reasoning, and regulatory 
effects would seem to flunk all of consistency doctrine’s requirements.460 An 
agency explaining what is “best” to achieve a statutory goal will, in a policy 
change setting, necessarily require comparative assessments. 
 
455 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016) (requiring “good 
reasons”). 
456 For discussion of this canon, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
457 Such statutory mandates and their data and science-intensive nature are presented and 
analyzed elsewhere in this Article. See supra notes 422-433 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra Section IV.D. 
459 Battles over the Clean Power Plan and consideration of capabilities “inside the 
fenceline,” as advocated by the Trump Administration, or of how power plants and their 
owners already achieve substantial GHG reductions through trading and other shifts that may 
physically occur off-site (the Obama Administration EPA view), involve just such questions 
about comparators under regulatory benchmarking. 
460 Early Clean Power Plan and Waters of the United States deregulatory actions never 
grappled with empirical and peer reviewed studies previously documented. By late 2018, 
following a series of judicial rejections of agency deregulatory actions, the EPA engaged in 
more substantial analysis. See supra Section I.E.5 (presenting such actions); Section II.H 
(discussing cases assessing actions); Section III.B (providing broader assessment of legality 
of these regulatory shifts). 
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Moreover, in major recent opinions, the Supreme Court has increasingly been 
emphasizing the need to read key language with attention to surrounding 
context.461 These cases also reflect a focus on the consequences of interpretive 
choices and whether they can be reconciled with all statutory signals about a 
statute’s meaning and stated purposes.462 The Court has castigated agencies for 
“interpretive gerrymanders,” where an agency strategically and unnecessarily 
refuses to consider all costs and benefits—also referred to as “advantages” and 
“disadvantages”—that result from a regulatory choice.463 An agency cannot 
keep “parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not.”464 
Recent scholarship investigating appellate judges’ interpretive practices reveals 
similar broad pluralistic and pragmatic inquiry, and little actual use of a purely 
textualist approach as espoused by Justice Scalia.465 Thus, both under 
consistency precedents and a related line of statutory interpretation opinions, for 
an agency to show deliberative integrity will require the following: the agency 
will have to engage with all salient language, the on-the-ground effects of 
choices permitted by the law’s relevant operative text, and surrounding 
contextual language and other clues as to permissible meanings. 
With the Clean Power Plan’s proposed abandonment or change under the 
Trump administration, for example, courts reviewing the agency’s actions will 
assess if the agency justified its proposed new fenceline-bound statutory reading 
according to the relevant emission standard, which requires identifying what is 
the: 1) best 2) system (not technology) of 3) emissions reduction that has 4) been 
adequately demonstrated.466 The linked language provides numerous levels of 
 
461 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (working with language 
from FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000), about attention 
to context, but looking more broadly at functionality and impacts); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439-49 (2014) (looking at context, structure, and impacts to 
conclude EPA lacked power to regulate small emitters despite literal language reaching them). 
462 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 133; 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2439-49.  
463 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-11 (2015) (rejecting EPA claim of no 
power also to consider costs associated with its regulation to reduce risks of mercury pollution 
from power plants). The dissent, written by Justice Kagan for herself and three other Justices, 
agreed with a general default rule that reasonable agency action requires consideration of costs 
unless precluded by the statute, but thought the EPA did so. Id. at 2716 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
Hence, the whole Court appears to have embraced this new substantive canon regarding 
consideration of both benefits and costs of agency actions, but the justices differ in its 
application. 
464 Id. at 2708 (majority opinion). 
465 Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey 
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1309-15 
(2018) (summarizing these findings). 
466 See Clean Air Act of 1963 §§ 111(a)(1), (d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), (d) (2012) 
(providing operative and definitional provisions underpinning CPP and guiding any policy 
change). 
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tethering, as do past EPA studies and reason-giving that discussed what is 
actually happening in the states, pollution control, and clean energy trends.467 So 
far, however, we do not know why the EPA thinks the “inside-the-fenceline” 
approach satisfies these criteria for setting of a performance standard, how it is 
“best” to reduce emissions, let alone “good reasons” for the change.468 
Regulatory materials so far leave “unexplained inconsistency” and minimal 
acknowledgement of changed views of “underlying facts.”469 
Under the very different Clean Water Act “waters of the United States” 
regulation, the statutory language is, viewed alone, both broad in its reach and 
quite indeterminate.470 But the 2015 Clean Water Rule was woven out of close 
attention to three decades of regulatory experience, three major Supreme Court 
decisions, the Connectivity Report’s survey of peer-reviewed science about 
waters, and the Clean Water Rule’s explanation for its line-drawing choices 
about what waters should be protected.471 They collectively created a substantial 
body of contingent analysis that under current consistency doctrine must be 
engaged with by the agency when revising policies. So far, however, the 
agencies that proposed these changes (the EPA and the Army Corps) have, 
through their divided steps and notice choices, in addition to limiting comment, 
substantially limited discussion of these issues. These shortcuts led to judicial 
rejection of the “Applicability Date” regulation due to the agencies’ failure to 
make policy changes in conformity with requirement of the Clean Water Act 
and APA.472 So far, in these various actions, the EPA and the Army Corps imply 
something illegal in the past approach. They also, in compliance with a 
presidential order, have proposed adopting Justice Scalia’s non-majority view 
of federal power. Until the 2018 Supplemental Notice, the agencies had avoided 
explanation for how these approaches would be permissible under the law and 
analysis of related effects.473 
Finding the correct answer to these particular policy shifts is beyond the scope 
of this Article, not least because the finality and legality of most of these actions 
and subsequent litigation will not be resolved for years. However, they reveal 
questionable self-constraining reads of statutory power to justify lack of 
 
467 Both 2015 and 2017 studies and agency actions will need to be engaged. See supra 
notes 133-143 and accompanying text. 
468 This series of actions is presented elsewhere in this Article. See supra notes 133-147 
and accompanying text. 
469 See supra notes 133-147 and accompanying text. 
470 See supra notes 113-132 and accompanying text. 
471 See supra notes 113-132 and accompanying text. 
472 See S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, No. 2:18-cv-00330, slip op. at 6-18 
(D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2018). 
473 The 2018 Supplemental Notice offers more in-depth discussion, but may still be based 
on a statutory interpretation that is illegal and only provides limited engagement with the 
relevant science and the effects of the old and likely new regulatory approaches. See supra 
notes 130-132 and accompanying text (citing and presenting action); supra notes 372-375 and 
accompanying text (discussing actions’ legality). 
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engagement with the heart of the statutory tasks, goals, and direct comparative 
assessment of regulatory effects of the old and new actions.  
If courts accept this new statutory abnegation strategy to achieve policy 
change—a new agency-proffered self-limiting statutory read, and minimal 
engagement with underlying facts and past reason-giving—then agencies would 
have broad newfound ability to sidestep the linked requirements of consistency 
doctrine and “reasoned decisionmaking” jurisprudence. Statutory abnegation, in 
particular, would become the new means to deregulate or achieve major policy 
changes. If accepted by reviewing courts, agencies could avoid discussion of on-
the-ground repercussions of the choice, their own past reason-giving, and also 
the agencies’ earlier explanations for why different, more broadly empowering 
reads were embraced. Courts would have to abandon a vast body of longstanding 
administrative law doctrine. 
Furthermore, such an embrace of this policy change strategy as legal would 
exacerbate Justice Gorsuch’s concerns—although he overstated them—with 
agency power to shift policy day-to-day, based on regulatory “whim.”474 Such a 
change would also undercut the values of stability and the judicially enforced 
norm that agency policymaking should be rigorous, offer publicly accessible and 
rational explanation, and be based on the best data and science.475 
Administrative law doctrine generally tries to hold in equipoise room for 
political responsiveness while also looking for expert, fact-based agency 
policymaking guided by congressional criteria. If such a shift in doctrine were 
permitted, it would decidedly skew agencies in a politicized direction and allow 
more rapid and unpredictable policy change. A focus on language and power 
disavowal could be used to avoid expertise-based analysis of choices and their 
effects. 
But consistency doctrine’s many facets make such doctrinal upheaval 
unlikely. To embrace such agency power to disavow power and thereby avoid 
justification obligations would involve at least the following major doctrinal 
adjustments. Chevron deference would be substantially expanded, with Step 
Two reasonableness oversight weakened. The whole line of “hard look review” 
and “reasoned decisionmaking” precedents would be substantially weakened 
and susceptible to strategic agency sidestepping of criticisms and engagement 
with data and past agency policy explanations. The still uncertain middle of 
consistency doctrine’s major cases—how much can a President’s or political 
appointees’ regulatory predilections shape an agency’s actions—would expand; 
agencies and presidents would have broadened latitude to follow their preference 
for laxity or stringency. Agency obligations to look both backwards and 
forwards to explain fully and frankly a policy shift would be weakened. The key 
 
474 See supra Section I.B (describing these views). 
475 Although many laws do not mandate reliance on such best available science or data, 
the rigor of “hard look review” and linked reasoned decisionmaking expectations will 
generally lead agencies in high stakes policymaking settings to rely on best available data to 
avoid later judicial rejection. 
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lessons of Massachusetts v. EPA and State Farm about fealty to statutory criteria 
over statutorily untethered political preferences would be subject to a new 
gaping exclusion. “Unexplained inconsistency,” which is now prohibited, would 
become common.476 Abrupt statutory interpretation shifts would become more 
frequent, and agencies could disregard more of their past work, others’ views, 
and facts. 
Even if judges assessing these deregulatory justifications shared a preference 
for less regulation, the long-term systemic costs of freeing agencies and 
presidents to make more abrupt and politically driven policy changes under the 
guise of power disavowals would—or should—give them pause. Such a 
doctrinal shift would create associated increases in discretionary agency power, 
heighten legal instability, and reduce political accountability to affected 
stakeholders. It would also undercut rule of law virtues like stability, 
predictability, and reasoned explanation by lawmakers.477 
For these reasons, jettisoning of consistency doctrine through embrace of this 
apparent new strategy of agency statutory abnegation is unlikely. It might work 
in the rare and unlikely setting of agency and court agreement that the agency 
never had any authority to act at all in a setting where it previously claimed 
power. But narrower and contingent forms of abnegation should not excuse full 
agency engagement with contingencies or allow agency bypassing of burdens of 
justification. Broader embrace of this strategy would destroy the stability-
responsiveness equipoise of current consistency doctrine. And several decades 
of case law governing agency consistency, as well as the first judicial opinions 
assessing the 2017 and 2018 deregulatory wave of actions, consistently hew to 
these longstanding requirements. 
CONCLUSION 
The law shaping agency power to change policy is built on a web of legal 
doctrine that shares common expectations and requirements. Contrary to recent 
claims of broad agency and presidential power to change policy with little 
constraint—claims that were stated with condemnation by now-Justice Gorsuch 
but embraced by administration agencies during the early years of the Trump 
Administration—policy change is subject to numerous hurdles. Agencies cannot 
run from underlying facts, contested issues, or past statutory interpretations and 
associated reasoning explaining past policy choices. Agencies must engage with 
these statutorily shaped contingencies. This body of doctrine tethers both 
presidents and agencies, but leaves substantial room for improved regulation and 
adjustment to new circumstances. If broad recent assertions about unfettered 
change power meet with success, that will likely mean a substantial change in 
 
476 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).  
477 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1947-55 (2018) (discussing “rule of law” values, consistency doctrine, 
and reliance interests in analysis of “morality” of administrative law as reflected in core 
modern doctrine and framed by jurisprudential writings). 
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the contours of consistency doctrine. Many of the current checks on agency 
lawlessness and arbitrariness would be weakened. The web of doctrines making 
up consistency law are well founded, however, and should endure, checking 
unjustified and unaccountable agency policy shifts. 
 
